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Summary
Community Networks (CNs) are naturally open and decentralized structures, that grow
organically with the addition of heterogeneous network devices, contributed and configured
as needed by their participants. The continuous growth in popularity and dissemination of
CNs in recent years has raised the perception of a mature and sustainable model for the
provisioning of networking services that does not depend on the investment and willingness
of profit-oriented traditional network service providers.
However, because such infrastructures include uncontrolled entities with non delimited
responsibilities, every single network entity does indeed represent a potential single-point of
failure that can stop the entire network from working, and that no other entity can prevent
or even circumvent. Given the open and decentralized nature of CNs, that brings together
individuals and organizations with different and even conflicting economic, political, and
technical interests, the achievement of no more than basic consensus on the correctness of
all network nodes is challenging. In such environment, the lack of self-determination for
CN participants in terms of control and security of routing can be regarded as an obstacle
for growth or even as a risk of collapse.
To address this problem we first consider deployments of existing Wireless Community
Networks (WCNs) and we analyze their technology, characteristics, and performance.
We start this investigation with the experimental evaluation of a production 802.11an
WCN, and compare to studies of other WCNs deployments in the literature. In an effort
to better assess the achievable and achieved path performance of existing deployments
and its underlying routing protocol, we compare experimentally obtained throughput
traces with path-capacity calculations based on well-known conflict graph models. We
observe that in the majority of cases the path chosen by the employed BMX6 routing
protocol corresponds with the best identified path in our model. We analyze monitoring
and interaction shortcomings of CNs and address these with Network Characterization
Tool (NCT), a novel tool that allows users to assess network state and performance, and
improve their quality of experience by individually modifying the routing parameters of their
devices. We also evaluate performance outcomes when different routing policies are in use.
Routing protocols provide self-management mechanisms that allow the continuous operation
of a Community Mesh Network (CMN) without requiring the users detailed technological
knowledge, permanent monitoring and eventual manual intervention that would be otherwise
be required. We focus on three widely used proactive mesh routing protocols and their
implementations: BMX6, OLSR, and Babel. We describe the core idea behind these
protocols and study the implications of these in terms of scalability, performance, and
stability by exposing them to typical but challenging network topologies and scenarios. We
evaluated the protocols experimentally using emulation, and the W-ILab.T testbed. That
provided us with a realistic wireless medium and respective measurements, especially in
terms of interference and CPU consumption. Our results show the relative merits, costs,
and limitations of the three protocols.
Built upon the studied characteristics of typical CN deployments, their requirements on
open and decentralized cooperation, and the potential controversy on the trustiness of
particular components of a network infrastructure, we propose and evaluate SEMTOR,
a novel routing-protocol that can satisfy these demands. SEMTOR allows the verifiable
and undeniable definition and distributed application of individually trusted topologies for
routing traffic towards each node. One unique advantage of SEMTOR is that it does not
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vrequire a global consensus on the trustiness of any node and thus preserves cooperation
among nodes with even oppositional defined trust specification. This gives each node
admin the freedom to individually define the subset, and the resulting sub-topology, from
the whole set of participating nodes that he considers sufficiently trustworthy to meet their
security, data-delivery objectives and concerns.
The proposed mechanisms have been realized as a usable and open-source implementa-
tion called BMX7, as successor of BMX6. We have evaluated its scalability, contributed
robustness, and security. Security achievements have been analyzed regarding the cor-
rectness of specified guarantees and the performance that our implementation achieves,
when encountering an attack of a wrongly trusted adversary, by propagating and applying
respectively-updated trust specifications. Scalability has been analyzed with respect to
network characteristics that are typical for existing network deployments such as size,
density, dynamics, and the limited processing capabilities of nodes, but also with respect to
new parameters such as the strength of crypto parameters or the frequency of reconfigured
trustiness. These results show that the usage of SEMTOR for securing trusted routing
topologies is feasible, even when executed on real and very cheap (10 Euro, Linux SoC)
routers as commonly used in CMNs.
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Resumen
Las Redes Comunitarias (CNs) son estructuras de naturaleza abierta y descentralizada,
que crecen orga´nicamente con la adicio´n de dispositivos de red heteroge´neos que aportan y
configuran sus participantes segu´n sea necesario. El crecimiento continuo en la popularidad
y difusio´n de las CNs en los u´ltimos an˜os ha ampliado la percepcio´n como un modelo
maduro y sostenible para la provisio´n de servicios de rede que no dependan de la inversio´n
y disposicio´n de proveedores comerciales de servicios de red tradicionales.
Sin embargo, debido a que estas infraestructuras incluyen entidades con responsabilidades
poco delimitadas, cada entidad en la red puede representar un punto de fallo que puede
impedir que la red funcione y que ninguna otra entidad pueda prevenir o eludir. Dada la
naturaleza abierta y descentralizada de las CNs, que agrupa individuos y organizaciones con
diferentes e incluso contrapuestos intereses econo´micos, pol´ıticos y te´cnicos, conseguir poco
ma´s que un consenso ba´sico sobre los nodos correctos en la red puede ser un reto. En este
entorno, la falta de autodeterminacio´n para los participantes de una CN en cuanto a control
y seguridad del encaminamiento puede considerarse un obsta´culo para el crecimiento o
incluso un riesgo de colapso.
Para abordar este problema consideramos primero las implementaciones de redes comu-
nitarias inala´mbricas (WCN) y se analiza su tecnolog´ıa, caracter´ısticas y desempen˜o.
Comenzamos esta investigacio´n con la evaluacio´n experimental de una WCN 802.11an
establecida y se compara con estudios de otros despliegues similares en la literatura. Para
evaluar mejor el rendimiento alcanzable y alcanzado por las implementaciones existentes y
el protocolo de encaminamiento utilizado, comparamos las trazas de rendimiento experi-
mentales con ca´lculos de la capacidad de los caminos basados en modelos bien conocidos
del grafo. Se observa que en la mayor´ıa de los casos el camino elegido por el protocolo de
encaminamiento BMX6 corresponde con el mejor camino identificado en nuestro modelo.
Analizamos las limitaciones de monitorizacio´n e interaccio´n en CNs y los tratamos con
NCT, una nueva herramienta que permite a los usuarios evaluar el estado y rendimiento de
la red, y mejorar la calidad de experiencia modificando los para´metros de sus dispositivos
individuales. Tambie´n evaluamos el rendimiento resultante para diferentes pol´ıticas de
encaminamiento.
Los protocolos de encaminamiento proporcionan mecanismos de autogestio´n que hacen
posible el funcionamiento continuo de una red comunitaria “mesh” (CMN) sin obligar a sus
usuarios a tener un conocimiento tecnolo´gico detallado, hacer un seguimiento permanente y
las eventuales intervenciones manuales que de otro modo ser´ıan necesarias. Nos centramos
en tres protocolos de encaminamiento proactivos para redes “mesh” ampliamente utilizados
y sus implementaciones: BMX6, OLSR y Babel. Se describe la idea central de estos
protocolos y se estudian la implicaciones de e´stos en te´rminos de escalabilidad, rendimiento
y estabilidad al exponerlos a topolog´ıas y escenarios de red t´ıpicos pero exigentes. Los
protocolos se evalu´an de forma experimental en una red emulada y con la red experimental
W-ILab.T. Esto ha proporcionado un entorno inala´mbrico realista, as´ı como las mediciones
correspondientes, especialmente en te´rminos de interferencia y consumo de CPU. Nuestros
resultados muestran los me´ritos, costes y limitaciones de los tres protocolos.
A partir de las caracter´ısticas analizadas en despliegues t´ıpicos de redes comunitarias,
y de las necesidades en cuanto a cooperacio´n abierta y descentralizada, y la esperable
divergencia sobre la confiabilidad en ciertos componentes de la infraestructura de red,
proponemos y evaluamos SEMTOR, un nuevo protocolo de encaminamiento que puede
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satisfacer estas necesidades. SEMTOR permite definir de forma verificable e innegable, as´ı
como aplicar de forma distribuida, topolog´ıas de confianza individualizadas para encaminar
tra´fico hacia cada nodo. Una ventaja u´nica de SEMTOR es que no precisa de consenso
global sobre la confianza en cualquier nodo y por tanto preserva la cooperacio´n entre los
nodos, incluso con especificaciones de confianza definidas por oposicio´n. Esto proporciona
a cada administrador de nodo la libertad para definir el subconjunto, y la sub-topolog´ıa
resultante, entre el conjunto de todos los nodos participantes que considere dignos de
suficiente confianza para cumplir con su objetivo y criterio de seguridad y entrega de datos.
Los mecanismos propuestos se han realizado en forma de una implementacio´n utilizable de
co´digo abierto llamada BMX7, como sucesor de BMX6. Se ha evaluado su escalabilidad,
as´ı como la robustez y seguridad que aporta. Se han analizado los logros en seguridad en
cuanto a la correccio´n en las garant´ıas especificadas y el rendimiento que consigue nuestra
implementacio´n frente a un ataque de un adversario erro´neamente considerado de confianza,
al propagar y aplicar las especificaciones de confianza actualizadas. Se ha analizado la
escalabilidad con respecto a las caracter´ısticas de red t´ıpicas en implementaciones de
red existentes, en cuanto a taman˜o, densidad, dinamismo, capacidades de procesamiento
limitado en los nodos, as´ı como respecto a nuevos para´metros tales como fortaleza de los
para´metros criptograficos o frecuencia de reconfiguracio´n de la confianza. Estos resultados
demuestran que el uso de SEMTOR para asegurar topolog´ıas de encaminamiento de
confianza es factible, incluso cuando se ejecuta en routers reales y muy baratos (10 Euro,
Linux SoC), utilizados de forma habitual en redes comunitarias inala´mbricas.
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Introduction
Computer networks have become a vital line of today’s society and provide the key enabler
for many omnipresent tools such as the Internet and all the various applications built on it.
Unfortunately, yet only a fraction of the world’s population has adequate digital access.
This includes not only the majority of third-world countries but, looking at regional scale,
also many rural areas in industrial countries such as Germany or Spain, where the lack of
profit prospects discourages Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to invest in the infrastructure
needed to meet even the basic requirements.
To overcome this divide, and stimulated by the continuously increasing pressure for digital
access plus the popularity and availability of inexpensive IP-network and licence-free
WIFI equipment, inhabitants and organizations of disconnected areas have joined efforts
and started creating their own networks. The so called WCNs have experienced an
exponential growth in recent years, causing the arise of network infrastructures covering
thousands of square kilometres and interconnecting tenths of thousands of nodes [19]. Due
to their unplanned evolution, they are naturally open and decentralized structures, growing
organically with the addition of heterogeneous network devices that are contributed and
configured as needed by individual participants.
Technically, like in any IP-based network, the abstraction from topology-detection, routing,
and forwarding related tasks results in a transparent end-to-end connectivity service
for distributed application processes that is provided by the network layer. This layer,
although distributed and relying on cooperation by nature, is not necessary decentralized or
guaranteeing the proper functioning of its entities. That, combined with a routing algorithm
that determines routes based on link parameters, restrict the freedom of community users
to express preference or avoid certain nodes in paths.
In the traditional case, where Internet backbone and last-mile networks are maintained by
large and profit-oriented ISPs, centrality and single-point of failures concentrate in higher
hierarchical layers of the involved organizations, which, following a clear customer-relation
model and interest for providing the promised quality of service, can relatively easily set
up responsibilities and measures to prevent, or at least react on, outages.
However, in the case of open CN, where the network infrastructure is, by design, composed
also of uncontrolled entities with unclear responsibilities, every single network entity
1
2represents a single-point of failure that can prevent the entire network from working and
that no other entity can avoid or even circumvent.
With the objective to narrow down the wide scope addressed by the title of this thesis into
a concrete, relevant, and practical scenario we decided to apply its key subjects to the case
of community networks and formulate the following overall research question:
How to cooperate decentralized, efficiently and reliably on the collaborative provisioning of
routing services in open and heterogeneous community networks?
In the following, the basic components related with this question, being the case of CNs in
general, the routing protocols which provide the core function of the underlying network
layer, and the aspect of decentralization and robustness of this layer, are elaborated in
more detail.
1.1 Background
The context of this research is crowdsourced computer networks: network infrastructures
built by citizens and organizations who pool their resources and coordinate their efforts [20].
The goal of most of these networks is to provide non-discriminatory and open access to the
shared network and be open for the participation of any member of the community in the
governance of the network. Therefore we first define what is a community network. One
of the popular technological choices in CNs, especially in urban areas, is wireless mesh
networks. Therefore we look at the characteristics and requirements of such networks and
the used mesh routing protocols. Finally, we focus on the limitations of current mesh
routing protocols in handling decentralization and resilience, as these protocols assume
that all routing processes in nodes operate correctly and nodes and their users have no
influence in the choice of paths of forwarding nodes.
1.1.1 Community Networks
CNs [21–24] are supposedly open and decentralized structures, growing and evolving
organically as network infrastructure is contributed, deployed, and configured by individual
participants.
The operation of such networks is based on the principle of cooperation among its members.
These communities usually have participation rules as a membership license or peering
agreement [19, 25, 26], that define their freedom, openness and neutrality.
However, for cost reasons and due to the open participation rules, infrastructure con-
tributions often consist of inexpensive wireless routers [23] with usually limited storage,
bandwidth, and computation capabilities that can be mounted at low cost on rooftops or
even isolated rural locations powered by solar energy. Links, manually or automatically
established between neighboring nodes, then create a restricted-route network without
universal direct connectivity between all mesh nodes [27, 28] and with very heterogeneous
and dynamic characteristics. In addition, because of potential poor hardware quality,
neglected maintenance, or remote location, they may be technically impaired or even
tampered by an adversary to launch an attack from inside the network.
3Typically, the deployment of such networks, such as Guifi.net [24] with more than 30,000
total active nodes, is structured in clouds, groups consisting of up to hundreds of nodes,
that constitute an Autonomous System (AS), operate its cloud-specific internal routing
protocol (e.g. OSPF, OLSR), and peer with neighboring clouds via an exterior gateway
protocol such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Many CNs also integrate into the global
Internet as one or serveral Internet ASs. Then exterior gateway protocols are typically
used on two levels. On a global level to exchange routing information between the CN
AS and other Internet ASs. And inside the CN, on a macroscopic level, to interconnect
different CN clouds that, on a microscopic level, operate internal routing protocols for
routing within the cloud.
CNs make technology choices and combine them to build, expand, and maintain their
networks. Therefore, we have to decouple the overall concept of community networks from
a particular technology choice or combination. The integration of wireless equipment is
a common choice for the facility of deployment, therefore we can find the term Wireless
Community Network (WCN) to refer to that choice and the challenges related with wireless
channel characteristics. However, also WCN do not restrict itself to rely only on wireless
links as CN often also integrate optical fiber and optical wireless links in their networks.
Further, networks can be build based on dedicated and manually configured point-to-
point links between nodes or with nodes that autonomously detect and interact with all
other nodes that are in communication range of each other. This latter, so called mesh
topology, typical preferred for CN clouds in urban areas, is referred to as Community Mesh
Network (CMN), The combination of both is referred as Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs).
Other times the focus is on the changing conditions (mobility) of nodes plus the self-
configuration (mesh) capabilities in the network, and the term used is Mobile Ad-hoc
NETwork (MANET).
1.1.2 Mesh Routing Protocols
Among the basic network-layer functions of neighbor discovery, routing, and forwarding,
the second can be regarded as the most critical and challenging. This is because in contrast
to the first, the routing shall coordinate decisions beyond the local neighborhood and
is responsible for the distributed establishment of consistent end-to-end paths between
nodes. On the other hand, the forwarding function can then already rely on the local
availability of rules (established by the routing function) and only needs to forward each
incoming packet respectively towards its destination. In addition, and especially in the case
of organically growing CNs that include links with dynamically changing characteristics
and potentially several hops along the path from the source to the destination, a number
of further characteristics are desired:
• Compatibility and smooth integration with existing IP networks such as the Internet.
Therefore IP compatible addresses are desired and the inter operation with traditional
routing protocols must be supported.
• Provisioning of connectivity quality similar to that experienced from traditional ISPs.
Therefore instant route availability as provided by proactive routing protocols should
be supported. In contrast to this, reactive routing protocols do not start discovering
routes before they are actually needed.
4• Support for autonomous neighbor discovery and flat (virtually random) addressing
schemes is important to consider new nodes, links, and paths without manual
interaction and avoid the need to coordinate address allocations with the topological
or physical location of a node.
• Self-healing and optimizing capabilities to continuously adapt and optimize routing
decisions to link outages and changes.
• Support the topological characteristics of CN deployments such as the order of
expected links and nodes.
• Meet resource constraints of community participants. For example, the processing
requirements of a protocol should not exceed the computation capabilities of inex-
pensive wireless equipment that stimulated the emergence of these networks in the
first place.
• Satisfy ethical and usability requirements of network communities. For example, to
increase transparency and control, an actively maintained and open-source protocol
implementation that smoothly integrates with OS distributions typically used for
low-cost routing hardware might be favored.
1.1.3 Network Layer Decentralization and Resilience
The previous introduction to mesh routing protocols actually assumed only correctly
operating routing processes. However, in an open network, where impaired or even
malicious nodes can be added at any time, this is not necessarily the case.
Thinking further, in an open and decentralized CN that brings together individuals and
organizations with different and even conflicting economic, political, and technical interests
[21, 29, 30] the achievement of no more than basic consensus on the (in-)correctness of all
existing nodes is at least hard. This could go as far that some users may insist to disapprove
particular nodes because of suspected passive traffic inspection while other less-critical
users heavily rely on exactly these. Thus, openness and decentralization is expected to
enrich controversy while full consensus may only be given among certain subsets of the
overall user group.
In summary, although the community may be united by the common ideal to share
networking resources such as routing hardware and links, different interests may hinder
the cooperation among them and raise the risk of exclusion and partitioning, affecting the
resilience of the network.
1.2 Problem Statement
The continuously, if not exponentially, growth of popularity and dissemination of CN
in recent years has raised the perception of a mature and sustainable concept for the
provisioning of fast networking services that do not depend on the investment and willingness
of profit-oriented traditional ISPs.
In fact, the growth rate in a CN reflects the diverse issues that appear over time. Figure 1.1
shows the example of the Guifi.net CN, where the monthly growth rate peaked in 2013 due
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Figure 1.1: Rate of monthly growth in number of nodes for the Guifi.net CN
(Source: http://guifi.net/guifi/menu/stats/nodes)
to diverse reasons that, as discussed with and among the community, are mainly seen in
scalability issues with the management of the network and the governance of the community
due to its growing size and diversity in aspects such as topology (point-to-point vs. mesh),
diversity of technologies (wireless vs. optical), attitudes (active, passive, opportunistic, or
even abusive participants), or levels of participation (active vs. silent participants).
In such environment, the lack of self-determination for CN participants in terms of control
and security, can be regarded as a potential obstacle for their further growth or even as a
risk for their eventual collapse.
With the objective to target this problem, the general research question of how to cooperate
decentralized, efficiently and reliably on the collaborative provisioning of routing services
in open and heterogeneous community networks, can be decomposed into one major and
one necessary research question and several respective aspects to be considered.
The major question, is formulated as Research Question B (RQB):
How to increase the user freedom in terms of self-determination and security while preserving
openness, decentralization, and cooperation and satisfying the constraints imposed by
nowadays existing CN ?
We look for solutions to this question that respect the technologies prevailing in nowadays
CN deployments and facilitate a smooth integration into the concept and architecture of
such networks. For that reason, we consider pragmatic and obvious constraints, together
with advanced constraints that demand further clarification.
6Regarding the obvious constraints, the following further assumptions and consequential
restrictions were imposed:
• IP-based routing is the most widely accepted standard for the provisioning of
networking-layer services in computer networks in general and also for CNs. Adoption
of the IP-protocol architecture and its respective APIs facilitates easy integration in
a wide range of already existing network environments, Operating Systems (OSs),
and tool chains.
• CN clouds represent the lowest organizational level for networking within a (potentially
larger) CN deployment where the overall network is structured in different clouds, each
constituting an AS that interconnect with others via an exterior gateway protocols
such as BGP.
• Topology independent (flat) addressing and autonomous neighbor and topology
detection to support organic evolution and growth of CN clouds. As a consequence
we concentrate on approaches suitable for mesh network clouds. In the following, the
term mesh network will be used synonymously for MANET (a term that is often
used in the literature to characterize unplanned and dynamic wireless networks) and
the term CMN for a CN cloud.
• Proactive route establishment, healing, and optimization support to reflect the
end-to-end connection latencies known from traditional ISPs.
The development of practical solutions for RQB in this work takes place under the constrains
just defined: within the scope of mesh network deployments, and focusing on the routing
protocols. In this scope, the mesh topology typically provides alternative links to nodes,
and the routing protocol has the choice to select the forwarding paths across network
nodes. Therefore, to understand the characteristics and challenges faced, a second research
question is formulated within this scope as Research Question A (RQA):
What are the constraints in terms of properties, requirements, and accepted limitations of
existing mesh-network deployments and its used routing protocols?
Aiming for solutions that do not burden the community with structural or conceptual
changes, new expenditures or drawbacks in the experienced service quality, the following
aspects of advanced constraints shall be assessed and satisfied respectively:
• Topology: Current and forthcoming topological properties, such as the number of
nodes (size), the average and maximum number of interfaces and links per node
(density), the frequency and impacts of changes such as the emergence of new nodes
and links (dynamics), and the diversity of these components, which may range
from unstable and failure-prone devices or links (e.g. wireless) to dedicated and
high-performance equipment.
• Openness: Participation should not be hindered by the enforcement of controver-
sial policies. Therefore solutions should be technologically neutral, not depend on
any central component, and provide user-centric configuration flexibility without
disturbing the distributed collaboration of components controlled by different users.
• Performance: Convergence, and route optimization capabilities should not degrade.
Convergence describes how quickly the routing can adapt to and heal from topological
7changes such as link or node outages or the emergence of new links or nodes. Path
optimization describes how well a selected route reflects the best possible selection of
existing end-to-end paths and how quickly this can be achieved.
• Resources: The imposed processing and communication overhead in terms of memory,
CPU usage, transmitted protocol data, should range in the order of what currently
existing solutions consume and should meet with the available resources provided
by even the weakest components of the overall cloud infrastructure to which these
requirements apply. For example if a potential solution implies cryptographic calcu-
lations that must be performed by all nodes then it should be ensured either that
nodes not being able to satisfy this are so exceptional that they can be replaced with
little effort or that such operations are sufficiently lightweight that even the weakest
nodes can perform them.
Coming back to the previously formulated research questions, the problem addressed by
RQA is to assess and if possible quantify the above summarized aspects based on the
evaluation of protocols and deployments used in the scope of community networks with
mesh topology, which implies wireless links (WCNs. The challenge addressed by RQB is
then to develop solutions in the selected scope that mitigate the lack of control and security
and validate that previously assessed constraints can still be satisfied.
1.3 Contributions
Characteristics and Performance of Wireless Community Mesh Network De-
ployments: We consider deployments of existing WCNs and analyze their technology,
motivations, and achievements. As a first step we focus on characteristics of WCNs such as
network topological structure, usage, and evolution. Therefore we perform an experimental
evaluation (in Section 2.1) of a production 802.11an WCN deployed by a local community
in a quarter of the city of Barcelona that is connected with a testbed at Universitat
Polite`cnica de Catalunya (UPC) and compare this with deployment studies of other WCNs
found in the literature.
One of the main metrics of CN users for valuing their expenditures into CN infrastructure
is given by the experienced end-to-end throughput between two nodes of the network
(typically the users own and his most favored gateway node). Such performance measure
is directly related to the path metric responsible for optimizing end-to-end routing based
on the availability of existing infrastructure components. In an effort to better assess
the achievable and achieved path performance of existing deployments and its underlying
routing protocol, we compare in Section 2.2 the experimentally obtained throughput traces
with path-capacity calculations based on a well-known conflict graph model. We observe
that in the majority of cases the path, chosen by the employed BatMan-eXperimental version
6 (BMX6) routing protocol, corresponds with the best identified path from our model.
In Section 2.3 we analyze monitoring and interaction shortcomings of CN and address these
with a novel tool called NCT that allows users to assess network state and performance
and improve their quality of experience by individually modifying their devices’ routing
parameters. We evaluate performance outcomes when different routing policies are in use
with a set of experiments using the NCT in a real-life CMN built with the open-source
router system Quick Mesh Project (qMp) and the BMX6 routing protocol.
8The results related to this contribution are presented in Chapter 2 and were originally
reported in [2, 3, 5, 6].
Evaluation of Mesh Routing Protocols: Routing protocols provide the self-management
mechanisms that allow the continuous operation of CMN without imposing the detailed
technological knowledge, permanent monitoring and respective manual intervention that
would be otherwise be required.
In Chapter 3 we focus on the mechanisms of three widely used, proactive, mesh routing
protocols and their implementations: BMX6, OLSR, and Babel. We describe the core idea
behind each of these protocols and study the implications of these in terms of scalability,
performance, and stability by exposing them to typical but challenging network topologies
and scenarios. Two different evaluation approaches were used: emulation, that provides
comprehensive high-level control and repeatability, and allows to easily apply topological
characteristics obtained from real-world deployments; and the W-ILab.T testbed at iMinds,
that provided us with a realistic wireless medium and respective measurements, especially
in terms of interference and CPU consumption. Our results show the relative merits, costs,
and limitations of the three protocols.
The results related to this contribution are presented in Chapter 3 and were originally
reported in [1, 7, 8].
Individually Entrusted Routing: Building upon the studied characteristics of typical
CN deployments, their requirements on open and decentralized cooperation, and the
expected controversy on the trustiness of particular components of an overall network
infrastructure, we propose and evaluate a novel routing-protocol called SEMTOR that can
satisfy these demands.
SEMTOR allows the verifiable and undeniable definition and distributed application of
individually trusted topologies for routing traffic towards each node. One unique advantage
of SEMTOR is that it does not require a global consensus on the trustiness of any node and
thus conserves cooperation among nodes with even oppositional defined trust specification.
This gives each node admin the freedom to individually define the subset (and resulting
sub topology) from the whole set of participating nodes that he considers sufficiently
trustworthy to meet his security and data-delivery objectives and concerns.
The proposed mechanisms have been realized as an usable and open-source implementation
called BMX7 (as the successor of the BMX6) and evaluated for their scalability and
contributed robustness and security. Security achievements have been analyzed regarding
the correctness of specified guarantees and the observed performance with which our imple-
mentation achieves to encounter an attack of a wrongly trusted adversary by propagating
and applying respectively-updated trust specifications. Scalability has been analyzed
with respect to network characteristics that are typical for existing WMN deployments
such as size, density, and dynamics, and limited processing capabilities of nodes, but also
with respect to new parameters, such as the strength of crypto parameters used or the
frequency of reconfigured trustiness. These results also show that the usage of asymmetric
cryptography for securing trusted routing-topologies is possible, even when executed on
real and very cheap (10 Euro, Linux SoC) embedded routers as commonly used in CMN.
9Figure 1.2: Research guidelines
The results related to this contribution are presented in Chapter 4 and were originally
reported in [4, 9, 10].
1.3.0.1 Integrations in Community Projects
• The Network monitoring tool developed during the work on Section 2.1 is available
as open source and actively used by several qMp based CMNs in Barcelona. Their
current status can be queried online at http://tomir.ac.upc.edu/qmpmon
• NCT from Section 2.3 integrated in experimental branch of qMp[31].
• Capacity aware routing metric based on path-capacity model from Section 2.2
integrated as default metric algorithm in BMX7.
• SEMTOR protocol from Chapter 4 integrated in BMX7.
• BMX7 integrated in Lede/OpenWrt [32] routing packages, Libremesh[33] and qMp[31]
CN distributions, and current Battlemesh [34] experimentation repositories.
1.4 Methodology
With the objective to answer the two main research questions, we followed an iterative and
experimentation driven approach that includes four main phases, being the analysis, design,
evaluation, and discussion phase. An overview of the this work flow is given in Figure 1.2
and described together with considered data sources, design and experimentation guidelines
in the following.
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1.4.1 Analysis
To understand the state-of-the art on the research topics addressed by this PhD we
combined the study of related work with opportunities and resources from the field that
go in the classical literature and of which the most relevant shall be briefly summarized:
• Our close interaction and collaboration with existing network communities such as
qMp [31, 35], Guifi.net [36] and Freifunk [37] and our active participation in related
community events such as the annual Wireless Battlemesh Conference [34] provided
valuable insights and awareness for the prevailing approaches and most bothering
challenges from the field, yielding continuous feedback on the findings that we could
achieve.
• The mutual trust established with the communities allowed us to get full access to
several productively used CN deployments and enabled us to perform experiments,
and even test some of our solutions, in real environments.
• Publicly available CN meta-data, such as the Community Network Mark Up Language
(CNML), that describes status, or the topology of existing CN deployments, has been
used to understand the structure of these networks and to feed experiments with
representative configurations.
The collected knowledge helped to substantiate the addressed scope and draft the assump-
tions, restrictions, and challenges to be considered. Selected aspects of this study are
analyzed more comprehensively by experimenting with real, and if necessary emulated,
systems to understand their characteristics and benefits. Relevant findings obtained during
this phase are discussed with the research as well as the networking community which we
are considering as our main target group. The resulting feedback eventually stimulated
further input and iterations and helped us to define and refine the objectives of our work.
1.4.2 Development
During the design and development phase, the knowledge gained from the analysis was used
for the development of ideas towards possible approaches to the problem which were then
studied regarding their applicability and adaptability on the case of community networks.
The design of concepts and mechanisms was addressed iteratively through modeling and
refinement. Intermediate results from this approach were checked for feasibility and
consistency with the overall architecture. Consequential implications have been estimated
based on practical and theoretical consideration and refined or discarded respectively. Once
having reached a convenient stage, proposed mechanisms were implemented exploiting
prior work as much as possible, for example by extending the functionality of existing
routing protocol implementations.
Here, the familiarity with open-source routing systems in general and the implementations
of routing protocols in particular, especially our own involvement in the development
of the BATMAN and BMX6 [38] routing-protocols, facilitated the opting for pragmatic
approaches and the effective alignment of ideas with feasibility and usability considerations.
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1.4.3 Evaluation
The evaluation and validation of our work has accompanied the development process with
the objective to provide continuous and experimentation-based feedback on the validity
and performance of the proposed solutions.
To allow for a relatively fast feedback cycle, an emulation based evaluation approach has
been followed. In addition to the observation of our prototype solution under selected and
well controllable scenarios, as would be provided also by simulation (including measuring
the consequences from its exposure to relatively large virtual deployments), this allowed us
the possibility for a later direct reuse of our implementation for real-world experiments.
The network emulation tool Mesh Linux Containers (MLC) [39], enabled us the creation of
such virtual experimentation scenarios with hundreds of nodes and links while providing
an environment that is almost fully consistent with the Linux firmware systems employed
by today’s open-source router projects.
Having refined the proposed solution with the knowledge gained via emulation, an enhanced
implementation has been tested against physical testbeds. Therefore, laboratory testbeds
(such as the W-ILab.T testbed at iMinds), community testbeds integrated in real-world
deployments (as given by the CONFINE [40] project), or temporary deployed testbeds
(as given by the annual Battlemesh [34] conference or the Wibed [14] system deployed
at UPC) have been used. The exploitation of such infrastructures did not only facilitate
the further optimization of the proposed solution and hardening of its implementation
but also yielded discussion with community network activists and the research community.
Contacts and confidence gained during these and related opportunities have been used for
the dissemination of our contributions. Eventually, existing community-network groups
could have been convinced to consider and integrate our achievements which provided
further feedback on the quality of experience, usability, and performance from the user’s
perspective.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
Our efforts to answer the question given by RQA and its related aspects are described
in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Here the aspects of topology, performance, and openness
are in the focus of Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 respectively while Chapter 3 then builds on
our topological findings and focuses primarily on the aspects of performance and resource
consumption from a routing-protocol point of view.
In Chapter 4 we address RQB by proposing and validating routing-protocol mechanisms
that enhance the self-determination and security of CN users. Here our design, validation
and evaluation is driven by the constraints identified in Chapters 2 and 3.
Existing technologies and work from the literature, that address findings and solutions
related to the issues we have introduced and worked on, are discussed throughout the
Chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 5 concludes and summarizes the findings of this thesis and draws future directions
that deserve further work.

Chapter 2
Evaluation of Community Network
Deployments
In this chapter we focus on the evaluation of constraints and properties of existing CN
deployments.
We start in Section 2.1 with the experimental evaluation of a production 802.11an Wireless
Community Network (WCN), deployed by a local community in a quarter of the city of
Barcelona that is connected with a testbed at the Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya
(UPC), and compare our findings with deployment studies of other commercial and non-
commercial wireless networks found in the literature.
In Section 2.2 we complement these studies by investigating the achievable and achieved
path performance of this deployment and its underlying routing protocol. Therefore, we
compare throughput traces obtained experimentally with path-capacity calculations based
on a well-known conflict graph model. We observe that in the majority of cases the path,
chosen by the employed BMX6 routing protocol, corresponds with the best identified path
from our model.
We discuss in Section 2.3 about monitoring and interaction shortcomings of CN. For that,
we describe the development, integration, and usage of a tool that allows users to assess
topology and performance characteristics of their network and improve their quality of
experience by interacting with parameters of their used routing-protocol.
2.1 Experimental Case Study and Comparison
Community networks are deployed and maintained by their own users. Unlike the model
used by the traditional telecommunication companies (which are business-focused), each
user is owner of a part of the total infrastructure which builds the mesh network. Using an
organization system (i.e. web site) they are able to understand each other and connect
with neighbors, neighbors of neighbors and so on. These networks are normally open and
free. Most of them use WiFi technology because it is the easiest and cheapest way to
deploy an outdoor network.
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A relevant example is Guifi.net [26, 36, 41, 42], the largest currently existing community
network, having more than 30, 000 operational nodes. Guifi.net has been deployed in urban
and rural areas of Spain (mostly Catalonia). Probably one of the main reasons of Guifi.net’s
success is the fact that it operates as an umbrella for many other small communities. Each
community uses its own kind of hardware, software and organization methods (meetings,
mailing lists, etc.). But all of them share probably the most important part of the Guifi.net
community, the web page. It is used mainly to distribute the IPs and federate the small
networks using a common system.
Guifi.net has become a rather complex and heterogeneous network, merging wired and
wireless links. Most of Guifi.net’s infrastructure is wireless and the OSPF and BGP routing
protocols predominate in the network.
Inside of Guifi.net the Quick Mesh Project (QMP) [31], an OpenWRT [32] distribution, is
being developed using BMX6 as routing protocol [1]. This distribution has been adopted
by one of the network communities which operate under the Guifi.net umbrella in the
quarter of Sants in Barcelona, Spain. For the sake of brevity we shall refer to the quarter of
Sants simply as Sants in the rest of the paper. Additionally, the EU CONFINE project [43]
deployed a research testbed at Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya (UPC) using QMP.
The CONFINE testbed has been linked to Sants, creating a network referred to as QMPSU
(from Quick Mesh Project at Sants + UPC) and as illustrated in figure 2.11. The QMPSU
network model is expanding among other districts of Barcelona. It grows very fast and
other Guifi.net groups in the city have become interested, and started the migration.
In this chapter we present an experimental evaluation of QMPSU and later compare it
with other existing community networks. To do so, live measurements have been taken
hourly over the last 5 months. We use this data to analyze main aspects of QMPSU.
These include topology, usage and network performance and characterization. To our best
knowledge, this is the first academic work where a production community wireless network
using 802.11an is analyzed.
The rest of section 2.1 is organized as follows: More details about QMP project and
QMPSU are given in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2. The measurements methodology is explained
in section 2.1.3, followed by the analysis of the topology, Internet access and Usage in
sections 2.1.4, 2.1.5 and 2.1.6. Then, wireless links are characterized in section 2.1.7.
Related work is discussed in section 2.1.8 together with a comparison in section 2.1.9
highlighting differences between the QMPSU and other existing networks. Some concluding
remarks are given in section 2.1.10.
2.1.1 Quick Mesh Project
QMP [31] is an operating system for embedded network devices based on OpenWRT/Linux.
It was started by some Guifi.net activists in 2011 with the objective to provide a fully
open-source solution to easily and quickly deploy a mesh network and share Internet uplinks
between it’s users.
As main routing protocol QMP uses BMX6 [1], a destination-sequenced distance-vector
protocol using UDP messages to discover other nodes and disseminate node and routing
information. Some extra features have been specially developed for QMP, such as a
1QMPSU web site: http://Guifisants.net.
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smart gateway selection using IPIP tunnels or a short message plugin which permits to
send arbitrary information to other nodes, piggybacked by the protocol packages. BMX6
obtained very good results compared with other mesh routing protocols tested in various
Wireless Battle Mesh iterations such as v6 in Aalborg (Denmark) 2013 and v7 in Leipzig
(Germany) in 2014.2 Other important characteristics of QMP are the native IPv6 and full
auto-configuration support. Each node auto-configures its own IPv6 address based on a
ULA3 prefix. IPv4 connections are enabled via tunnels over the ULA-based IPv6 network.
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Figure 2.1: QMPSU network. Two main gateways are
underlined.
Figure 2.2: Supernode.
Figure 2.3: QMPSU network web page.
2.1.2 QMPSU Architecture
QMPSU is a wireless, 802.11-based, mulit-hop, semi-static, and productively used mesh
network where (topologically) all nodes provide the same routing functionality for relaying
other node’s traffic. Most of the network users only have the mesh network for reaching the
Internet, so they depend on the community. In consequence, stability and good performance
of the network are mandatory points. QMPSU is not a pure MANET network, it is being
2Experiments description and raw measurements data online at http://battlemesh.org/BattleMeshV6/
ActualTests, http://battlemesh.org/BattleMeshV7/Tests, and https://github.com/axn/wbm2pdf/
tree/wbmv7
3RFC4193 Unique Local Address
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deployed following a model named by the participants: SmartMesh. The concept tries to
explain a model placed between the complete unmanaged model used in many of the known
Mesh/MANET networks and the complete organized model used in the AP/Infrastructure
networks. The main points which define the SmartMesh deployment idea are:
• Use patch antennas with < 90◦ as main equipment in AD-HOC mode.
• Use parabolic antennas (< 6◦) for long shots (point-to-point links).
• Use two or more devices for some strategic locations (super-nodes).
• Use different channels to multiplex the spectrum (super-nodes make the interconnec-
tion).
• Use only 802.11an to reduce the noise and interference (spectrum space is bigger
than 802.11bgn).
• Use only stable links and devices placed in the outdoor (roof or balcony).
These requirements imply the inconvenience of planning in advance the deployments
and links and requires to manually orientate antennas during the installation. But it
has the advantage of reduced interference (one of the biggest problems in ISM-spectrum
based networks) and fewer neighboring nodes but with better links. Following this model,
reasonable end-to-end performance could be achieved even over 7 ore more hops.
The most common hardware used in QMPSU is NanoStation M54, which has the following
characteristics: Antenna 5GHz 16dBi, Processor Atheros MIPS 400MHz, Flash Memory
8MB, SDRAM Memory 32MB, two Ethernet ports 10/100, Radio Atheros 9k 802.11AN
MiMo 2T2R. For point-to-point long shots the typically used hardware is NanoBridge M55,
a variant of the NanoStation with parabolic antenna. Finally for super-nodes, the most
common equipment is a couple of Rocket M56 with 120◦ sector antennas (see figure 2.2).
Number of nodes
Bidirectional links
Unidirectional links
30
35
40
45
50
40
60
80
10
20
30
40
0 1000 2000 3000
Capture
N
um
be
r
Figure 2.4: Number of nodes, bidirectional
and unidirectional links in each capture.
Number of nodes (69)
Bidirectional links (187/359)
Unidirectinal links (172/359)
0
25
50
75
100
0
25
50
75
100
0
25
50
75
100
0 20 40 60
0 50 100 150
0 50 100 150
Index
Pr
es
en
ce
(%
)
Figure 2.5: Nodes and links presence.
4http://www.ubnt.com/downloads/datasheets/nanostationm/nsm_ds_web.pdf
5http://www.ubnt.com/downloads/datasheets/nanobridgem/nbm_ds_web.pdf
6http://www.ubnt.com/downloads/datasheets/rocketmgps/Rocket_M_GPS_Datasheet.pdf
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2.1.3 Methodology
Measurements were obtained using ssh to connect to each QMPSU node and gathering
information with basic system commands available in the QMP distribution. This method
has the advantage that no changes or additional software had to be installed in the nodes.
This is an important point, since being a community network, the users are the owner of
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their nodes, and so, a minimum intrusion was desirable. The data collection was done
hourly from December the 29th 2012 to June the 13th 2013. A simple monitoring web page
was developed, which is publicly available at [44] (see figure 2.3). The web page allows
navigating through the graphs obtained in the captures.
QMPSU is rather dynamic. Several reasons contribute to this fact: Being a community
network the growth is essentially unplanned. In Sants, nodes are added by community
members using their home roofs, which are often at non optimal locations. This fact
produce a high diversity on the quality of the links, making some of them to flip-flop
time to time, and even some nodes to be sporadically unreachable. Other reasons of
unreachability have been electricity cuts, nodes that have been upgraded, reconfigured,
hanged, etc. Additionally, community members some times have re-tuned the radios of
their devices, trying to achieve better performance (transmission power, channel and other
parameters), thus, changing the characteristics of the links. Furthermore, during the
measuring period not only new nodes have been added, but other were removed or changed
their position. E.g. testing nodes only used temporarily at UPC, or users that changed
residence in Sants.
Characterizing such a dynamic network is challenging. That is why in the following sections
we have chosen different statistical representations depending on the parameter under
study. For instance, in order to reflect the dispersion of the measured parameters, in some
cases we have used standard boxplots (showing the range, median and quartiles).
2.1.4 QMPSU Topology
Figure 2.4 shows the number of nodes and bidirectional and unidirectional links found in
each capture. Regarding the links, we have considered those reported by BMX6 (with
the command bmx6 -c show=links). For bidirectional links, in figure 2.4 we count both
links in opposite direction as a single link. Figure 2.5 shows the nodes and links presence.
We define presence as the percentage of times a given node or link is observed over the
captures.
Figure 2.4 shows that QMPSU is growing. The solid line in the figure shows a linear
regression fit, which increases from around 33 to 48 nodes. On the average 40.6 nodes have
been found, 21.4 in Sants and 19.2 in UPC. Even if UPC and Sants have a similar number
of nodes, at UPC the nodes are distributed in the Campus, which covers a rather smaller
19
area than Sants (see figure 2.1). Overall, 69 different nodes where detected. From those,
figure 2.5 shows that only 42 had a presence larger than 50%. Indeed, figure 2.5 shows
that only 27 nodes were alive almost all measuring period, having a presence higher than
80%. The reason for this are temporary installations (that got removed after a while of
testing) and poorly maintained installations with weak wireless link connections to other
nodes of the mesh.
Figure 2.6 shows the link length Complementary Empirical Cumulative Distribution
Function (CECDF). We have found that the link length distribution can be fitted by a
mixture of 2 exponentials (solid line in figure 2.6). The distribution is fitted with correlation
coefficient of ρ = 0.996. This is in line with the results reported for Guifi.net in [42, 45].
Let L be the complementary CDF of the link length, X, then: L(x|µ1, µ2, θ) = P (X >
x) = θ e−x/µ1 + (1 − θ) e−x/µ2 This result shows that links can be grouped in two sets:
42% of shorter links with mean µ1 = 196 m and 58% of longer distance links with mean
µ2 = 581 m. Thus, an overall mean link length of 419.3 m.
Figure 2.7 shows the out degree distribution. To derive this figure we have proceeded as
follows: We have first built the graph of each capture and its out degree ECDF. Note that
the graphs may change in every capture for the reasons formerly described. Then, for each
out degree we have taken the average of its ECDF value obtained over all captures. In
order to show the variability of the out degree, in figure 2.7 we have added a boxplot of
the out degree ECDF values obtained over the captures.
Figure 2.7 shows that, on the average, around 90% of the nodes have more than 1 link,
and around 40% of the nodes have at least 4 links, with an overall average degree of 4.2.
This is in contrast with Guifi.net[42], were the average is around 2, and only 20% of the
nodes have degree higher than 3. This fact can be explained by the higher number of links
that are automatically discovered and established by the nodes in the ad-hoc configuration
used in QMPSU, than the static links manually configured in Guifi.net. We note that no
standard distribution (including a power law) has been found to fit the average out degree.
Therefore, it cannot be stated that the scale-free pattern found in the Internet applies
to QMPSU. Nevertheless, the size of QMPSU (around 45 nodes) is too small to do an
accurate topology fitting.
# iw dev wlan0 station dump
Station dc:9f:db:26:6a:40
inactive time: 10 ms
rx bytes: 3568971019
rx packets: 135222757
tx bytes: 3147225400
tx packets: 167098650
tx retries: 457952780
tx failed: 104548
signal: -72 dBm
signal avg: -73 dBm
tx bitrate: 162.0 Mbps MCS 12 40Mhz
rx bitrate: 120.0 Mpbs MCS 11 40Mhz
Station dc:9f:db:08:8d:a9
...
Figure 2.13: Output of the command iw dump.
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Figure 2.14: Link traffic CECDF.
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Figure 2.15: Link traffic in the busy hour
CECDF.
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Figure 2.16: Traffic in the 3 busiest links.
2.1.5 Internet access
Internet access is provided by some nodes of QMPSU having links with other nodes of
Guifi.net. These nodes disseminate a default route, and we shall refer to them as gateways.
The number of gateways has been variable during the measuring period: there were found
between 2 and 5 gateways, 3.3 on the average. Figure 2.8 shows the frequency plot of the
number of gateways. BMX6 estimates a metric to each gateway, and chooses the best one.
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Figure 2.17: Throughput CECDF.
download
uploadUPCc6-ab/UPComega-70
UPComega-70/UPClolo-cd
GSgV-ns56/GSmVictoria-NS40
40
44
48
52
13
15
17
19
21
17
18
19
20
21
22
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Hour of the day
L
in
k
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
[M
bp
s]
Figure 2.18: Throughput in the 3 busiest
links.
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Figure 2.19: Throughput asymmetry.
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Figure 2.20: Throughput (top) and average bitrate of received packets (bottom) vs signal
power.
Note that when a gateway becomes unreachable by a node, it will stop receiving its default
route announcements, and BMX6 will switch to another one. Thus, in order for a node to
be disconnected from the Internet, is necessary a failure in all links that allows the node
to reach any of the gateways. Therefore, as an estimation of robustness of the Internet
availability we define the max-min-cut to any gateway as the maximum min-cut between
a node and any gateway of the network. Recall that the min-cut between two nodes s
and t is the minimum number of edges such that, after removal, there is not directed path
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Figure 2.21: Number of stations per scan.
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Figure 2.23: ECDF of the number of interfering stations.
from s to t.7 Figure 2.9 shows the average ECDF of the max-min-cuts obtained in each
capture. The distribution has been obtained following the same procedure as in figure 2.7,
i.e. taking the average of the max-min-cut ECDF obtained for each graph, and adding a
boxplot in order to show the dispersion of each value. Figure 2.9 shows that around 75% of
the nodes have a max-min-cut of at least 2 links to a gateway. We note that no standard
distribution have been found to fit the average max-min-cut. Figure 2.8 shows that the
dispersion of the max-min-cut equal to 2 is rather high: the interquartile of the ECDF
values for this point is around 0.42. This is motivated by the fact that one of the nodes at
UPC (called UPC-H-22, see figure 2.1) had a wireless link not very stable with the Sants.
The failure of this link decreases the max-min-cut of many nodes.
Figure 2.10 depicts the average ECDF of the number of hops to the gateway of each node.
This has been derived from the routing tables, which were also recorded in every capture.
The plot has been obtained similarly to figures 2.7 and 2.9, i.e. taking the average of the
ECDF obtained for each capture, and adding a boxplot in order to show the dispersion.
Figure 2.10 shows that around 67% of the nodes have 3 or less hops to the gateway, with an
average of 2.9 hops. We can see from the boxplots of the figure that the ECDF measured
over the captures does not show strong deviations.
We have estimated links throughput using the TCP STREAM test of netperf [46]. As
before, measurements were taken hourly. The command was run from every node to its
gateway. In order to limit the disturbance to the users we tried to reduce the test to
the minimum time. After some trials, we observed that running netperf tests of only 3
seconds yield a good estimation. The throughput of every wireless link was also computed
(link throughputs are discussed in section 2.1.7). For the link measurements IPv6 link
local addresses were used, thus, assuring that no other links would be used. To avoid
interferences, throughputs tests were done in serial (only one test at a time). Figure 2.11
depicts the ECDF of the average throughput of the nodes to their gateway measured over
all captures. The figure shows that the throughputs are rather high, with an average of
10.9 Mbps. This is due to the high performance that can be achieved with Multiple input,
multiple output (MIMO) 802.11an cards of most equipment. Finally, figure 2.12 shows the
average throughput vs. average number of hops to the gateway. As expected, throughput
tend to reduce as the number of hops increases. However, the line is rather irregular, due
to the diversity of the links.
7There are efficient algorithms to compute the s-t min-cut available in common numerical tools.
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2.1.6 QMPSU Usage
We have gathered the usage of the network using the linux iw command [47] (see figure 2.13).
Recall that captures were done hourly. Thus, taking the difference between the transmitted
bytes counter (tx bytes in figure 2.13) of two consecutive runs of iw, it is possible to
estimate the average traffic sent each hour in every link.
Measurements where done using directional links, i.e. traffic sent in opposite directions
between the same nodes is counted as two different links. Only wireless links, and having a
presence higher than 25% (in order to avoid outliers) where considered in the statistics:
196 links in total.
Figure 2.14 shows the CECDF of the average traffic sent in each of these links. Interestingly,
it was found that the traffic is well fitted by a mixture of 2 exponentials (solid line in
figure 2.14): 65% with mean µ1 = 8 kbps and 35% with mean µ2 = 88 kbps (overall mean
of 36 kbps). An explanation of this result is the presence of two groups of links: Those
where most of the traffic belongs to a single user, and backbone links carrying the aggregate
traffic from a number of users.
We found that the hour having the highest average traffic (busy hour) was between 22h
and 23h. Figure 2.15 shows the CECDF of the average traffic sent in the busy hour. The
figure shows that a mixture of 2 exponentials still gives a good fit. The overall average is
now 56 kbps, almost 55% higher than before. Figure 2.16 shows the average traffic in both
directions of the three busiest links over each hour of the day.
2.1.7 QMPSU Wireless Links
In this section we try to characterize the wireless links of the network. We start by studying
their throughput, measured using netperf as described in section 2.1.5. In order to avoid
outliers, only those of section 2.1.6 are considered. From the 196 links, the throughput
was able to be measured in 169 (86%). Failures were due to unidirectional links (were
netperf cannot run the test), or too weak links for netperf to succeed. Figure 2.17 shows
the CECDF of the throughput of the links were netperf succeeded. The figure shows that
the link throughput can be fitted with an exponential distribution with mean 14.4 Mbps.
In order to see the variability of the throughput, figure 2.18 shows the throughput averages
in both directions of the three busiest links (same links as in figure 2.16) over each hour of
the day. Comparing figures 2.18 and 2.16 we observe that the throughput is only slightly
affected by the traffic in the links. Additionally, measurements on each direction of the links
are identified with the same solid or dashed lines in figures 2.15 and 2.16. Comparing the
figures it is apparent that the asymmetry of the throughputs measured in both directions it
is not due to the asymmetry of the users’ traffic. For instance, around 5am, when the user
traffic is the lowest and equal in both directions, the asymmetry of the links throughputs
observed in figure 2.15 remains the same. We thus conclude that this asymmetry must be
links characteristics, as level of interferences present at each end, or different transmission
powers.
In order to measure the links’ asymmetry, figure 2.19 depicts the throughput measured
in each direction. A boxplot of the absolute value of the deviation over the mean is also
depicted on the right. The figure shows that around 25% of the links have a deviation
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higher than 30%. Thus, we can conclude that the symmetry of the links, an assumption
often used in the literature of in wireless mesh networks, is not very realistic.
Figure 2.20 shows the average throughput of each link (top of the figure) versus the average
signal power of the received packets (measured with iw dump). The figure also show the
average bitrate reported by iw dump for unicast received packets (bottom of the figure).
We have assumed that unicast transmissions correspond to packets with bitrates higher
than the lowest basic rate (6 Mbps in the 5 GHz band). As expected, the figure shows the
clear dependency of both measures with respect of the signal power.
Finally, we have estimated the interference level by doing a scan in every node at each
hourly capture. All nodes were configured in ad-hoc mode in the 5GHz band. However,
some radios were dual band, and reported scans in both 2.4 and 5 GHz. We discriminated
QMPSU stations because they share the same BSSID address, which is reported in the
scans. Figure 2.21 shows the average number of stations detected in every scan of the
nodes, in decreasing order. The figure shows the stations detected in both bands. The
average of QMPSU stations is shown in darker color. Figure 2.21 shows that the 2.4 GHz
band is much more crowded: only 3 non-overlapping channels of 20 MHz are available,
while a much higher number of stations are detected. Figure 2.22 shows the number of
stations detected on every channel. As expected, it can be observed as most of the stations
detected in the 2.4 GHz band use the recommended 3 non-overlapping channels. In the
5 GHz it can be observed the channel where most of the QMPSU stations are located.
Note that it is not possible to have high frequency diversity in QMPSU since most of the
stations have only a single radio. Even if channel assignment is a key issue, it was fixed
manually by QMPSU users based on trial and error. Figure 2.23 shows the ECDF of the
average number of stations detected in the same and adjacent channels used by QMPSU
nodes (5 GHz band). ECDF of detected QMPSU nodes is also reported in dashed lines.
All QMPSU nodes were configured to use channel bonding (i.e. combining two adjacent
20 MHz channels). Thus, they can potentially interfere with stations located in adjacent
channels. Figure 2.23 confirm the low number of stations belonging to external networks
interfering with QMPSU nodes: around 90% of nodes detect less than 1 station, on the
average, from external networks in each of the 3 channels of interest. Looking at the
stations in the same channel, around 50% detect more than 3.5, from which more than 2.5
are QMPSU.
2.1.8 Related Work
A lot of research has been done in recent years about wireless mesh networks, including
design aspects (routing, scalability, security [1, 21, 48–56]), deployment (urban, rural,
centrally-, individually-, or un-planned [57–60]), measurements and analysis (topologies,
performance, usage patterns, evolution, mobility [24, 41, 42, 57–67]), as well as surveys of
prior work and related aspects [26, 68–71].
Recent studies of Guifi net include various aspects of network and link characteristics [24,
41, 42], power laws [41], usage patterns, social participation [19, 26], and evolution over
the last 10 years [24]. Like in our work, links are planned individually (decentralized) but
the average link length in Guifi.net is (due to its deployment also in rural environments)
typically more than 10 times longer than in the QMPSU cloud. Unlike in our system,
nodes in Guifi.net are clustered into zones and in fact the network presented in this work is
one of these clouds. The studies distinguish between the Guifi core network (or backbone
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network) which includes only non-leaf nodes and the base network (which including all
nodes).
2.1.8.1 Roofnet
The Roofnet testbed presented by Bicket and Aguayo [57, 66] in 2005 and 2006 provides
one of the first works on characterizing a real-life mesh network. Motivated by the need
to understand the performance and topological consequences that result from a rather
unconstrained participation of users and unplanned deployment of nodes, the network under
study consist of 37 802.11b-based, single-radio nodes with omni-directional antennas that
have been set up by individuals on rooftop and indoor locations in the urban environment
of Cambridge/Massachusetts. A proactive, link-state, source-routing protocol called Srcr,
integrated in each node’s Linux/open-source operating system, is responsible for routing
the traffic in the flat and fully meshed network topology. Further analysis provides in-depth
measurements and simulation results on the link and end-to-end performance and about
the topological characteristics of this network.
2.1.8.2 TFA
Other pioneering work is given by the technology-for-all (TFA) mesh project presented by
Camp et al in [58, 67] where the authors analyze the performance of a single-radio, 802.11b
based 18-nodes mesh network serving some 4000 users in a dense urban deployment in
Houston TX. In contrast to Roofnet, the deployment in this work follows a measurement-
driven approach with the objective to optimize the overall performance of the employed: a
two-tier system architecture which distinguishes between the access and the backhaul part
of the network.
2.1.8.3 MadMesh
In contrast to the open, flat, and decentralized networking approaches given above,
MadMesh is a WMN planned deployment using proprietary technology from CISCO
in 2007. MadMesh is a commercial-grade WMN providing Internet access to residential
customers and small business, in Madison, Wisconsin. MadMesh is annualized by Brik et al.
in [60]. The experimental study is based on 8 months of data collection using SNMP logs.
The authors perform a wide analysis that cover topological aspects and robustness, user
activity and radio channel characterization. Additionally, the authors study the feasibility
and gain of introducing Network Coding.
2.1.8.4 GoogleWifi
Afansasyev [63] about the Google network in Mountain View, California present urban
deployments and performance properties of large scale (several hundreds of nodes) mesh
networks based on proprietary and centrally managed node systems. In contrast, the
system we present is fully open source (GPL licensed) and can be deployed, managed, and
maintained completely decentralized. The networks studied by both works are up to 10
times larger than the network studied in this work. While the topology in their networks
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is organized in a tree-like structure where each mesh node is bound to a parent node
upstream to the few GW nodes where all out and incoming traffic aggregates, the topology
of our network is managed in a flat (full mesh) structure where each node may become a
GW node and/or a relay towards any other node. While the main focus of [63] is about
usage patterns, both works present interesting and comparable performance characteristics
about the links and end-to-end routes for their backbone networks.
2.1.8.5 Meraki
In [61], LaCurts present measurement and analysis of 110 real-world 802.11 mesh networks
with an average size of 13 nodes (total of 1407 APs). The focus of this paper is on link-level
measurements, investigating SNR versus bit-rate correlation, benefits of opportunistic
routing, and the impact of hidden stations. In contrast to our network, only 2.4GHz
802.11bgn standard has been used (QMPUS also uses 5GHz 11an) for mostly indoor
deployments and few measurements are given about end-to-end performance in the studied
networks.
2.1.9 Comparison
In this section we compare the experimental results obtained for QMPSU, with those
obtained for the networks listed in section 2.1.8. We summarize our comparison by means
of table 2.1. Note that table 2.1 is built such that columns correspond to networks under
comparison, and rows to measured parameters. The columns are ordered left to right in
descending chronologically order of the research papers’ publication date, used to derived
the experimental results. Those parameters not provided in the research papers are left
blank. The parameters in table 2.1 have been grouped into 5 categories:
• General characteristics: References used to derived the measurements; their year of
publications; usage type of the network; environment (rural/urban); square area;
type of deployment (planned/unplanned); and methodology used to collect data.
• System characteristics: Hardware used in the network; Operating System (OS) and
license; type of MAC and antennas; routing protocol.
• Topology characteristics: Network structure (flat, tree, etc); number of nodes; number
of edges; out-degree.
• Link characteristics: Length of the links; throughput.
• End-to-end performance characteristics: number of gateways; number of hops to the
gateways; download throughput from the gateways.
Recall that Guifi.net is organized in zones (see [41, 42] for details). The results given
in table 2.1 corresponds to Catalonia zone. Additionally, like in [42], for the topology
characteristics of Guifi.net given in table 2.1 we distinguish between the core (or backbone)
and base networks. The core is obtained by removing all nodes with degree 1 from the base
network (which is the one including all nodes). This distinction is motivated by the way
Guifi.net is deployed: A relatively small number of nodes, called super-nodes, located in
strategic points, having a high number of wireless links connecting to single end customers
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or other super-nodes. For instance, the node having the maximum number of links (the
node with degree equal to 476, as shown in table 2.1), is located in a hill (composed of
several sectorial antennas) and provides access to Guifi.net to the users in the Village of
Tona and its surroundings.
Table 2.1 shows that Catalonia zone (which has only around 46% of Guifi.net nodes) has
10, 625 nodes. This is, with difference, the largest network under consideration. However,
table 2.1 shows that it is weakly connected, if compared with the other networks. For
instance, the 0.75 quantile is 1 for Guifi.net base network, and even for the core is only 2,
while it is between 4 and 6 for the other networks. This fact highlights one fundamental
advantage of WMN: the robustness provided by the links that are automatically created,
providing redundant paths between the nodes.
Regarding QMPSU, despite its decentralized and individually management and deployment,
our measurements show promising performance characteristics. For example table 2.1
shows that 50% of the links allow for more than 10 Mbps throughput. This is in contrast
with the 0.7 Mbps obtained in Roofnet. One reason of this improvement might be that link
distances are rather short (50% of the links are less then 150 meters long and only 25%
are more than 300 meters long). However, QMPSU is deployed in a dense urban area and
many links does not have a line of sight free of obstacles. Taking into account that Roofnet
has a similar number of nodes, and it is deployed in a similar area (in km2), we conclude
that the high throughput of QMPSU can be attributed to the improvements introduced by
802.11an over 802.11b, used in Roofnet. From the TP versus signal strength measurements
we can observe similar characteristics as already identified on the TFA mesh ([58, 67]), that
link TP increases almost linearly between it’s minimum and maximum rates. However,
with the 802.11an technology used in QMPSU (compared to 802.11b in TFA) an average
TCP TP of more than 20Mbps can be achieved with the same signal power (-67dBm) that
allowed only up to 5MBps UDP TP on the TFA network.
In terms of end-to-end performance, QMPSU deployment provides 50% of the nodes with
more than 7 Mbps download via the nearest gateway. This is a small reduction over the
10 Mbps median link throughput, taking into account that 50% of the nodes have 2 or
more hops to the gateway(compared with the commercial MadMesh network ([60] where
50% of the nodes have more than 4 hops to the nearest GW).
Finally, it is interesting to note that the routing protocol, one of the key components of a
WMN, is different in all networks under study. This demonstrates the fact that there is
not yet an optimal solution for this problem.
2.1.10 Conclusions
In this Section 2.1 we presented an experimental evaluation of QMPSU, a wireless commu-
nity network deployed at Universitat Polite`cnica de Catalunya (UPC) and Sants, a quarter
of Barcelona, Spain. QMPSU is rather dynamic due to many reasons, e.g.: its community
nature in an urban area; it is a growing network; there is a high diversity of the quality of
wireless links; the mesh nature of the network.
Characterizing such a dynamic network is challenging. To do so we have performed an
extensive statistical study of the main parameters. These include topological properties,
Internet access, usage of the network and characterization of the radio links.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of related networks
QMPSU Guifi.net Meraki MadMesh Google Wifi TFA Roofnet
General characteristics
References [2, 3] [24, 41, 42] [61] [60] [62, 63] [58, 67] [57, 66]
Published 2013 2012,2013 2010 2008 2008 2006,2008 2004,2005
Usage community community real clients commercial non-comm. non-comm. testbed
Environment urban urban & rural indoor urban urban urban urban
Area [km2] 6 15,000 26 32 3 6
Deployment unplanned unplanned planned planned planned unplanned unplanned
Data
sources
sys. tools,
probes
SNMP, publ.
CNML DB
probes sys.-portal,
SNMP, sys.
tools, probes
Tropos mgmt
portal
sys. tools,
probes
sys. tools,
simulations,
probes
System characteristics
Hardware open open Meraki Cisco 1510 Tropos
MetroMesh
VIA EPIA x86
1GHz,
small PC
OS / license GPL, qMp [31],
Linux
openWRT
RouterOS
(proprietary) or
Linux (GPL)
Meraki proprietary
Cisco OS
proprietary
Tropos OS
Linux Linux
MAC /
antennas
802.11an, /
sect. & dir.
802.11abgn /
sect. & dir.
802.11bgn 802.11a /
11dBi sect.
802.11b/g 802.11b /
15dBi omni.
802.11b /
8-12dBi omni.
Routing BMX6 [1] BGP, IGP,
OSPF, OLSR,
BMX6, static,..
Meraki ease (SNR +
ETX)
proprietary
Tropos
AODV Srcr (link-state
source-routing,
ETT)
Topology characteristics
Structure flat (full mesh) clustered and
grouped in
zones
flat (full mesh) trees trees flat (full mesh) flat (full mesh)
Nodes 40.6 (avg) base: 10, 625
core: 735
12.8 (1407 APs
/ 110 networks)
250 500 18 37
Edges 62.5 (avg) base: 10, 949
core: 1, 059
344
Degree
.5/.75/1∗
4/6/15 base: 1/1/476
core: 1/2/30
3/4/10 4/6/12
Link characteristics
Length
[km]
.5/.75/1∗
0.15/0.3/3.3 0.59/1.36/34.6
Throug.
[Mbps]
.5/.75/1∗
11.3/22.9/59.5
(TCP)
throug. vs.
SNR
throug. vs.
SNR
0.4/0.7/4
End-to-end performance characteristics
Number of
gateways
avg. 3.2 3 + 75 (nodes
with direct link
to GW)
4
GW
distance
[hops]
.5/.75/1∗
2/4/11 4/5/8 1/2/5 2/3/5
GW throug.
[Mbps]
.5/.75/1∗
6.8/11.6/43
(TCP)
0.6/1/1.2 limited to
1 Mbps
∗ We use the notation .5/.75/1 to refer to quantiles. Note that quantile = 1 corresponds to the maximum
measured value.
We have found simple distributions that fit some of these parameters. For instance, the
network is not scale-free, the link length and traffic is fitted by a mixture of two exponentials,
and the average throughput of the links is exponentially distributed. Regarding radio links,
we have observed a non negligible asymmetry.
Our results show that the network is rather well connected and adaptive. Thus, demon-
strating the advantages of a wireless mesh network. Furthermore, even if the network is
deployed in an urban area with an average link length of around 500 m, an average link
throughput of around 14 Mbps was obtained. This high performance can be attributed to
the 802.11an devices used in the network.
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We have also compared QMPSU with Guifi.net and other experimental WMN studies found
in the literature. Most Guifi.net’s infrastructure consists of wireless links manually set up,
and use OSPF and BGP routing protocols. Our comparison shows that QMPSU results
much more connected, and thus resilient than the rest of Guifi.net, thus, demonstrating
the benefits of a WMN.
Our comparison with other WMN highlights the wide number of scenarios where WMN are
being deployed. These include the pioneer research testbed of Roofnet, in 2004; commercial
WMN used to provide Internet access, as Madmesh; companies that offer WMN solutions
to small organizations, as Meraki; to QMPSU used in a wireless community network. We
observe a significant performance improvement over time. However, all these networks are
rather small (up to few hundreds of nodes), and all use different routing protocols. We
conclude that the optimum routing protocol, and to what extend it can scale, are still open
issues in WMN.
2.2 Experimental Evaluation of BMX6 Routing Metrics
In this section we experimentally evaluate the path-metric performance of the mesh routing
protocol BMX6 [1, 72] which is the routing protocol used in the QMPSU production
community network described in [2]. The results presented in this chapter are included in
the paper [5].
We exploit the full access to the wireless routers of QMPSU to achieve two goals: The first
is comparing the experimental measures of throughput on multi-hop paths that we perform
on the network with the expected capacity estimation on the same paths derived using
the well known conflict-graph model introduced in [73]. Our experiments show that even
with an accurate knowledge of the network parameters the conflict-graph model introduces
an overestimation of the available capacity. We discuss the possible causes for this error
and propose a correction. The second goal is to test the capability of the BMX6 routing
protocol used in the WCN to choose the path that can guarantee the highest throughput.
We show that BMX6 is able to choose the best path in the large majority of the cases,
which is a key feature for any routing protocol, enabled by the right combination of the
protocol internals and the metric used for link and path quality estimation.
2.2.1 Related Work
The experimental evaluation of production-state wireless mesh network has been done only
in a small number of papers in literature compared to the enormous amount of works that
use simulations, a review of the experimental research papers can be found in [68]. Some of
the works use a similar approach to this work for the extraction of real measurement data [57,
58], but most of the networks analyzed are single-channel networks using omnidirectional
antennas. In our case the use of multi-channel and directional antennas makes the analysis
more challenging, since we neither assume interference between every couple of neighbor
links (like in [57]) nor its absence and thus have to rely on a complex model for capacity
estimation [73]. Moreover, to our best knowledge, this is the first empirical evaluation of
a real IEEE 802.11an-based community network. Other empirical works use controlled
scenarios [74] to compare routing metrics (like Expected Transmission Count (ETX) [75],
Expected Transmission Time (ETT) [76], Direct Air Time (DAT) [77] metrics). Finally,
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some other works use off-line evaluation of available data to estimate various network
properties [42], including routing performance [78] but can not really be compared to
on-field experimentation.
2.2.2 Theoretical Path Capacity
In order to evaluate the performance of the routing protocols we need to estimate the
capacity of selected paths. Accurate capacity estimation in wireless is challenging, and the
Protocol Model proposed in [79] is typically used in 802.11 networks. With this model any
couple of nodes using the same channel and in interference range can not simultaneously
transmit. The protocol Model was used to define the concept of conflict graph in [73] to
estimate the capacity of wireless networks as an LP optimization problem. Afterwards,
the conflict graph has been extensively used in the literature to estimate the capacity of
wireless networks in resource optimization problems, e.g channel allocation [80–82]. In the
following we will recall the concept of conflict graphs and will use it not to formulate an
optimization problem but instead to estimate the capacity of a multi-hop path once the
capacity of the single hops has been measured.
Let G(V,E) be a graph in which the set of vertices V corresponds to the set of nodes in the
network and the set of edges E corresponds to the set of links. Let N = |V | the number of
nodes of the network denoted by ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Take a generic path P = {n1, · · ·nd} as
the ordered set of nodes chosen by the routing protocol to deliver a packet from the source
node n1 to the destination node nd. Let li be the link used to connect each node ni to the
next node ni+1 in P , ci the capacity (in bit per second) of link li and L = {l1, · · · ld−1} the
set of links used in P .
Let Gc(E,C) be the conflict graph of G. In Gc vertices correspond to links in G, between two
vertices there is an edge if the two links interfere and thus can not transmit simultaneously.
Let Gc(P ) be the induced sub-graph of Gc, where the vertices are the links L in P , and
the edges are the same as those that links L have in Gc.
Now, let Ni(P ), i = 1, · · · d−1 be the sets formed by each vertex of Gc(P ) and its neighbors.
Consider two links li, lj ∈ Ni(P ) that require a time 1ci and 1cj respectively to send one
bit on the link. Note that each set Ni(P ) is formed by links that need to schedule their
transmissions in different time intervals, so if a bit has to travel over link ci and then cj it
will require a total time of τ = 1ci +
1
cj
. The capacity of the path li, lj is thus given by
1
τ .
Generalizing, for each sub-path formed by links belonging to Ni(P ) the expected capacity
is:
Ci(P ) =
1∑
lj∈Ni(P )
1
cj
, i = 1, · · · d− 1. (2.1)
The theoretical capacity of the path, Ct(P ), is given by the most restrictive sub-path, thus:
Ct(P ) =
1
tb(P )
(2.2)
where
tb(P ) = max
i
∑
lj∈Ni(P )
1
cj
, i = 1, · · · d− 1 (2.3)
Note that Ni=b(P ) is the set of links of the path P that minimize (2.1). Thus, we shall
call tb(P ) the bottleneck airtime of the path.
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Figure 2.24: Experimental Ce(P ) (exp), theoretical Ct(P ) (comp), and fitted Cf (P ) (corr)
capacities (top); relative error of theoretical et(P ) and fitted ef (P ) capacities (middle);
and number of hops (bottom).
2.2.2.1 Validation
In order to validate equation (2.2) we have proceeded as follows: We have experimentally
estimated the capacity ci of each link by measuring the throughput with netperf. The same
has been done to estimate the capacity of the path to the gateway for each node. We shall
refer to these measurements as the experimental capacities, and denote them as Ce(P ).
In order to compute the conflict graph Gc(P ) we proceeded as follows. First we defined the
graph G and we assigned to each link a value for the capacity ci that equals the measured
one. Then we generated Gc, using as vertices the node links, and adding edges between
neighbor links using the same channel. Thus, we assume that interference only occurs
between WiFi neighbor interfaces using the same channel. For each node we computed
the path used to reach the gateway by means of the routing tables and, on that path,
we computed the theoretical capacity using (2.2). We shall refer as theoretical computed
capacity, Ct(P ), to the capacity obtained by (2.2).
Figure 2.24 (top) shows the mean experimental (Ce(P )), and theoretical (Ct(P )) capacities
to the gateway of each node. These are measured only for the most frequent route of
each node.The means were obtained averaging more than 100 points in all cases. The
resulting confidence intervals were rather small, less than 5% in most cases. In the same
figure is shown a third curve (Cf (P )), which is a better estimation than Ct(P ) and will
be explained in next section. Figure 2.24, middle, shows the relative error of Ct(P ) and
Cf (P ) capacities with respect to the experimental ones, Ce(P ), computed as:
ei(P ) =
Ci(P )− Ce(P )
Ce(P )
, i = {t, f}. (2.4)
Finally, Figure 2.24 bottom shows the number of hops of each route. Note that paths are
sorted in increasing order of hops, and capacity.
Figure 2.24 shows that the theoretical capacity overestimates significantly the experimental
one. Indeed, the absolute relative error has an average around 34%. This result concerns
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the usage of the conflict graph as an accurate tool to estimate the capacity of a wireless
network. In the following section we discuss this mismatch and propose a better fit of
equation (2.2) to the experimental path capacity.
2.2.2.2 Path Capacity correction
Given the results of 2.2.2.1, we can say that the definition we use for the conflict graphs leads
to an overestimation of the available capacity. To build the correct conflict graph we need
to know all the links that interfere with each other, and can not transmit simultaneously. In
Gc we set an edge between two links only when the two links are in the same channel, and
are separated by no more than one hop, we say that this approach describes only “direct
interference”. This assumption is reasonable considering that the majority of the radios
use directive antennas, but is probably optimistic, since there are a number of factor that
produce what we call “collateral interference”. First we do not consider interference at a
higher distance than one-hop, which instead can happen. The number of hops between two
nodes depends on the way the radio are configured, and on the decision that the routing
protocol takes. Two nodes can be close to each other, but configured with an incompatible
MAC layer mode (for instance, both configured to be client of a third node) that prevents
them to be direct neighbors. Second, neighbor-channel interference can happen when two
radios are placed nearby [83] and even when directive antennas are used [84]. We can not
capture this phenomenon with our abstraction so it is reasonable that this contributes to
the overestimation of the available capacity.
Since it’s impossible to perfectly model a network operating in real conditions with an
analytic approach we chose to apply an empirical approach using the experimental data
we have.
Thus, we propose to modify equation (2.2) to estimate the collateral interference in the
QMPSU network, as:
Ce(P ) ≈ Cf (P ) = 1
tb(P ) + f(P )
(2.5)
We shall call airtime bloat the term f(P ), which represents the increment on the bottleneck
airtime induced by the interference that we can not precisely model over path P .
f(P ) = θ
∑
lj /∈Ni=b(P )
1
cj
, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (2.6)
In order to estimate θ we used the available experimental data to compute the the mean
square relative error of the mean capacities, i.e. by minimizing the cost function8:
J(θ) =
∑
P
(
Cf (P )− Ce(P )
Ce(P )
)2
(2.7)
From which we obtained that the most suitable value to approximate our data set is given
by θ ≈ 0.5.
Figure 2.24, top, compares the experimental (exp) and computed capacities using equa-
tion (2.5) (corr). Figure 2.24, middle, reports the relative error. It can be observed that
8We have used the BFGS algorithm provided by the numerical tool R.
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Figure 2.25: Fitted BMX6 (bmx6), best (best), and worst and best SPF paths (spf.min,
spf.max) capacities (top); relative error with respect to corrected capacities (middle); and
number of hops of fitted, best and SPF paths (bottom).
the capacity estimation is significantly improved. In fact, the absolute relative error has an
average around 12%, which is almost 3 times smaller than the 34% error obtained with
equation (2.2). Note that the value of θ is a characteristic of the QMPSU network, so it can
not be simply re-used in other networks. Nevertheless, giving a reasonable good estimate
for QMPSU, as discussed above, equation (2.5) will be used as reference to investigate the
performance of BMX6 carried out in next section.
2.2.3 BMX6 Performance
In this section we compare the paths chosen by BMX6 with the best paths (having the
highest capacity). For the sake of comparison we also use the paths obtained using the
Shortest Path First (SPF) algorithm. Note that SPF correspond to hopcount metric. All
capacities shown in this section are computed using the corrected equation (2.5). The best
path to the gateway has been computed using the Algorithm 1. Basically, the algorithm
performs a recursive search estimating the capacity of each path. In order to avoid a costly
exhaustive search, it is first guessed a best path using a weighted SPF, with link airtimes
as costs. Then, recursion is performed, stopping over paths that give worst bandwidth
than the current best path estimate.
Figure 2.25 compares the capacity of the path chosen by BMX6 (bmx6 ); the best path
(best); and paths yielding the maximum and minimum capacities using SPF (spf.max, and
spf.min, respectively). Note that the points corresponding to bmx6 are the same than
those marked as corr in Figure 2.24. For the same number of hops, there might be different
paths, having different capacities. As in the previous section, these capacities are computed
averaging over the most frequent paths chosen by BMX6, and the best and SPF paths
obtained in the same captures. Figure 2.25, middle, reports the relative error of best and
SPF paths with respect to BMX6 (see equation (2.4)). Thus, positive error means better
paths than BMX6, and negative error means worst. Finally, Figure 2.25, bottom, shows
the number of hops to the gateway for the paths chosen by BMX6, best and SPF.
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Algorithm 1: Find the best route (shortest route having the highest path capacity).
Data: g: network graph, s: source, d: destination.
1 Initialization
2 BestRoute← WeightedShortestPath(g, from=s, to=d)
3 BestBw← PathCapacity(g, BestRoute)
4 foreach n in Neighbors(g, s) do
5 SearchBestRoute(g, s, d, n)
6 end
7 SearchBestRoute(g, r, d, c)
8 begin
9 r← push(r, c) /* append c to route r */
10 bw← PathCapacity(g, r)
11 if (bw > BestBw) or (bw = BestBw and length(r) < length(BestRoute)) then
12 if c = d then
13 BestRoute← r
14 BestBw← bw
15 else
16 foreach n in Neighbors(g, c) do
17 if n /∈ r then
18 SearchBestRoute(g, r, d, n)
19 end
20 end
21 end
22 end
23 end
Figure 2.25 shows that BMX6 Vector Metric behaves indeed very well: In most cases the
best paths only give a slightly better capacity than BMX6. Only in 2 cases there exists
a significantly better path (with relative increases of 400% and 40%, respectively), but
having a larger number of hops. Regarding SPF, it was obtained that for the best choice
(spf.max), only in 2 points SPF was slightly better, but less than 10%. While spf.min was
always worse or equal than BMX6. Indeed, spf.min yielded 6 points (26% of the paths
having more than 1 hop) with a relative reduction higher that 40% than BMX6.
2.2.4 Conclusions
In this Section 2.2, we used experimental evidence to analyze the performance of the BMX6
routing protocol. In particular we focused on the capacity of BMX6 Vector Metric to select
the route that can achieve the highest throughput and we verified that the combination
of metric and protocol internals used by BMX6 is very efficient in selecting a path that
is very close to the optimal one. To achieve this goal we performed experiments on the
QMPSU network that showed that the model proposed in [73] with simple assumptions on
the interference among links produces an overestimation of the achievable throughput.
2.3 Reflection and Self-determination in a Community Mesh
Network
Community Networks (CNs) are IP-based networks designed, built, operated and main-
tained by communities of individuals that join together and cooperate to satisfy their
telecommunication needs. They consist of distributed and decentralized network devices
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-linked via wired and wireless links- that interconnect computing systems, services providers,
content repositories, etc. exchanging traffic between them. The size of CNs ranges from a
few nodes to the tens of thousands. [21, 70]
The main difference between the CNs paradigm and the traditional commercial ISPs is
that end users are not mere consumers, but active contributors and stakeholders of the
infrastructure[21]. This empowerment comes along with rights and duties: having a voice
for decision-making, the obligation by some sort of network compact or agreement [25,
85] and, to a limited extent, the freedom to audit and participate in the control and
management of the network resources and infrastructure.
There are, however, several obstacles that significantly limit this freedom. Leaving aside
issues in CNs like community organizations, technical and legal aspects of network de-
ployment, etc., this document focuses particularly on the day-by-day monitoring and
management of the CN. For such an important task, there is a lack for convenient tools
to help the end user evaluating and understanding the state of the CN as a whole (or, at
least, the part of the CN around him that plays the most important role in the perceived
performance and quality of experience). Despite the existence of many networking tools
[86, 87] to inspect particular characteristics of Metropolitan Area Networks (MANs), they
are tailored for use cases that significantly differ from those of CNs. Typically, MANs are
owned or controlled by a single or few entities. There, persons in charge of the network
administration are well-skilled, able to perform complex evaluation tasks and have compre-
hensive control over all core components. This is not necessarily the case for an average
CN user, whose boundaries for a comprehensive control are given by the nodes he owns, or
with network skills similar to those of customers of a traditional ISP (this is, somebody
able to deal with an intuitive web portal on the home router).
To address this shortcoming, CN members have created tools to visualize their network
topology and evaluate link qualities and bandwidth capacities. However, these tools do not
provide an integrated solution that combines feedback about the performance of individual
links and end to end (e2e) routes and illustrates the chosen path and involved links when
traffic is sent towards a given destination. This lack of integration significantly hinders
the potential of Routing Protocols (RPs) like BMX6 [38, 72] to adapt to user-specific and
application-dependent priorities.
The rest of this section is structured as follows. In Section 2.3.1 we discuss related work
and existing solution that address aspects of topology monitoring and route management in
CNs. In Section 2.3.2 we present the design of our integrated solution to facilitate the life
interaction of CN users with their network. We describe experienced challenges, considered
scenarios and experimentation results obtained from integrating our developed solution in
a real-life CN in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. Eventually Section 2.3.5 concludes this work.
2.3.1 Related work
In recent years, the upraising of Community Mesh Networks [21, 70, 88] has perceived an
increasing amount of attention and several studies have been published that analyse the
characteristics [2, 28, 42, 78] of these networks from an academic perspective. However,
apart from the promotion, increased recognition, and general understanding of their
functioning and for the demand of such networks, these insights provide little concrete
advantage for their standard users that are often faced with (academically wise) trivial but
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real-life problems such as capacity shortages and variances and a lack of means to detect,
understand, and encounter related phenomena.
Various tools exist for CN providing a high-level overview of the network topology as well as
detailed information about existing links and nodes. Some of them take the information from
a rather static database (Guifi network Map [89], WiND [90], Nodeshot [91]), some retrieve
data from the nodes dynamically via Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
(Freimap [92]) and others use a combination of both (Nodewatcher [93]). A downside of
these tools is the requirements for setting up and maintaining the visualization services so
that they can be used, which usually requires quite an advanced knowledge on systems
administration and networking.
Another type of mapping tools are decentralized monitoring services, often integrated or
shipped with node- or router-system firmwares. They are accessed via the node’s web
interface, like the case of FreiFunk [37], Gra`cia Sense Fils (GSF) [94], qMp [31], Lugro-
mesh [95], Commotion [96], etc. These tools mostly rely on the topology information locally
available from the RP and optionally enhance the representation with street map data from
external services like OpenStreetMap [97]. These tools can show nodes and links that are
known to the running protocol but can not assist in any centralized management tasks like
node registration, address assignment or representation of planned links. However, they are
instantly available to the users and showing a live snapshot of the topology. Anyway, all
the existing tools lack means to indicate the relation between a given CN topology (either
on a map or as graph) and the network performance for a particular user. Furthermore,
they do not provide details on how the RP could be stimulated to improve the network
experience at all. There, tools like traceroute, tracepath, My Trace Route (MTR), etc.
are only of partial help because they assume symmetric e2e routes. This is often not
the case for routes in CMNs with enough redundancy, where different paths between two
nodes may be eligible. In such context, the RP continuously evaluates the best path for
transmitting packets. The decision taken is mostly conditioned by the following facts. First,
the quality of a link between two nodes can be very asymmetric. For example, different
transmission powers can be chosen independently at each device, one of the devices may
operate in a noisy electromagnetic environment whereas the other might be isolated, etc.
Second, this link quality can change at any time in an unpredictable fashion (the wind
may cause antennas misalignment, remote interferences may appear and disappear, etc.).
In conclusion, it can not be taken for granted that e2e routes between CMN nodes are
symmetric nor invariable in time.
2.3.1.1 Routing metrics for Community Mesh Networks (CMNs)
The issue of routing in distributed system has raised new attention with the emergence
of wireless CMNs, as they pose new challenges on this cooperative task because of their
intrinsic heterogeneity and the impacts from wireless links characteristics. It has also
become clear that, even when assuming a common objective, there is no ”one size fits
all” solution and there are multiple trade-offs amongst routing metrics [88]. To address
these challenges and requirements, various routing metrics (Hop Count (HC), ETX [75], ,
ETT [76], DAT [77]) have been proposed to overcome the limitations of rather traditional
routing approaches and to optimize routing for specific objectives.
Existing MANET protocol implementations have been extended to support new and
experimental routing metrics. OLSR [98], originally considering HC as the base metric,
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which implementation [99] supports to define arbitrary metrics via a plug-in framework,
now uses ETX as the default one. The concept of adaptable metrics got extended with
OLSRv2 [100] for which the DAT metric is suggested. Babel [101] declares the exact
computation of route metrics as out of the scope of its definition and only defines the
requirement of being monotonic and isotonic. The babeld [102] implementation uses an
additive ETX metric to calculate e2e path costs but makes it easy to define alternative
metric functions.
Nevertheless, the RPs above mentioned assume that path metrics are calculated with the
same metric by all nodes of a network. Therefore, to ensure a consistent calculation of the
routing tables that are applied in a distributed fashion by all nodes, switching the routing
metric in use demands a synchronized exchange of all RP implementations in all nodes.
This requirement makes it practically impossible to test, or even let individual CN users
temporary select a particular routing metric for their own traffic.
2.3.2 A Community Network Characterization and Interaction Tool
2.3.2.1 Objectives and Vision
The envisioned benefits of the NCT for CNs users shall be illustrated with an example: A
non-expert CN user is trying to obtain the best possible down-link connection to a server
out of the CN, reachable only via various multi-hop away Gateways (GWs) or proxies. By
looking at the current network topology shown on the web interface of the home router
(the CN node), the user can learn about the topology of the CN, the capacity of the links,
etc. and actively measure network performance in real time. As a result, the user can take
actions to improve the network usage experience, by configuring the home router to apply
different routing policies that lead to better performance. This way, optimal trade-offs
between path delay, bandwidth and packet loss can be selected for different applications
(voice over IP, large downloads, etc.)
2.3.2.2 The NCT: Architecture, Components and Considerations
The NCT provides CN users a graphical tool to let them learn about the CMN and manage
their CN home routers. This is achieved with two software components that integrate
together. On the highest abstraction layer, the NCT user interface (NCui) web-based tool
shows information about the network, evaluates performance parameters and provides
interaction mechanisms to change routing metrics, etc. The interface integrates with the
NCT daemon (NCd) on the lower abstraction layer. NCd manages the interaction with
the local device components and the remote network nodes. The architecture of the NCT
is depicted in Figure 2.26, showing the external components NCd is surrounded by.
The NCT daemon (NCd) The core of the NCd is the lunced daemon (which stands
for Lua[103] Network Characterization Daemon. It interacts with the other system
components and enables the communication between them. It has a modular design, where
plug-ins provide specific interaction functionalities (e.g. with the routing algorithm). This
interaction is divided in three blocks: user I/O, [mesh] network I/O and system I/O.
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Figure 2.26: Architecture of the network characterization tool
User I/O interaction in lunced comprehends a set of tools to allow the end user to interact
with the NCd in three different ways so far: web interface, system log and command line.
The system log interaction is possible via a specific plug-in that allows lunced to log certain
system events (e.g. requests received from remote NCd-capable nodes). Command-line
interaction is based on the interface provided by OpenWrt[32] Ubus[104]. The NCd is
actually designed to perform the communication between the NCui and the NCd via Ubus.
In CMNs it is common to find two very different types of users. On the one hand there are
those who, once their network node is installed, avoid as much as possible touching it. On
the other hand, there are very enthusiastic users who are eager to test and update their
node even with intermediate router-firmware releases. In terms of the software running,
this leads to very heterogeneous networks. This has been taken into account, to ensure that
different versions of the NCd can coexist with minimum backwards compatibility issues, or
even with nodes that are not NCd-capable at all.
The modularity of the NCd allows room for all types of plug-ins and new developments.
For instance, if a new RP is added, only a plug-in needs to be created.
The NCT user interface (NCui) The NCui provides CN end users a visual tool to
monitor the network and perform network administration tasks accordingly to improve
their usage experience. It is based on an graph showing the network nodes and the links
connecting them. Its user-centric approach makes much sense in the context of a mesh
network with BMX6 as the main routing protocol. Unlike other so-called link-state RPs,
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BMX6 is a distance-vector RP and it is not aware of the complete network topology (see
2.3.4.1).
The process of discovering a whole CMN with the NCui can be seen in Figure 2.27.
Fig. 2.27a shows the initial view, with the local node in the middle and its three neighbours
around. In Fig. 2.27b, the graph is centred over the node on the right after its list of
neighbours has been requested. No new nodes are added, but links previously unknown
have appeared. The discovery process is repeated until all the nodes appear on the graph
(Fig. 2.27c depicts the whole CMN). Finally, Fig.2.27d uses a palette (blue → green →
yellow → orange → red) to colour the links in function of their measured quality. More
features not shown here are provided by the NCui, like a tool to discover network paths
from one node to another.
(a) Local node in the center, with all its
neighbours and links.
(b) The second node’s neighbours and
new links are shown.
(c) All the mesh nodes are shown, and
also the links connecting them.
(d) The network links are coloured as a
function of their quality.
Figure 2.27: Discovery of the nodes in a mesh network and the links’ properties in four
steps using the NCui.
In addition to the visual information displayed by the graph, the NCui also provides
text-based data about the nodes, the routing algorithm, paths, etc. by means of a sidebar
and floating HTML divs when needed. Figure 2.28 shows the BMX6 path discovery between
two nodes in the mesh network.
Inter-NCd communication One of the key features of the NCd is that the lunced
daemon can exchange information by sending and receiving JSON queries over HTTP. To
do so, a special function is used to forward local queries to other nodes running the NCd.
This occurs when the user manually requests information about a remote node or at time
intervals, but only when the NCui is in use.
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Figure 2.28: Screenshot of the NCui showing the mesh graph and highlighting the path
from the far right node to the one on the far left.
One of the current shortfalls of the NCd implementation is that all the requests a node
receives from other nodes in the mesh are executed, no matter where they come from. The
next development effort will take this into account to, at least, provide a configuration
option to tell lunced to only attend read-only requests and discard the ones intended at
changing the node’s settings. Ideally, an authentication mechanism should be implemented
(for example, by exchanging RSA keys and sending write commands securely via SSH).
NCT source code and OpenWrt package for dissemination The source code of
the NCT is freely available [105] under a GPL licence and can be run on the current (as
of February 2015) OpenWrt stable version. Packages for OpenWrt are provided for the
development and releases of qMp that could be included by node admins on demand.
2.3.3 Approaching and upgrading a real-life CN
The Network Characterization Tool (NCT) deployment is based on field experience in
Guifi.net[36]. This very heterogeneous CN is mostly built up with nodes that work with
the BGP and Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) RPs. Most of these nodes are connected
by wireless links operated in infrastructure (Access Point (AP)/Client) mode. However, in
the last years, some parts of Guifi.net have started to be deployed as CMN, operating in
ad-hoc mode and using BMX6[38] as the main RP inside them. Most of these CMN are
geographically located close to Barcelona (Catalunya), but operate as independent mesh
clouds and are linked by infrastructure network.
CMNs in Guifi.net are mainly managed by the users who own the nodes and participate
there, or by a few network administrators, on which users trust. This means that adminis-
trative access can not be immediately obtained (if at all) on certain nodes. Furthermore,
very different versions of the qMp router-system firmware are in use in these CMNs, as
some nodes are not regularly updated after installation. To install the NCT software and
perform experiments with the nodes both administrative acces and up-to-date firmware
versions are needed. This makes almost impossible to deploy it in the short term in larger
CMNs like GuifiSants[35] (with some 40 active nodes).
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2.3.3.1 History and current state of the Raval CMN
The Raval CMN is one of the more recently deployed ones in Barcelona. The first nodes
were installed in 2013 by Routek[106] with the financial support of the city council as part
of a bigger plan[107] to reduce the digital divide in this district of the city. This project
involved local organizations related with the community sector and the digital inclusion
(non-profits, etc.).
At the time of developing NCT, there are 17 nodes running qMp in the Raval CMN and
using BMX6 as the main RP. All the nodes work on the same 5 GHz unlicensed frequency,
and they are strategically deployed in an area of less than 1 km2. On 4 of the locations
there are two backbone mesh network nodes with sector antennae to cover, in total, about
240 degrees horizontally. The rest of the network locations have a single wireless device
with more directional antennae. One of the backbone nodes has a dedicated infrastructure
link that connects to the rest of Guifi.net and operates as an Internet GW. The Internet
connection is provided by EXO[108], a non-profit closely related to Guifi.net. Additionally,
a private user offers another Internet GW sponsored by him. The main part of the traffic
is generated by the 7 residential users that connect to the network and the passers-by that
use a free HotSpot.
For both technical and logistic reasons, this CMN is specially suitable for running the NCT
experiments.
2.3.3.2 CNs organization, ownership and administration
The administration model of CN reflects the social background of the people behind them.
In the case of Guifi.net, among the first promoters there use to be hacktivists that build and
operate an embryonic network in some part of the city. During the initial growth phases
they are the main administrators of the network, until more people joins the network and a
critical mass is reached. From this point on, the network grows organically, and newcomers
receive support not only from the first hacktivists, but from others already in and with a
broader scope of interests and skills.
Very often, people find out about CNs in search for non-expensive or even free Internet
access (the misconception of free as in freedom for free as in ”gratis” is a common reason
for disappointment and turn-down). However, those who stay engaged appreciate the
values embedded in such organizations, like social economy, freedom of speech, alternative
and responsible business models.
2.3.4 Network characteristics and NCT performance measurements
Some of the routing protocols adopted worldwide by ISPs, carriers, etc. (like BGP, Routing
Information Protocol (RIP) or OSPF) are also widely used in the context of CNs. However,
they are not always optimal for dealing with the particularities of a CN, specially in the
case of the very dynamic CMNs. There, the links’ physical properties rapidly change,
needing for routing mechanisms that are able react to these changes in shorter times than
those for other use cases.
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The BMX6 RP is specially designed for CMNs, where every user contributes with his own
network node. As this home network router is, in most cases, solely under the control
of the user owning it, he is able to perform network administration tasks that deliver a
better network usage quality of experience9. In BMX6 this is achieved by using different
algorithms for calculating the route of the packets going towards the user’s node.
2.3.4.1 BMX6 routing metrics
BMX6 is a distance-vector routing protocol that accounts for several metric calculation
algorithms. The default one is Vector Bandwidth (VB), which calculates an estimation of
the capacity of the path that packets will follow from one node to another. HC, Multiply
Path (MP) and Expected Bandwidth (EB) can be found among the others available.
Metrics formulation Every node is able to inform the rest of nodes about the algorithm
and the associated parameters to be used for calculating the path metric towards it. At
the same time, every node has an estimation (either a default value or configured by the
network administrator) of the maximum capacity of each one of the network interfaces. A
links matrix cij represents the maximum capacity between node i and j.
A node running the BMX6 RP broadcasts UDP probe packets (named HELLO messages)
to its neighbours. These messages are used by the neighbours to calculate a quality matrix
qij , which is defined as the ratio of successful HELLO messages received from i by j. qij
ranges from 0 (no link) to 1 (perfect link).
During an initial phase, the BMX6 daemon of every node creates a register of all the
nodes in the mesh network and updates their identifiers. By means of an efficient flooding
mechanism, BMX6 propagates information sets from one node to the rest of them. Then a
path metric is calculated in order to set up proper routing decisions. This calculation is
performed using different functions, which can be configured by defining the algorithm and
its associated exponents.
Consider the set of adjacent nodes of node i indexed as 1 ≤ k ≤M . With the transmission
and reception exponents αj and βj received from node j, the link quality matrices for every
adjacent node k are built:
Qjik = umq
αj
ik q
βj
ki (2.8)
Then, to take the capacity of the link between nodes into account, we also build the links’
bandwidth matrices:
Bjik = cikq
αj
ik q
βj
ki (2.9)
Finally, µjki is defined as the metric to reach destination node j when transmitting from
node k to node i. The metric function depends, in general, on Qjik, B
j
ik and µ
j
ki. To sum
9In a CN this is perfectly acceptable as long as it is done under a fair use basis and not worsening other
users’ network performance
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up, the path metrics matrix µ∗ij contains the best metric from node i to node j expressed
as in (2.10).
µ∗ij = max
1≤k≤M
φ(µjki, Q
j
ik, B
j
ik) (2.10)
where φ is the particular metric function used.
2.3.4.2 Metric functions
The BMX6 daemon implements a wide set of metric functions, which are introduced below.
The VB algorithm uses function 2.11 below to calculate the path metric for non-zero
argument values.
1
φ2
=
1
µ2
+
1
B2
(2.11)
The EB and Expected Quality (EQ) algorithms use very similar metric functions (2.12).
Both of them are based on adding the inverse of the metric values.
1
φ
=
1
µ
+
1
x
(2.12)
where x = Q for expected quality and x = B for expected bandwidth. When the exponents
take the particular values α = β = 1, the so-called ETT metric (2.13) is obtained:
1
φ
=
1
µ
+
1
cikqikqki
(2.13)
Finally, another set of metric calculation functions (2.14) are based on the multiplication
of different terms:
1
φ
=
1
x
um
Q
(2.14)
where x = min(µ, c) is used for the Multiply Bandwidth (MB) algorithm and x = µ for
the Multiply Quality (MQ).
2.3.4.3 Experimentation environment in the Raval CMN (Barcelona)
In order to test the NCT capabilities for performing network experimentation outside of a
controlled testbed environment, the Guifi.net CMN of the Raval district in Barcelona has
been selected (see 2.3.3 for more details).
In this small∼middle-sized and very densely meshed network, almost all the nodes are
directly connected with at least five other nodes. This means, a priori, that a large number
of possible short e2e paths between two nodes can be used, rather than a few paths with
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many hops in between. In addition, all the nodes are built with similar hardware (in terms
of CPU architecture, transmission power, antenna radiation patterns) and installation
techniques (orientation, etc.) so they are expected to all offer very similar performance.
The first experiments that have been performed using the NCT in a real-life CMN analyse
the paths diversity between two specific nodes over time and the round-trip time of ICMP
ping probes with different routing metrics calculation algorithms in use. The preliminary
information about the BMX6 RP behaviour in this CMN, the performance measurements,
etc. could be very valuable for improving the network quality of experience of the end
users.
Diversity in path discovery experiment The objective of this first experiment is
to evaluate the diversity of paths that BMX6 chooses over a period of time to transmit
packets from one node (the origin node) to another (the destination node). Since BMX6
is a distance-vector protocol, in order to discover the full path, next hops towards the
destination need to be asked iteratively, starting at the origin node, until the last hop to
the destination is found. Each node decides, at the time of forwarding the packet, which
node to send it to. This decision is taken according to the calculated metrics matrix (see
section 2.3.4.1) and the metrics calculation algorithm announced by the destination node.
In this experiments set-up, the default algorithm (VB) and exponents (1/2, 1/1) are used.
To perform the path diversity experiments, the origin and destination nodes in the Raval
CMN have been selected with the following criteria: they must not have direct connection
between them (i.e. not be neighbours) and they must have good connectivity with at least
three other mesh nodes. This way, it is potentially probable to obtain a greater paths
diversity.
Four rounds of path discovery measurements have been performed, each finding the path
from the origin node towards the destination node 100 times. In each round, different
values for ∆t (the pause between consecutive path discoveries) have been used: 0 s, 5 s, 10 s
and 30 s.
The experiments data show that, after the 400 paths discovery measurements, a total of
11 different unique paths have been recorded. Fig. 2.29 shows the probability of their
occurrence on the 4 rounds, along with the total experiments average. In the plots only
the 9 more used paths have been represented, sorted by order of appearance in the results.
As can be seen in the figure, path 1 is clearly the preferred path, used in more thant than
60% of the occasions, followed by number 2 (15%) and number 3 (12%). These paths
consist of, respectively, 2, 3 and 2 hops. The six next paths represented account for 2, 2, 3,
2, 3 and 4 hops, and the two remaining paths (not shown in Fig. 2.29) both consist of 3
hops. These numbers confirm the preliminary impression about the high density of the
Raval CMN (the 2-hops paths indicate that origin and destination nodes share at least 5
common neighbours).
ICMP ping performance with different algorithm experiment The goal for this
second experiment is to evaluate the Round-Trip Time (RTT) of ICMP ping probes
when different BMX6 metric calculation algorithms are in use (see section 2.3.4.1 for
reference). This is a first approach to one of the main objectives of the NCT: to provide
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Figure 2.29: CDF of the paths’ occurrences in the path discovery experiments, ordered by
first appearance. The interval between consecutive path discoveries is indicated by ∆t.
The average corresponds to the four rounds of experiments.
end users information about e2e network performance parameters when the routing protocol
configuration is modified.
In this experiment, the same two nodes as in section 2.3.4.3 have been selected, expecting
that having a wide list of possible paths will be reflected in the ability of BMX6 to take
advantage of them under different metrics calculation algorithms.
Eight rounds of ICMP ping tests have been performed, testing the EQ, MB, EB and VB
metrics calculation algorithms with two different ICMP packet sizes (64 B and 1008 B).
On each round, 5 series of 20 pings have been performed at intervals of 60 s.
The most convenient way to obtain valuable data from the results of the experiment is to
plot their [cropped] CDF, as can be seen in Figure 2.30. Differences from one algorithm to
another can be seen there. On the left sub-figure, for instance, VB clearly outperforms
the other algorithms, while the EB algorithm incurs in significant delays (beyond 50 ms,
though without packet loss). On the right sub-figure, all the algorithms perform worse
than before (surely due to the higher packet size). Three of them (VB, MB and EQ) have
similar performance characteristics, while EB outperforms them and even behaves better
than with the smaller packet size.
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Figure 2.30: CDF of the paths’ occurrences in the path discovery experiments, ordered by
first appearance. The average corresponds to the four rounds of experiments.
2.3.4.4 Discussion
Before reaching any conclusion, it is worth noting that these two experiments presented
have been the first ones to be performed with the NCT in a real-life CMN, with the
difficulties described in section 2.3.3 in comparison to a laboratory testbed environment.
Only a very small fraction of the many network performance aspects has been monitored
and for a short period of time.
This said, however, these experiments become a proof of concept of the usefulness of the
NCT for evaluating the network performance in a CMN. The preliminary results show
that, in a very densely meshed network like the one described, even when many paths are
potentially available only a few of them are intensively used while the others are marginally
chosen. In terms of network performance, observable differences have been found between
the tested metrics calculation algorithms and in function of the packet size.
For future experiments, in the Raval CMN or elsewhere, the effect of the different algorithms
in the diversity of network paths shall be analyzed, in order to improve the understanding of
the behaviour of the network as a whole. In terms of network performance, additional tests
shall be performed (e.g. throughput) for different types of traffic (real-time multimedia
streaming, web browsing, P2P transfers, etc.).
2.3.5 Summary
In this Section 2.3 we presented and discussed the NCT, a tool providing network interaction
capabilities for CMNs users to control routing parameters and monitor and evaluate network
performance from within the web interface of their home routers. The objective of the tool
is to provide them with life information on the current topology, paths, and performance
of their CN and allow them to take administrative actions on their devices to improve the
experienced network quality for the different Internet applications involved.
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We integrated the NCT into the wireless router firmware qMp and described the experienced
challenges and benefits from its deployment in a productively used community mesh network
in the Raval district in Barcelona/Catalunya.
2.3.5.1 Future work plan
In terms of development, the NCT is not yet ready to be used by average CMN users, as more
testing has to be performed outside the laboratory testbed, in real CN environments. In
terms of the adoption by the community, a few users have tested it at different development
stages and have provided informal but valuable reports on usability and desired features.
The tool, once it is mature enough, is expected to be included by default or optional with
future qMp router-system version.
From the experimentation point of view, we plan to perform more systematic tests, consid-
ering additional routing-metric and mechanisms, broader diversities of possible e2e paths
(as typically given by larger networks), and long-lasting experiments, to better understand
and exploit the full potential of employed RPs and the whole CMN infrastructure.

Chapter 3
Evaluation of Mesh Routing
Protocols
In this chapter we focus on one important self-management mechanism, routing, and we
study the scalability, performance, and stability of three proactive mesh routing protocols:
OLSR [99], BMX6 [38] and Babel [101], three common routing protocols in wireless
community networks. We study different metrics on an emulation framework and on the
W-ILab.T testbed at iMinds under different networks’ sizes and characteristics, making the
most of the two worlds. Emulation allows us to have more control over the topology and
more systematically repeat the experiments, whereas a testbed provides a realistic wireless
medium and more reliable measurements, especially in terms of interference and resource
consumption. These routing protocols have been further characterized by studying their
control overhead, convergence delay, CPU and memory consumption, and stability. Our
results show the relative merits, costs, and limitations of the three protocols.
3.1 Related Work
Ad hoc network routing protocols have been extensively studied in the literature; however,
most of the work done focuses on mobile ad hoc networks. The performance of routing
protocols is expected to be different in wireless mesh networks, where the backbone mesh
nodes are static and do not have energy constraints.
Among the three protocols considered, OLSR has received more attention: its protocol
overhead, route convergence time, delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, and throughput have
been compared in simulations with those of AODV, HWMP, DSR, TORA and DSDV ([49,
50, 109–112]). There are also some real testbed experiments that compare OLSR with
BATMAN([48, 113]) or AODV([114–116]) in networks that range up to 49 nodes and some
provide additional information such as CPU and memory consumption.
The results in these studies demonstrate that compared to on-demand routing protocols,
OLSR has comparable results in terms of delivery ratio, while the end-to-end delay is lower,
and the overhead is lower in dense networks with many flows and higher in the contrary
situation. The OLSR protocol has been also compared with other proactive routing
protocols, such as Babel and BATMAN in [52] and [113], showing that distance-vector
protocols have lower overhead but do not necessarily achieve higher throughput.
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The authors of [116] experimentally quantified and discussed the performance of OLSR,
Babel, and AODV implementations based on a small (7-nodes) indoors testbed. Results
are ranked using Kiviat diagrams to balance between the studied measures of overhead,
energy consumption, packet reordering, delay, and loss. Although the obtained standard
deviations for each measure indicate a high statistical validity and allow a clear and non-
overlapping ranking between the different protocols, the relevance of equivalently compared
but obviously correlated measures of different importance seems misleading.
Another shortcoming is the lack of plausible explanations for certain results, such as why
the overhead of proactive routing protocols in an unchanging environment should depend
on the distance (hops) between two communicating nodes or how application-traffic delay
and loss measured between two nodes with only a single possible single-hop path between
them could be affected by the routing protocol.
Regarding self-healing and convergence performance, while a tremendous amount of work
has been employed in the last years on simulation-based research on the performance
of mobile ad-hoc networking and mesh routing protocols regarding their performance
[117–120] and tuning [121, 122], much less insight hs been published based on experimental
analysis using emulation [1, 52, 123] or testbeds [116, 124, 125], leaving the experimental
performance evaluation of changing topology aspects on mesh routing protocols surprisingly
unattended.
Despite this gap of profound experimental evaluation, pioneering projects have started to
work on concrete solutions targeted for low-budget IEEE802.11 enabled devices, such as
the Serval project [126], promising a communication anytime and anywhere even in the
absence of phone towers and other supporting infrastructure. Another project, however,
which does not focus on mobile routers, is the Village Telco project [127]. It is interesting
to note that both of these projects have changed the underlying routing protocols since
their existence due to critical performance issues found in live deployments.
In addition, it is worth mentioning the Battlemesh event [34], which is an annual gathering of
mesh-routing protocol developers with the objective to compare their protocols in different
challenging environments and scenarios, including mobile scenarios. Unfortunately, due to
the dynamics of these events, reproducible results obtained via systematically performed
measurements have not yet been documented. However, measurement snapshots from past
years, capturing the performance in semi-static and mobile scenarios suggest a huge gap
between simulation-based and experimentation-based measurements.
This work extends our earlier studies in [1, 7, 128] which, compared with other work
such as [52, 113, 116], also evaluates the effect of network dynamics (e.g. link failures)
and topology changes; topological constraints that must be expected from any real-world
wireless mesh deployment. Another relevant difference of our work is that results are based
on the combination of various scenarios and topologies and are thus not tightly coupled to
a particular deployment, which allows us to generalize results and derive expectations for
deployments with different topological structures, sizes, or node densities. Also, to the best
of our knowledge, none of the existing works has experimentally and comparatively studied
the performance of existing proactive routing-protocol implementations when exposed to
highly changing topologies as evaluated with our reactivity and mobility experiments.
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3.2 Mesh Routing Protocols
Routing is a critical function in wireless mesh networks, since it decides the path any
packet must follow to reach its destination. In a community network that grows organically,
with several hops from the source to the gateway and where network management is not
done by a single entity, but by many members of the community in a decentralized way,
it is imperative that a routing protocol is able to continuously adapt to network changes.
Routing protocols are usually classified as proactive or reactive, based on whether they
learn routing paths proactively or just when needed (reactively). In [23], it can be seen
that the vast majority of community networks use proactive routing protocols, since nodes
do not have energy constraints. Additionally, proactive routing protocols are more efficient
in terms of packet delay and outperform reactive protocols when the number of flows in
the network increases [129].
One of the goals of our evaluation is to understand the consequences of choosing either
a distance-vector or a link-state paradigm and how it affects scalability. Distance-vector
routing protocols follow the Bellman-Ford algorithm, sharing only aggregated information
about the path metrics, whereas link-state protocols share the whole view of the network,
and the metric of every single link is known by every node. On the representation of
link-state routing protocols, the choice is OLSR, which can be seen as a reference as it is
the most studied [52, 130–134] and used [23] link-stated routing protocol. On the distance-
vector side, we have chosen BMX6 and Babel. Babel has been chosen because it is a clear
implementation of a distance-vector protocol and BMX6 because of its recent popularity
in existing community network projects (e.g., Guifi.net/qMp [3] and Libre-mesh [33]). In
addition, BMX6 uses the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA1) hashes instead of IP addresses
as node identifiers and implements a number of features to reduce the protocol overhead
while keeping the protocol as reactive as possible. The other famous Layer-2 BATMAN
[135] has not been included in our evaluation because of the difficulty of comparing it
with the Layer-3 protocols. All four above protocols have been extensively discussed and
experimentally challenged in last years Battlemesh [34] workshops.
In the following subsections, we explain how these three routing protocols work by describing
the mechanisms used for neighbor discovery (How does a node know other mesh nodes in
range?) and topology dissemination (How does a node learn about routes to nodes that
are not directly reachable?).
3.2.1 Babel
Babel is a proactive, distance-vector routing protocol based on the Bellman-Ford protocol
[101]. Its main concern is to limit routing pathologies as routing loops or black holes, which
it achieves using a proper feasibility condition and attaching a sequence number to routing
updates.
Babel’s feasibility condition determines which of the received routing updates should be
considered and which should not; a routing update for a route is feasible only if its metric
is smaller than any of the routing updates for the previously advertised route.
The sequence number attached to a routing update is generated by the destination node it
announces and determines to which other routing updates the metric can be compared.
Only information with the same sequence number is comparable.
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Neighbor discovery. Babel nodes discover its neighborhood by exchanging two types of
messages.
• Hello messages are sent to a multicast address by every Babel interface with a
sequence number that is increased locally every time a new Hello message is sent.
By listening to Hello messages, a node not only discovers its neighboring nodes, but
it also estimates the reception cost (rxcost) of that link. By default Babel sends a
Hello message every four seconds.
• I heard you (IHU) messages are used to determine the bidirectionality of a link and
share the rxcost with the neighboring node. The IHU messages are conceptually
unicast; however, they are sent to a multicast address to avoid address resolution
protocol (ARP) exchanges and to aggregate multiple messages in a single packet.
They are also sent periodically, but usually not as often as a Hello messages; by
default they are sent every 12 seconds.
Topology dissemination. In Babel, nodes discover far away nodes by sharing their
routing table in route update messages.
• A route update message announces a route and its associated cost, and every Babel
node sends a periodic update for every node it can reach to a multicast address.
Additionally, when there is a significant change in the network topology, such as a
route retraction or a significant change in the metric, an unscheduled route update is
sent, so that periodic updates do not need to happen as often (by default every 16
seconds).
When a node receives an update, first of all it checks its feasibility, and if feasible, it
computes the accumulated metric by combining the metric on the update message plus
the cost of the link from where the update is received.
3.2.2 BMX6
The BMX6 protocol is also a proactive, destination-sequenced distance vector protocol
whose main goal is to reduce the size of periodic messages to achieve low routing overhead
while attaining high reactivity to network changes. The key concepts behind this are (i)
using a stateful-compressed communication between neighbors and (ii) the context-specific
propagation of local versus global and static versus dynamic information.
In a mesh network with flat addressing, reducing overhead using stateful communication
translates largely to the use of compact (16 bit) local identifiers to refer to other nodes,
since addresses (specially with IPv6) are very long. Therefore, every message sent by a
node will use its own local identifiers instead of a global one, which has been previously
shared.
On the categorization for information, static information refers to such addresses and other
details about a node that are unlikely to change; those attributes are gathered together into
the node’s description. On the other hand, dynamic information refers mainly to link and
path costs estimations. The global versus local separation determines which information is
kept within the neighborhood and which is flooded through the network; local identifiers
and link costs are kept locally, while path costs and node descriptions are shared globally.
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Neighbor discovery. Neighbors are discovered in a similar fashion to Babel.
• Hello messages are sent to a multicast address periodically with a sequence number
that is locally increased every time a new Hello message is generated. By default,
Hello messages are sent every 0.5 seconds.
• Report (RP) messages are sent with the same interval as Hello messages and report
the number of Hello messages received. By counting the number of Hello messages
received from a node and knowing the number of Hello messages that a node has
received, a node can compute both the transmission and reception costs of a link.
Topology dissemination. Routes to other nodes in the network in BMX6 are obtained
as a result of the flooding of originator messages.
• OriGinator Messages (OGM) are sent periodically by every node (originator) to
announce its presence and then re-sent if appropriate by any node that receives it. An
OGM contains the sender’s local identifier of the originator, a sequence number, and
a metric that measures the cost of reaching it from the sender’s perspective. When a
node receives an OGM, it computes the cost of reaching the originator by combining
the metric announced in the OGM with the cost of the sender’s link; if this cost is
smaller than the cost via any other neighbor, then the node will re-multicast the
OGM, after updating it with its local identifier and the metric computed. By default,
a node generates an OGM every five seconds.
Additionally, static information is shared on demand. When a node receives an OGM
or a Hello message with an unknown local identifier, it will ask the sender for the node
description’s hash. This hash allows the node to determine whether the local identifier
refers to any of the known nodes, and if it is not the case, then it will request the node’s
description and update its knowledge conccerning the network.
3.2.3 OLSR
In contrast, OLSR, as its name points out, is an optimized link-state routing protocol.
The optimized part comes from the optimization on the flooding mechanism; only nodes
selected as multi-point relays (MPR) retransmit the node’s messages.
Topology dissemination. As any link-state routing protocol, OLSR provides every node
in the network with a (partial) view of the whole topology by flooding the network with
Topology Control (TC) messages.
• A TC message describes all the nodes that are reachable from the message creator,
as well as the quality of the involved links in both directions. The TC messages
are generated periodically by every node in the network and are then retransmitted
unchanged throughout the network. By default, the implementation used in our
experiments transmits a TC message every five seconds.
Neighbor discovery Neighborhood sensing is performed in OLSR by periodically sending
Hello messages.
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• A Hello message consists of a locally increased sequence number and the list of
known links to the sender’s neighbors as well as their quality and the quality from
the neighbor’s perspective. Link quality is computed as a function of the number of
received Hello messages from that neighbor, while the quality from the neighbor’s
perspective is simply the quality reported in its Hello messages. Hello messages are
sent to a multicast address periodically, by default every two seconds.
In this evaluation, we have used the popular implementation by olsrd.org[99], which
implements three fundamental changes to the original RFC. First, the MPR optimization
itself, originally designed for wired scenarios with loss-free links, is modified to require not
only one but seven nodes to reach every two hop neighbor. Otherwise, when considering
even the weakest detected link as a reliable resource for the dissemination of topology
information, massive network instabilities must be expected. Second, to compensate
for the overhead introduced by the increased MPR redundancy, the fish-eye extension
has been introduced [130] where TC updates are exchanged less often between far away
nodes than between nearby nodes. This is achieved by letting the originator of each TC
message use different time to live (TTL) values with the consequence that only every
second TC message propagates beyond the first hop. Third, the path metric used by the
olsrd.org implementation is based on the expected transmit count (ETX) metric [75] which,
compared to the originally proposed hop count metric, provides a better reflection of the
real path cost for transmitting a packet via wireless links. Although controversy on the best
parameterization of this protocol exists (such as the findings published by Johnson and
Hancke in [132] on the performance of ETX and the hysteresis-based hop count metric),
we decided to base our experiments on the defaults of this implementation because their
current selection still represents a common ground that reflects the experience from its
usage in several community networks over many years.
3.2.4 Summary
In essence, what differentiates these routing protocols is their topology dissemination
mechanisms and how they solve and position themselves in the trade-off between convergence
delay and overhead.
• In Babel, nodes only interact with their neighbors, sharing all the relevant information
between them periodically. Routing updates are bigger because they contain the
complete routing table, but are only shared locally. Overhead is reduced by retaining
long intervals between periodic updates, while reactivity is increased by sending
unscheduled updates when the network changes considerably.
• Additionally, BMX6 floods small OGM messages through the network, but principally
the information shared is the same as on Babel, except messages are split and
triggered differently. Overhead is reduced by compacting periodic messages as much
as possible using stateful communication between neighbors, whereas convergence
delay is minimized by having a very frequent exchange of messages.
• Further, OLSR is a link-state protocol; therefore, during topology dissemination,
information concerning every link is shared, instead of path-aggregated information.
Overhead is reduced using the fish-eye extension; updates are shared more frequently
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Table 3.1: Periodic Messages
Message Size (B) Interval Messages/node
Babel
Hello 8 4 s 1
IHU 16 12 s 1× n
Update [ 12, 28 ] 16 s 1× route
BMX6
Hello [ 4, 6 ] 0.5 s 1
RP 1 0.5 s 1× n
OGM 4 5 s 1
OLSR
Hello [ 28, 32 ] +20× n 2 s 1
TC 28 + 20× n 5 s 1
Figure 3.1: Topology dissemination mechanisms
with nearby nodes than with far away nodes, but to be adequately reactive, the time
interval between updates is kept small.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the topology dissemination mechanism for each routing protocol.
Table 3.1 lists the messages exchanged by each routing protocol, explaining its size and
how many of them are exchanged depending on the number of neighbors (n) that a node
has. The size given for each message type does not take into account the length of the
headers.
3.3 Evaluation Metrics
There are several metrics to consider when evaluating the performance and overhead of a
wireless mesh routing protocol.
The most common one is to measure its network efficiency, that is: how much routing
traffic is necessary to be able to establish a connected network. Network efficiency is usually
measured in terms of bytes/second or packets/second.
Given the relatively dynamic properties of wireless community networks we are interested
in measuring how fast the routing protocol can adapt to these network changes or how
stable the IP network is, given that the physical network is not stable. In terms of stability,
we can measure the percentage of time the network is connected by pinging from some
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nodes to others or, similarly, measuring the longest time the network is not connected.
From the perspective of reactivity, we can measure how long it takes to learn a new or
better path, which is what we call convergence time. We are also interested in the cost
in terms of the resource consumption of processing (CPU) and memory for each routing
protocol. We must ensure the network nodes have the capabilities to run such protocols.
We measure the sensitivity of these metrics to the scale of the network, according to the
variation of the size of the node neighborhood, variation of the total network size, variation
of the length and number of hops of the network paths, and variation of the availability of
links or the rate of changes in the network.
These measurements are performed and evaluated in different scenarios using container-
based emulation and testbed-based experimentation. Both of them have different degrees of
realism and flexibility. Emulation allows total control over environmental conditions, such
as topology, availability, and changes but under limited realism. For instance, details taken
from diverse real wireless community networks regarding the structure and events during a
temporal period can be reproduced in a series of experiments and even be subjected to
variations. In contrast, testbed experimentation provides a real environment, under stable
environmental conditions, with a given set of nodes, radios, and locations, and control over
a few aspects, such as transmit power and choice of nodes to use in an experiment among
those available in the testbed.
3.4 Emulation Experiments
Using emulation, we can easily measure network overhead and convergence time. It is
also possible to measure the cost in terms of memory, but the CPU cost is not reliable.
Measuring the quality of the path is also complicated because the channels are not perfectly
modeled. These metrics, therefore, are better studied in a testbed or real world deployment.
The emulation experiments presented in this chapter represent a summary of the results
obtained during several experiments using the same emulation system. Table 3.2 shows the
network characteristics used for each figure. The Barcelone`s area corresponds to a large
portion of the city and metropolitan area of Barcelona, and its topology was retrieved
from Guifi.net Community Network Mark Up Language (CNML). Generator refers to
topologies obtained using the generator from [41] with parameters from the Osona county,
a representative semi-rural area where Guifi.net started. Each specific experiment with a
given set of parameter values was repeated at least 20 times.
Our emulation system is based on mesh Linux containers (MLC) [39], which is a set of
scripts based on Linux containers (LXC) and Linux networking tools, such as ip or tc. The
MLC runs an LXC container for each node in the network and establishes the desired
connections between them with a given link quality using tc, so that packets are randomly
dropped and delayed with probabilities as configured. The system does not allow applying
complex Wi-Fi models or reflecting the impact of interference between links of any kind.
3.4.1 Network Overhead
In our first set of experiments, we studied the effect of network size on the network
overhead of each routing protocol. The topology emulated in this case corresponds with a
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Table 3.2: Network characteristics of the emulation experiments
Topology Number of nodes Number of links
Figs. 3.3a, 3.4a Barcelone`s {10,20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 66} {9,21,31,43,54,65,72}
Figs. 3.3b, 3.4b Barcelone`s 50 54
Figs. 3.3c, 3.4c Barcelone`s 69 {75,100,150,250,500,750,1000}
Fig. 3.5a Barcelone`s 66 72
Figs. 3.5b, 3.5c Generator 50 75
Fig. 3.6a Generator 49 74
Fig. 3.6b Generator {16,25,49,64,81,100} {24,38,74,96,122,150}
Figure 3.2: The topology of the Barcelone`s network
representation of the Barcelone`s area of Guifi.net (shown in Figure 3.2 and more details in
Table 3.2), where each link quality was determined by averaging the measurements of one
hour.
Figures 3.3a and 3.4a illustrate the network overhead in bytes and packets of each routing
protocol on networks with different numbers of nodes. To obtain those networks, the
original network was randomly sampled. As we can see, the number of bytes increases with
the number of nodes, and OLSR seems to be the more heavily influenced protocol, Babel
always has lower overhead but seems to increase at a faster rate than BMX6. Regarding
the number of packets, all routing protocols seem quite stable except Babel, which has a
step increase on 50 nodes.
Then for Figures 3.3b and 3.4b, we run the experiment using the Barcelone`s network
without any modifications, and it shows the overhead of each node depending on the
number of neighbors each node has. As we can see, OLSR is more heavily affected by the
number of neighbors, whereas Babel and BMX6’s overhead in bytes only increases slightly
with the number of neighbors. The number of packets looks stable in every case, except
for a peak in Babel when there are five neighbors.
Finally, Figures 3.3c and 3.4c show the results when there is a fixed number of 69 nodes in
the network, but the number of links is variable. As before, OLSR is the protocol that is
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(a) Bytes vs. nodes (b) Bytes vs. specific links (c) Bytes vs. average links
Figure 3.3: Network overhead in bytes
(a) Packets vs. nodes (b) Packets vs. specific links (c) Packets vs. average links
Figure 3.4: Network overhead in number of packets
more heavily affected by the number of links, whereas Babel remains stable in every case.
Further, BMX6 increases slightly as the number of links increases. Because every point
represents the overhead for a node, nodes with higher numbers of links within the same
network will have higher overhead, and this difference is greater for OLSR than for BMX6
and Babel. The results for the number of packets are similar.
3.4.2 Stability and Reactivity
Our second set of experiments attempts to characterize the stability and reactivity of the
three routing protocols.
To measure the convergence time, we have looked for the longest path on the Barcelone`s
network. Then, we have measured how long it takes to discover new nodes that are
attached to each of the nodes in the path from one of the endpoints. Figure 3.5a depicts
our experiments’ results. The OLSR obtains the worst performance, and we can clearly
see a step function. This is due to the fish-eye extension [130], which sends link updates
more frequently to nearby nodes, and not that frequently to far away nodes. Both BMX6
and Babel have flat responses, with BMX6 outperforming Babel.
In reference to measuring the stability, we have generated random network topologies using
the community network generator presented in [41] with the parameters from the Osona
zone in the Guifi.net [36] community network (degree=2.99, shape α = 0.2521602, and rate
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(a) Convergence vs. hops (b) Ping success vs. changes (c) Oﬄine period vs. changes
Figure 3.5: Network stability and reactivity
β = 0.01147359). Then links of the network were turned on and off with different times
between changes but always ensuring that the network remained connected. Figure 3.5b
illustrates the success rate of a ping between two randomly selected nodes of the network,
depending on the number of changes per second. As expected, more changes imply that the
routing protocol cannot keep up, and connectivity is lost sometimes. In this case, BMX6
outperforms both Babel and OLSR, which present similar results. Figure 3.5c presents the
same results regarding which routing protocol has longer oﬄine periods.
3.4.3 Memory Usage
The final metric studied through emulation is the cost in terms of memory. To measure the
memory consumption, we have run the experiments on a computer with an Intel Core2 Duo
E8400 processor running at 3.00 GHz with 4 GB of memory. We have retrieved statistics
regarding memory usage using the pmap utility.
Our first experiment considers a network of 49 nodes and 74 links, and studies the memory
consumed by each node based on the number of neighbors it has (Figure 3.6a). In this
scenario, both OLSR and Babel show constant memory usage, independently of the number
of neighbors; however, BMX6 requires more memory when the number of neighbors reaches
15. The results are similar in our next experiment (Figure 3.6b), which increases the size
of the network (e.g., network with 16 nodes and 24 links, then 25 nodes and 38 links, etc.)
and measures the average memory used by each node. Babel memory usage is stable,
BMX6 increases with size and for OLSR, we observe an increase in one case for the biggest
network. We believe that, for bigger networks, we would also see an increase in the memory
use for OLSR and Babel, but this is not seen because memory is assigned in chunks, and,
in contrast to BMX6, the OLSR and Babel protocols do not yet need the full memory
provided by the current chunk. The assignment of memory in chunks also explains why
memory usage of BMX6 seems non-linear. The measured usage remains unchanged until
the last allocated memory chunk is exhausted and the probability for allocating the next
chunk rises quickly and is non-linear in sections. The measured BMX6 memory usage in
Figure 3.6a for 10 and 15 neighbors indicates such a section. In Figure 3.6b, the exponential
growth in memory requirements for BMX6 is also caused by an increasing number of links
that come with an increasing number of nodes.
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(a) Memory vs. number of links (b) Memory vs. number of nodes
Figure 3.6: Memory consumption
3.5 Testbed Experiments
In contrast to emulation, a testbed-based experimentation allows us, at the cost of limited
flexibility for considering CN-typical topologies, to study the impact of real embedded node
hardware and wireless channel characteristics in an isolated environment. This way we
aim to complement our picture of the protocol-respective overhead and efficiency (in terms
of stability and reactivity) when processing capabilities of nodes are limited by hard CPU
and memory boundaries and transmissions are subject to loss, delay, and jitter caused by
interference among nodes.
3.5.1 Experiment Setup
Protocol performance measurements based on real hardware have been performed in the
W-ILab.T wireless testbed [136]. The facility consists of approximately 60 stationary and
15 mobile experimentation devices deployed in a 60 x 20 meter indoor location at iMinds.
The grid-like deployment structure of stationary devices is principally given by six rows
with 10 devices (columns) each and an inter row space of 3.6 meters and inter column
space of six meters. The devices consist of of-the-shelf computer hardware, each equipped
with two 802.11abgn WLAN cards, which can be freely programmed by the experimenters.
Further characteristics and configurations are summarized in Table 3.3.
The devices, also called nodes, were configured to run a Linux operating system (OS)
based on OpenWRT, a Linux distribution optimized for embedded wireless devices, and
several convenient OS and measurement tools to control and collect measurement data.
For the experiment, 50 nodes (the upper five node rows) have been used with one radio
each configured in IEEE 802.11a ad-hoc mode. All protocols were configured to run on
IPv6 and to announce only their primary interface addresses. Given the physically dense
node deployment with an average neighbor distance of less than five meters, a number of
preliminary measurements were performed to understand the wireless characteristics of
the testbed and to avoid a fully connected mesh where the broadcast-based link detection
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Table 3.3: General W-ILab.T testbed and protocol characteristics and configuration
Characteristic Configuration
Environment Laboratory 16x60 meter
Deployment Regular 5x10 nodes grid (see Fig. 3.7a)
Operating system Linux/OpenWRT BarrierBreaker rev41558
Protocol impl. babeld v1.5.0, bmx6 rev8b0585e8, olsrd v0.6.6.2
Hardware ZOTAC NM10-ITX
CPU model Intel(R) Atom(TM) CPU D525 @ 1.80GHz
Memory 903460 kB
Wireless Atheros - AR928X 802.11a/b/g/n
Wireless mode 80211a, ad-hoc, channel 36 (5.18GHz)
Table 3.4: Experimented parameters, defaults, and ranges
Parameter Default Range
Transmit power [dBm] 3 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
Transmit rate [Mbit] 36 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48, 54
Used nodes 50 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
Network Load active none versus active (single TCP stream be-
tween most distant nodes of a row)
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Figure 3.7: Topologies in different scenarios
mechanisms of the routing protocols detect links to nearly all other nodes (note that even
the two most distant nodes are less than 63 meters away from each other) and achieve
the establishment of true multi-hop topologies. The result of this exercise can be seen
in Figure 3.7, showing topology snapshots (as detected by the OLSR protocol) resulting
from different transmit power configurations with and without background traffic. The
representation of node locations that are physically placed in a strict grid structure starts
with the first node in the top left at (x, y)-position (0, 0) and has been bended to allow the
illustration of many otherwise hidden links. E.g. the weaker (yellow) direct link between
nodes at positions (0, 0) and (0,−15) in Figure 3.7c would have been overdrawn by the four
stronger (green) and shorter links between nodes at positions (0, 0), (0,−3.75), (0,−7.5),
(0,−11.25), (0,−15).
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Figure 3.8: Network densities and link qualities for different testbed configurations
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Figure 3.9: End-to-end path length and TCP throughput depending on network density
varying power and rate
The average number of links per node is shown in Figure 3.8 for the number of nodes,
transmit (TX) power, and TX rate grouped by their link quality and whether the links
were captured with or without interference caused by TCP background traffic. It can
be seen that the presence of TCP user traffic significantly decreases the perception of
high-quality links (here those with an ETX rate of less than 1.3), while the total number of
detected links is much less affected. The figure also indicate that, in our testbed scenario,
the average number of links per node increase linearly with the selected transmit power.
Figure 3.9a demonstrates the path length established by each routing protocol to route
from the leftmost node in the second upper row (node Id 0) to the rightmost node in the
same row (node Id 9). As expected, with a low transmit power (or high TX rate) and
consequently small transmit range the selected end-to-end path relies on many intermediate
hops, while less relaying nodes are required with an increased TX power (or a more robust
but lower rate). Figures 3.9b and 3.9c give an impression on the end-to-end throughput
achievable with each routing protocol when varying the node density by increasing power
or rate.
Based on these findings, our following experiments will be configured to use the parameters
shown in Table 3.4. Primarily, we use 3 dBm of transmit power and disabled transmit
rates below 36 Mbps to enforce the establishment of topologies with more than seven hops.
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3.5.2 Measurements
In order to measure the impact of neighbor size (density) and network size on cost
and performance, all protocols have been sequentially exposed to a variety of testbed
configurations. These testbed configurations were given by the range of parameterization
values for each studied parameter and the default value for all other parameters. Each
exposure (experiment) consists of the following standard procedure. First, all currently
active protocols were disabled on all nodes. Then, the interfaces, IPv6 addresses, wireless
settings (channel, mode, TX power, and enabled rates), and the currently probed protocol
(only one at a time) were configured and activated only on those nodes relevant for this test.
A stabilization period of 100 seconds was applied before continuing the actual measurement
to avoid capturing of atypical bootstrapping effects. Each following measurement lasted
60 seconds and relied on common Linux tools (such as ping6, iperf, top, and tcpdump)
for active probing of end-to-end path characteristics and monitoring and capturing CPU,
memory, and traffic overhead.
After each experiment, the measurement data were oﬄoaded and, once all experiments of
a particular scenario were executed, post processed into graphs illustrating the dependency
of one characteristic depending on a particular testbed parameter. Each measurement
point in any of the graphs shown in Figures 3.8 to 3.15 represents the averaged relevant
measurement data captured during a single experiment run.
The very limited exclusive testbed usage slots that allow interference-free experiments in the
often overbooked W-ILab.T infrastructure do not allow the systematic repetition of scenarios
required for a statistical validity analysis. Instead, the goal has been covering a wide range
of selected parameters. However, atypical measurements have been selectively repeated to
avoid the consideration of exceptional outliers. This way, the resulting and purposely un-
smoothed plots also include strongly varying behavior that is a typical characteristic of any
real wireless network. Still, a number of protocol-typical characteristics and tendencies can
be identified and generally acknowledge the findings made via our previous emulation-based
measurements.
The results in Figures 3.10a, 3.11a, 3.13a, and 3.14a illustrate the impact of network size
on overhead, CPU, and memory consumption and are based on the experiments of a single
scenario where nodes, grouped in rows with 10 nodes each, were successively added to the
total number of participating nodes, starting with the second row (which also contained
source and destination node used for end-to-end path probing and optional transmission of
TCP user traffic), then adding the first, third, fourth, and fifth rows until the final size of
50 nodes was reached, eventually yielding a topology as illustrated in Figure 3.7a. During
this scenario, the power and minimum rate was fixed to 3 dBm and 36 Mbps.
The impact of node density has been studied by either varying the transmit power of each
node (with results shown in Figures 3.10b, 3.11b, 3.13b, and 3.14b) or by varying the
minimal allowed transmit rate per node (see Figures 3.10c, 3.11c, 3.13c, and 3.14c). For
these scenarios, all 50 nodes were used from the beginning, but transmit power or rate was
successively changed in each experiment round.
The repetition of the above scenarios without background user traffic revealed that CPU
and memory consumption do not significantly differ in both cases: thus, only the resulting
impact on protocol overhead is shown in Figure 3.12.
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In order to obtain an experimentation-based picture of the self-healing capabilities of each
protocol, we probed the end-to-end path between two nodes. This was realized using a
20-node subset (given by the upper two rows) of the original 50-node topology and an
additional “mobile” node installed on a robot that was programmed to move with different
speeds just below the second row of nodes in the W-ILab.T deployment from near the
leftmost node column to the eighth column and back. Figure 3.7d illustrates this setup.
The robot turning points were located 42 meters (or seven inter-column spaces) apart from
each other. Path health to this moving node was probed using the ping6 command from
the fourth node of the second row, located in the middle between the turning points. Figure
3.15a shows, based on a TX power and rate setting of 3 dBm and 36 Mbps, that for each
protocol the average ping success rate to this moving node depending on its velocity, each
reflects a scenario with differently fast changing links. It can be seen how the success rate,
around 90% at velocities of 5 cm per second for all protocols, decreases with increasing
destination velocities down to around 60% for BMX6 and below 40% for OLSR and Babel.
The repetition of this scenario with slightly increased power settings at 4 and 5 dBm (see
Figure 3.15b and 3.15c) lead to a broader continuous coverage of the moving node, giving
routing protocols more time to adapt to weakening links and narrow the performance gap
between the three protocols.
3.6 Discussion of Results and Conclusion
In this section, we take a closer look at the measurement results obtained via emulation and
experimentation with the objective to gain a general understanding of how the characteris-
tics of a network influence the performance of various routing protocols. We also discuss
potential discrepancies of the two different methodologies. Table 3.5 provides a high-level
summary of the identified protocol-specific behaviors by grouping the studied performance
characteristics (in terms of overhead and self-healing capability) and dependencies (in
terms of density, size and topology dynamics) into rows with a few comparative words for
each protocol.
3.6.1 Protocol Data Overhead
Protocol data overhead has been measured in bytes and packets per second and depending
on network size, density, and dynamics.
Regarding byte overhead depending on network size, both, emulation- and experi-
mentation-based measurements (Figures 3.12a and 3.3a) show (apart from one exception
in experimental Babel measurements, which we will discuss later) consistent results of
an essentially linear increase with a protocol specific slope and base load. In addition,
BMX6 shows the highest base load but lowest slope, while Babel shows the lowest base
load and a slightly greater slope and OLSR shows the greatest slope which, given the
emulation-based results, raises up to 400 bps, about 120% more than Babel and 50%
more than BMX6 for a network of 70 nodes. The different absolute numbers between
experimentation- and measurement-based results can be explained by the greater average
number of links (neighbors) per node in the different scenarios, with three versus up to
five (compare Figure 3.8a).
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Figure 3.10: Data overhead (bytes/s) depending on network size and density (power, rate)
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Figure 3.11: Data overhead (packets/s) depending on network size and density (power,
rate)
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Figure 3.12: Data overhead (bytes/s) depending on network size and density (power, rate),
no TCP user traffic
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(c) Impact of TX rate
Figure 3.13: CPU consumption depending on network size and density (power, rate)
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Figure 3.14: Memory consumption depending on network size and density (power, rate)
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Figure 3.15: End-to-end delivery success depending on topology dynamics and link redun-
dancy
67
A different picture arises when experimentally comparing the byte overhead in the
presence of TCP user traffic as shown in Figure 3.10a. Then, transmissions naturally
cause interference and thereby affect the perception of link qualities between neighbors
(Figure 3.8a) as well as the propagation of routing information. In this scenario, we see
that the overhead of Babel increases dramatically because Babel reacts to topology changes
by sending unscheduled route updates. On the other hand, BMX6 and OLSR propagate
routing updates periodically, independently of topology changes; therefore, this results in
little effect on the overhead.
The slight increase in BMX6 can be explained by the requirement of acknowledgements
when exchanging routing updates, which will cause overhead due to the retransmissions
caused by traffic collisions. The opposite is the case for OLSR where the collision of link-
information (TC messages) containing packets, if not successfully received via alternative
links, are not further propagated and eventually result in an decreased overall overhead,
an effect particularly likely in sparse networks with low link redundancy.
Another critical factor affecting protocol overhead is given by the network density where
emulation- and experimentation-based measurements show quite different results. Looking
at the former (Figure 3.3c), the observed shape of all protocols well matches with what one
could expect from each protocol-dissemination algorithms. The highest, quite linear, slope
for OLSR represents that of a non-optimized link-state protocol where information about
all links in the network are propagated to all nodes for calculating a local view of the total
topology. For this purpose, every node contributes to the propagation of this information
by re-broadcasting new link state information once (via TC messages) and thus causing
respectively increasing transmission overhead by each node. This non-optimized link-state
behavior could be explained by the non-standard behavior of the OLSR implementation
using a default MPR selector set of seven (instead of one, see also Section 3.2.3). However,
compared to the experimentation-based results in Figure 3.10b, in the beginning the greatly
increasing OLSR overhead quickly flattens for densities of around 10 or more links per
node (corresponding to a TX power of 5dBm according Figure 3.8b), an effect which
indicates that the OLSR-implementation specific MPR selector set value of seven still
yields significant optimization in very dense networks.
The moderate overhead slope for BMX6 and the constant seeming slope for Babel from
the emulation-based results correspond with the typical characteristics of distance-vector
routing protocols, where link-quality information is only exchanged between neighboring
nodes and thus affects each nodes’ overhead only by a few additional link-probing related
messages and as far as the size of its local neighborhood increases but not beyond. Here
the aggregation of many messages into much less eventually broadcasted packets help to
even flatten the observable overhead on layer 2.
Interestingly, a significantly different picture could be observed for the Babel overhead when
considering the measurement-based experiments where the amount of transmitted data
increases by a factor of 10 when the node density (at a power level of 6 dBm) exceeds 15
links per node. We attribute this behavior to the high susceptibility of the Babel protocol
to topology dynamics, which was already observed for the impact of interfering TCP traffic
in Figure 3.10a. In this case, such topology dynamics are caused by natural interference
and consequent collisions due to the dense wireless deployments, a factor not existing in
the emulation-based analysis. In fact, protocol performance instabilities, which are likely
related to similar topology dynamics, were measured repeatedly in different scenarios. The
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exceptional experimental Babel measurements points mentioned earlier for byte overhead
depending on network size are one example.
The measurement results for network overhead in terms of packets in Figures 3.4 and
3.11 illustrate on the one hand the dominance of protocol-specific link-probing and update
intervals causing a constant and minimal packet transmission rate even in the simplest
possible deployment. On the other hand, once protocol-stress factors (such as network size,
density, or dynamics) cause a protocol to disseminate more data than could be aggregated
into the packets sent at a minimal transmission rate, they show how packet overhead first
increases in steps before scaling linearly with the byte overhead discussed earlier. In this
sense, the high base rate of BMX6, at two packets/second compared to 0.5 packets/second
for OLSR and even less for Babel, should only be considered relevant for deployments of
rather stable and sparse networks. For more complex deployments the initial lowest packet
rate of Babel can easily turn into a rate several times higher rate than that of OLSR and
BMX6.
3.6.2 CPU and Memory Consumption
Experimentation-based measurements show (see Figures 3.13 and 3.14) that network
size and density only have a very limited and generally non-critical impact on the CPU
and memory consumption caused by the respective routing-protocol process. Given the
embedded hardware and studied parameter space of up to 50 nodes and densities above 20
links per node, protocol-specific CPU usage always remained below 2% of the total CPU
processing capacity, and virtual memory consumption (including all shared library objects
mapped into the process) remained significantly below 1.5 MByte while showing only a very
low increase over the studied ranges. Given these experimentation-based measurements,
the memory consumption of Babel is the lowest and least increasing, while OLSR and
BMX6 both show a very similar low linear increase depending on network size. Regarding
density, BMX6 demonstrates a similar low slope as Babel, which matches what can be
expected from any distance-vector protocol that only has to maintain the next hop towards
any distant node. However, the link-state based OLSR protocol, which must keep track of
all relevant links in the overall network topology, shows only a slightly greater increase of
memory usage depending on density.
In contrast, the emulation-based measurements in Figure 3.6 depict the writable memory
requirements (instead of virtual) of OLSR and Babel as completely unaffected by network
size and density and below those of BMX6, which also shows a more spread requirement of
memory for networks with more than 50 nodes or densities with more than 14 links per
node. Nonetheless, the total memory requirements of all protocols remain non-critically
low, given memory provisioning, even of resource-constrained embedded devices.
3.6.3 Self-healing Performance
A number of cases have been studied based on emulation or experimentation to characterize
the capabilities of the different protocols to react to topology changes in different scenarios.
Emulation-based results studying the average time needed by each protocol to fix an
end-to-end path depending on its length (Figure 3.5a) show that the two distance-vector
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based protocols outperform the link-state based OLSR, particularly in end-to-end scenarios
with many intermediate hops.
While the poor performance of OLSR could be explained by the implementation of fish-eye
optimisation, the better convergence time of BMX6 compared to Babel is surprising given
the reactive nature of the Babel algorithm that should encounter spontaneously detected
topology changes on demand instead of delaying the propagation of corresponding routing
updates for the next update period. However, the better performance of BMX6 regarding
topology dynamics is consistently confirmed in all further measurements (emulation- or
experimentation-based, such as shown in Figures 3.5b, 3.5c, and 3.15) and must be
attributed to the prevailing of other protocol characteristics. One reason is certainly given
by the different link-probing and route update intervals (see Table 3.1) used by each
protocol that allow BMX6 (using a Hello interval of only 0.5 seconds) to detect and react to
local topology changes much faster than Babel and OLSR. On the other hand, to enhance
the self-healing performance of a protocol, such intervals cannot be decreased without
introducing additional protocol overhead, which is already significantly higher for the latter
two protocols in large and dense networks and which, if further increased, would also lead
to further protocol instabilities due to self-caused collisions and interference.
Table 3.5: Summary of observed and interpreted performance characteristics from Section
3.6
Characteristic OLSR BMX6 Babel
Increase of protocol overhead depending on size, density, and dynamics
Size: high linear low linear moderate linear
Density (low density): high linear low linear lowest
Density (high wireless
density):
logarithmic low linear in non-linear steps
Topology dynamics due
to interference from
TCP user traffic:
negative unimpaired highly susceptible
with typical strong
growth
Increase of memory usage depending on size and density
Size: low linear low linear lowest, unaffected
Density: linear, acceptable low linear low, unaffected
Comment: Non-critical given the studied range of size, density, and dynamics
Increase of CPU usage depending on size and density
Size: low, total max <
0.5%
low linear, total max
< 0.2%
low linear, total max
< 0.2%
Density: varying, total max <
1.5%
varying, total max <
1%
varying, total max <
2%
Comment: Non-critical given the studied range of size, density, and dynamics
End-to-end path-healing performance due to topology changes
Off time versus path
length:
high, increasing slope
with jump between 7
and 9 hops, avg ∼
35s
low, unaffected,
avg ∼ 8s
medium, unaffected,
avg ∼ 16s
Outage versus BMX6 shows least outage in highly changing environments
changing rate: All protocols equally good at low changing rates
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3.6.4 Conclusion
This section presents an evaluation of mesh routing protocols for wireless community
networks. We study the scalability, performance, and stability of BMX6, OLSR and Babel,
three proactive routing protocols commonly used in these networks, through emulation
and experimentation.
Our emulation and testbed-based experiments with various network conditions at different
scales have provided several detailed results that compare the three protocols. In summary,
we can say that Babel is the most lightweight protocol with the least memory, CPU, and
control-traffic requirements as long as it is used in networks with stable links and low node
densities.
However, if the protocol is used in large or dense wireless deployments with frequent link
changes due to dynamic interference or nodes leaving or joining the network, then its
reactive mechanisms to encounter topology changes by sending additional routing updates
and route request messages turn into massive control-traffic and processing overhead. In
such scenarios, OLSR and BMX6, with their strictly constant rate for sending topology
and routing update messages, outperform Babel in terms of overhead, stability, and even
self-healing capabilities.
The OLSR protocol significantly benefits from the MPR mechanism that (despite the highly
redundant parametrization used within our experiments) achieves only a logarithmically
increasing overhead depending on network density.
The BMX6 protocol benefits from its generally low control overhead due to the usage of
compact local identifiers and the hiding of local state (e.g. link qualities) from globally
propagated information. It differentiates from OLSR with higher memory requirements
but lower control overhead and a better reaction on dynamic link changes.
Chapter 4
Enabling Individually Entrusted
Routing
In this chapter we describe our efforts for the development of routing-protocol mechanisms
than can enhance the autonomy and security of CN users, integrate and scale with the
structural and technological implications given by existing deployments, and support the
general commitment of communities for providing open, neutral, and decentralized network
infrastructures.
Our results show the feasibility and performance of adversary-free routing, based on the
user-individual decisions on the trustiness of components from the overall CN infrastructure
while ensuring neutral recognition and support of even oppositional trustability perspectives
of the participants.
4.1 Introduction
The operation of community mesh networks is based on the principle of cooperation among
its members. These communities usually have participation rules as a membership license
or peering agreement [19, 25, 26], that define their freedom, openness and neutrality.
Nonetheless, current designs and implementations of mesh networks impose comprehensive
technical definitions and restrictions to achieve functional data transit and end-to-end
delivery among any pair of network nodes [22]. That includes the use of a specific routing
protocol and routing metric so that nodes can consistently learn and inform about the
state of the network and update their own routing tables. In practice, due to the lack of
mature implementations, only a very few of the proposed routing protocols are used in
real deployments or have been experimentally analyzed [8, 23, 52, 137]. Among them there
are the AODV [138, 139], Babel [101, 102], BMX6 [38], the widely used OLSR [98–100],
and batman-adv [140] protocol implementations.
One shortcoming of current solutions is given by the lack of routing-security support that
comes without introducing centralized dependencies (e.g. certificate authorities) [141],
which would contradict with the open and the decentralized objectives of such networks.
Another problem lies in the protocol requirements for unified parametrization of metrics
and policies to determine QoS, routing, trust and security decisions for all network nodes
[4]. Such a strong level of unification prohibits the usage of individually defined policies
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and limits its openness. It also imposes a substantial effort, increasing with the number
and diversity of community members, for finding consensus on related questions.
To dilute the limitations of a single and unified set of QoS parameters for routing, QoS
Multi-Topology (MT) routing has been proposed [142, 143], allowing the concurrent support
of multiple virtual topologies (on top of a single physical topology), each established based
on a different definition of QoS parameters. This approach could also be adapted to
concurrently support different security and trust sets. A network could for example
maintain one topology (a) for nodes trusted by organization A, and a second topology (b)
usable only by nodes certified via organization B.
The security design of the protocol proposed in this work ensures that each node is the only
authority able to define and publish its set of individually-trusted nodes via which forwarding
rules (routes) for delivering its traffic should be selected, propagated, and maintained.
This way, our protocol pursues the multi-topology approach as it establishes dedicated
virtual topologies for each participating node. It further supports the cooperative, open,
and decentralized philosophy that enables community networking, as deployed network
infrastructures remain open for other nodes to join and be used while being independent
from any central entity.
In summary, the main contributions of this work are:
• Propose a novel secured and decentralized routing protocol called SEMTOR. In
SEMTOR users can set up trust sets of nodes, which are the only ones allowed to
route their traffic.
• Describe how SEMTOR is implemented as an extension of BMX6, a routing protocol
currently used in production community wireless mesh networks.
• Summarize the assumptions, and respectively achieved safety and liveness properties
provided by SEMTOR, and prove their correctness with formal reasoning.
• Experimental validation of the resistance of SEMTOR to attack scenarios and
challenging network environments.
• Analysis of the hardware requirements of SEMTOR by investigating its performance
in terms of traffic, CPU, and memory overhead. Our results show that SEMTOR
can be deployed using off-the-shelf inexpensive WiFi routers.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After looking at related work in
Section 4.2, we identify the addressed problems and design objectives in Section 4.3 and
detail the system model with further assumptions and definitions in Section 4.4. Section 4.5
describes the design and mechanisms of our protocol to solve these objectives which
is then validated from an formal and an experimental perspective in Section 4.6.3 and
4.7. This includes the presentation of our prototypical implementation and its functional
and performance evaluation using embedded router hardware in a virtualized network
environment. We discuss the contributions, open issues, and adjacent security solution in
Section 4.8 and conclude in Section 4.9.
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4.2 Background and Related Work
Existing work on secure routing for ad hoc and mesh networks has been reviewed in [56,
144]. Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN) [145] as proposed by Sanzgiri et
al. as well as Admittance-control enabling extensions for OLSRv2 proposed by Herberg et
al. [146] use digital signatures to verify the authenticity and integrity of control messages.
Both rely on the existence of a central certificate server trusted by all participating nodes.
Babel HMAC cryptographic authentication [147] relies on one or several pre-deployed
shared keys to validate messages via attached message authentication codes. However,
the requirement for preserving a shared keys as a private secret within an open network
community disqualifies related approaches for any open CN.
SEAD [148] and SAODV [149] encounter the dependency on a central trust authority
with a self-securing control plane. Using Anchored Hash Chains (AHCs) to protect the
mutable hop counter field of routing update messages they ensure that a malicious node
cannot claim better distances to any remote node than it really has. However, both
remain vulnerable to data-plane attacks such as packet dropping or routing-table poisoning.
SAODV also proposes the use of digital signatures to protect non-mutable data in routing
messages. To avoid the dependency of a certification authority as a central root of trust
that guarantees the binding between node public keys and other node properties such as
their IP address Zapata [150] proposes to bind the identity of nodes given by their public
key to their allocated address by building it based on the hash of the public key.
Work in [151] and [152] address the problem of misbehaving nodes by punishing malicious
nodes based on their forwarding behavior as observed and assessed by neighboring nodes.
Adnane et al. [151] build on top of SOLSR and extend it with detection and reaction
mechanisms. Mogre et al. [152] present another holistic approach combining self-securing
routing, detection, reputation, and counter-measure mechanisms.
SEMTOR follows a different approach. In fact, guaranteeing in all aspects the correct
operation of nodes is indeed hard and, as pointed out by Adnane et al. [151], cannot
be guaranteed (e.g. data-plane attacks cannot be prevented) by securing the topological
information exchanged between nodes. Therefore, instead of aiming to ensure or enforce
correct operation, SEMTOR enables each node admin to freely define their individual subset
(and resulting sub-topology) from the whole set of participating nodes that he considers
sufficiently trustworthy to meet their security and data-delivery objectives and concerns. In
addition, none of the yet presented work relying on asymmetric cryptography for verification
of control messages has yet been analyzed in terms of performance and benchmarked based
on real embedded hardware and exposed to traffic and network characteristics that are
typical for existing community mesh network clouds.
An impressive amount of further related research about wireless mesh networks has been
done in recent years. In the following, selected publications are ordered thematically
according to the aspects considered of particular importance for the objectives of this
work. The case of community mesh networks is discussed in terms or legal implications,
motivation, design, and business models in [21, 26, 69–71, 141, 153]. In addition, scalability
and performance aspects of routing protocols are hanlded in [1, 48–52, 61]. Trust and
security related work is surveyed and discussed in [53, 56, 154–157], with solutions for
particular routing functions in [148, 151, 158–164], and presentations of holistic security
frameworks in [152, 165, 166]. The last four also present measurement results based on
simulation. Approaches towards supporting different or user-defined routing policies are
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handled in [4, 54]. Traffic validation, or how to recognize a misbehaving path, node or
link and which information is needed, is addressed by sketches [167–170], counters [171],
fingerprinting [172] or sampling [168]. Distributed detection, the assessment of anomalous
and faulty nodes based on sharing of distributed observations, considering the arbitrary
behaviour of malicious nodes, is addressed by Π2 and Πk+2 [173] in general, or by KDet [174]
specifically for community networks. Frameworks and algorithms for self configuration,
channel assignment, and resource allocation are presented in [175–177]. Testbeds, tools,
and trends for experimentation and evaluation of mesh-network protocols are covered and
reviewed in [11, 116, 178–183].
4.3 Problem Statement
The goal of SEMTOR is to provide secure mechanisms to ensure that non-trusted
nodes in an open network are effectively prevented from disrupting the routing
between trusted nodes. In multi-hop mesh networks, end-to-end routing is a distributed
task that relies on the contribution of network resources by nodes and honest collaboration
between them. However, in an open network, that allows new or unknown nodes to
join without pre-conditions. Therefore malicious or misconfigured nodes with byzantine
behavior can participate and interfere the collaboration with faulty operations or adverse
contributions. As such, the routing system is one of the most complex and fragile, but
unfortunately also one of the least protected component in a network infrastructure [155].
In such hostile environment, our mechanism shall ensure that routing-related tasks such
as path detection, (efficient and consistent) route establishment, and end-to-end packet
forwarding are robust against any faulty operations from non-trusted nodes.
With reference to the work of Mizrak et al [173], the problem of detecting and handling
compromised nodes in a network can be split into the three sub problems of (i) Traffic
validation: Behavior characterization based on local observation, (ii) Distributed detection:
Assessment of anomalous and faulty nodes based on sharing of distributed observations,
and (iii) Response: Enforcing the distributed exclusion of a given set of identified faulty
nodes.
In that sense, our protocol only addresses the third sub problem of response. More precisely:
Given a known subset of faulty or distrusted nodes (from the overall set of existing nodes)
is known, then how to achieve that no subset of these nodes can negatively affect any
routing-critical task. The other two sub problems of traffic validation and distributed
detection are out of scope of this work, but there are complementary solutions suitable
for this scenario with sketches [170] for the first problem, and KDet [174] for the second.
Further, no assumptions are made on how a required subset of trusted nodes (or its relative
complement from the set of overall nodes: the set of non-trusted nodes) is obtained. It is
just given for granted as each community mesh can implement its own way.
4.3.1 Objectives
For the design of the protocol, the following four objectives have been identified and are
briefly summarized as follows.
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Regarding ownership of data traffic, forwarding routes, and node identities, the objective
is that any community-network related routing-table entry and packet can be attributed
to exactly one node of the network. Each node can be unambiguously identified with a
secure identity and an identity-proving address. In addition, each node is the exclusive
owner of exactly those routes pointing towards this address and those packets carrying
this address as destination.
Regarding security in terms of autonomy and robustness, the general objective is
that any contiguous group of nodes (node admins), trusting and willing to cooperate and
support each other, can not be prevented by an external (e.g. an adversary) from doing so.
Regarding openness and decentralization, the objective is that each node admin can
individually decide which of the other nodes he wants to trust and rely on, that multiple
cooperative groups of nodes (admins) can coexist, group membership is not exclusive, and
there is no need for a central registry or authority. Nonetheless, similar to social networking
or so called networks of trust, public key-servers or other decentralized coordination
platforms may be used in addition to facilitate the management of known and trustable
nodes and corresponding node IDs.
Regarding scalability, an implementation of the proposed mechanisms should be feasible
and scalable for the characteristics (e.g. number of nodes and links per node) of typical
community-network clouds and given the resource limitations (e.g. CPU, memory, and
bandwidth) of low-budged but state-of-the art embedded routers as used in today’s
community-network deployments.
4.4 System Model
4.4.1 Community Model
Figure 4.1: Model of a community mesh network
Figure 4.1 intends to illustrate the key scenarios, assumptions and characteristics that are
consistent with real-world community mesh networks clouds. Mesh clouds incorporate up
to thousands of users, hundreds of mesh nodes, and tens of links per node [3, 41, 42, 68,
184] and typcially extend from a smaall neighborhood to the coverage of a city or rural
district. They interconnects via gateways with neighboring community clouds and other
private or publich networks such as the Internet.
The technical enablers are given by nodes based on wireless or wired router hardware [23]
with usually limited storage, bandwidth, and computation capabilities but that can be
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mounted at low cost on rooftops or even isolated rural locations powered by solar energy.
The links, manually or automatically established between neighboring nodes, create a
restricted-route networks without universal direct connectivity between all mesh nodes
[27, 28].
As such, the overall infrastructure is owned, developed, and maintained by its users, united
by the common idea to share their networking resources: Users are offering their own
resources, in terms of routing hardware and processes and links, to others while being
allowed to individually select from the overall pool of existing resources offered by others.
Being able to select is desired because the usage and thereby implicated dependence, for
example on the router of one particular admin, may, for various reasons, be disapproved by
some of the users. For example because their nodes are notoriously error-prone. Therefore
usage should not be imposed.
Users can be grouped into two stakeholder groups: users of the infrastructure; and
administrators that take the additional responsibility to control and maintain individual
nodes (mesh routers), and other locally connected infrastructure such as content servers
or border gateways to neighboring networks.
Due to the different roles, a local trust relation exists between the directly connected
users of a node and its representative, the node administrator who implements the local
user decisions. It is expected that such local node communities are rather small (typically
at the scale of a house or organization) so that consensus on commons such as a license or
terms of usage (e.g. [19, 25, 26]) can be reached via direct communication. However, if
consensus is not possible, an independent local node deployment, implementing a different
usage policy, can be set up such as the case for the upper right building in Figure 4.1 which
hosts two nodes operated by different administrators.
Another fundamental assumption for an open and decentralized CN that brings together
individuals and organizations with different and even conflicting economic, political, and
technical interests [21, 29, 30] is that the achievement of global consensus on the trustability
of all other participating nodes and their administrators is actually impossible. Instead,
it is expected that controversy may exist and trustability is only given among various
subsets of the overall user groups. Such directed trust relations between admins
are exemplary illustrated as green arrows for users of admin E and F. E users agreed on
accepting the license and trusting in the administrative setup of A, C, and F, while admin
F and its connected users trust in B, D, and E.
4.4.2 Network Model
The network model described in the following shall provide community-networks users
(as modeled in previous Section 4.4.1) support for the specification of discretionary trust
relationships between node admins.
A network node is defined as a (routing) process owning an individual public/private key
pair to support cryptographic operations for authentication, integrity-verification, and
non-repudiation of data created by the node. The private key is assumed to be permanent,
globally unique, and accessible exclusively by the key-owning node. A node is supposed
to correctly perform the tasks of path detection, route establishment, and forwarding of
IP data-packets as specified by algorithms and implemented respectively by a specification-
conforming routing protocol. A supposedly correct (benign) node may indeed not conform
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Table 4.1: Summary of used symbols
Symbol Description Properties
V set of all nodes (correct or not)
KpubX public key of node X
KprivX private key of node X for K
pub
X
VX = v(K
pub
X ) particular node X labeled as VX VX ∈ V
AX = a(VX) IPv6 crypto-address (CGA) of VX
tx(d) tx function broadcasting data d to all neighbors
rx(d) rx function receiving broadcasted data d from neighbor
ct, cr arbitrary transmitted or received message code, e.g. c ∈
{ping, pong, ...}
I interval between two points of time
SX,d = s(K
priv
X , d) signature created by VX with K
priv
X over data d
s(KpubX , S, d) signature verification function s : {K,S, d} →
{false, true}
DcX,Q = {VX ,
KpubX , Q
d
X , Q
a
X,Q,
AX ,VtX ,MX , fX}
unsigned description components of node VX with sequence number
Q = QdX
DX,Q = {DcX,Q ,
s(KprivX , D
c
X,Q)}
signed description of DcX,Q
QdX description sequence number of DX,Qd Q
d ∈ N+
QaX,Q AHC anchor of DX,Q
QbX AHC heartbeat matching Q
a
X,Q
QhX = h(Q
a
X,Q,
QbX , VX , Q
d
X)
heartbeat sequence number of VX Q
h ∈ N+
VcX set of all correct nodes regarding VX
VcX set of all adverse nodes regarding VX VcX = V \ VcX
VtX set of all nodes trusted by VX
VtX set of all nodes not trusted by VX VtX = V \ VtX
E set of all links between all nodes
EB,A particular directed link from VA to VB EB,A 6= EA,B ,
EB,A ∈ E
EtX set of all links trusted by VX (see eq. 4.6)
LB,A = l(EB,A) directional link-metric quality for transmitting from A to B L ∈ R+
MT,S = m(VT ,
VS , fT , MˆT )
path-metric quality from VS to VT depending on VT -defined cus-
tomizer function f and upper quality bound MˆT
M ∈ R+ , M ≤
Mˆ
G = g(V,E) overall network topology graph
GtX = g(VtX ,EtX) trusted topology graph of VX
PT,S =
{V0, V1, ..., Vn}
particular explicit path from VS to VT as ordered list of connected
nodes V ∈ V from G with V0 ≡ VS , Vn ≡ VS
PT,S set of all directed paths from VS to VT
PtT,S set of paths trusted by VT from VS to VT PtT,S ⊆ PT,S
PcT,S set of paths consisting only of correct nodes regarding VT from VS
to VT
PcT,S ⊆ PT,S
Pt,cT,S set of paths consisting only of trusted and correct nodes regarding
VT from VS to VT
Pt,cT,S ⊆ PtT,S ∩
PcT,S
RT,S = r(VT , VS) established route from VS to destination VT along implicitly defined
nodes
with the specification of correct behavior. This may be due to accidental miss-configuration
or malicious motivation of the person administering this node. The public key of a node
X is denoted as KpubX . An identity function VX = v(K
pub
X ) is an injective function that
assigns a (identity) label VX to node X based on K
pub
X . A practical identity function v(N)
such as the secure SHA224 [185] hash function is assumed for this work. The set of all
(correct and non-correct behaving) nodes is given as V.
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A link EB,A describes a directed connection that exists if a network interface of node VB
is in direct transmission range of a network interface of VA and vice versa, providing a
functioning bidirectional transmission opportunity between VA and VB. However, while
the existence of EB,A implies the existence of EA,B it does not imply that these two links
are symmetric or even identical: EB,A 6= EA,B.
Path detection denotes the task of identifying and maintaining, for a given network topology
G and VT , VS-tuple, existing paths and path metrics so that identified (VT , VS)-paths could
be differentiated and ranked. Depending on routing-protocol concepts, knowledge about
path details could be distributed (such as in distance-vector protocols where only the next
hop towards a given destination is known by each node) or complete (such as in link-state
protocols where each node knows the complete topology).
Route establishment denotes the task of combining information from path detection with a
path metric for setting up IP forwarding rules so that continuous and consistent forwarding
paths establish between any tuple of source and destination nodes.
Forwarding denotes the task of forwarding and eventually delivering IP-data packets
according to previously established routes from a source to a destination node.
The routing process relies on the following assumptions and service primitives provided by
the data-link layer:
• The network connectivity over time is given by the topology graph G during interval
I.
• Links of G either exist (are up) or not (are down) and their states do not change
within one particular interval In.
• tx(d): The transmit function broadcasts data d to all neighboring nodes to which
a link from the broadcasting node exists.
• rx(d): The receive function receives data d broadcasted by any node from which a
link to the receiving node exists.
• The maximum transmission delay υ between any tx(d) function call and corresponding
rx(d) events is much smaller than interval I: υ  I
Routing processes exchange routing update messages containing information updates and
announcements about nodes, links and network routes.
4.4.3 Adversary Model
The behavior of a network node VY regarding a particular other node VX is either correct
(benign) and complies with the protocol rules regarding VX or it is adverse (malicious) and
performs arbitrary behavior (byzantine) regarding VX that, detectable or not, deviates
from the protocol rules. The set of correct nodes regarding VX is given as VcX . The
set of adverse nodes regarding VX is given as VcX with VcX = V \ VcX . No assumptions
are made on the point of time (which may be any time in the future) and the extend
of deviation (which may happen at the control or data plane), collaboration (allowing
coordinated and distributed attack), or communication capabilities (using extraordinary
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and dedicated channels) of adversaries. Unless otherwise precluded, no assumptions are
made on the methodologies and behavior applied by adversaries to achieve their objectives.
The following assumptions apply to all nodes (including adversaries).
Assumption 1 Nodes can not launch a worm-hole attack [186] without being detected and
corresponding packets being discarded by the receiving node.
This implies that it is impossible to replay entire packets without changing them so that
they appear to a receiving nodes as being received directly from the node that originated
the repeated packet in the first place. Such attack that can be addressed by lower protocol
layers (Phy or MAC) via packet leashes [187] or NPAs [188], or by higher level distributed
detection [189].
Assumption 2 Nodes cannot tamper with cryptographic primitives.
This means nodes can not attack fundamental cryptographic primitives and its key proper-
ties such as given by a secure hash function, the asymmetric encryption and decryption,
signing and signature verification based on a public-private key pair, the Diffie-Hellmann
secure key-exchange, and a the identity and ownership proving properties provided by
Cryptographically Generated Addresss (CGAs). Nodes can not control other nodes beyond
the specified protocol rules. In particular private key material is inaccessible for other
nodes and other node services (e.g. ssh) are sufficiently secured.
Assumption 3 Nodes cannot perform anonymous denial of service attacks.
Nodes can not perform denial of service attack by exhausting processing capacities (in
terms of memory or CPU) of neighboring nodes without being detected as the cause of
the critical resource exhaustion and their packets being discarded. Network and traffic
monitoring and detection can detect and mitigate these attacks.
Assumption 4 Nodes can not physically disturb other nodes.
This also means that wireless channels can not be disturbed via jamming and traffic
incurred by concurrent transmissions sharing the same local channel environment have
only a marginal impact on the remaining capacity of affected links.
4.5 Protocol Design
The basic idea to achieve our objectives may be best illustrated with a simple example:
If person x declared that he fully trusts in persons a and b, then any person y, than
knows about xs declaration, could hand out value for x to a or b while fully respecting
x’s assumptions of trust and knowing x as being in full charge of this action and any
subsequent consequences. Further, these trust declarations should not be weakened by
composition (intransitive). Retaking above example, intransitive means that even if a or b
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assume (and declared) z as trusted, they must not hand out value for x to z unless also x
explicitly declared z as trusted.
When applying this idea for routing in IP networks then a person is represented by a
node which, being administrated by a person, uses a network protocol to communicate the
declaration of its administrator.
SEMTOR extends the concepts of receiver-driven routing [4], which already allows nodes
to express path-selection preferences via a descriptive profile. Both approaches employ
principles of table-driven, proactive, destination-sequenced distant-vector (DSDV) routing
[190] protocols where sequenced routing updates, originated by each node of a network and
updated and re-broadcasted by each hop, are used to propagate path cost and versioning
information in the network. In contrast to the traditional DSDV protocol, the routing
update of SEMTOR contains a reference value, instead of a destination IP address or
network, which unambiguously identifies a particular node of the network and a specific
version of this node’s self-defined description. This reference is given by the descHash, the
SHA hash of the node’s current description (also called description reference). Another
unambiguous reference to a particular version of a node’s current description is given by the
the tuple of its public-key hash (nodePKHash) and description sequence number (descSqn)
that are given in protocol packet headers and description messages. The relations between
packet-header fields, descriptions, and other protocol messages and content as potentially
contained in a protocol packet are illustrated in Figure 4.2 and is discussed in more detail
in the following.
4.5.1 Global Node Identification and Description
A strong and permanent node-public key (nodePK) provides the root of trust for all
operations performed on behalf of the node possessing the corresponding node-private key.
The SHA hash of this public key (nodePKHash) is used as a global ID, an unambiguous
and permanent reference for identifying the node.
The node description aggregates information about the node’s current configuration and
manifests at least the following information:
The node-public key (nodePK) and its global ID (nodePKHash).
A description version – sequence number (descSqn) that must be incremented with
every description update or node reboot, allowing to always differentiate between the
latest and out-of-date versions of any node’s description. Sequence numbers of routing
updates and descriptions do NOT wrap around. Instead, the exhaustion of the former
requires the generation of a new description (update) after which routing-update SQNs
are reset but also lead to a new descHash. The exhaustion of a descSqn indicates the
end-of-life of a used nodePK.
A description signature (descSignature) matching the permanent node-public key given
in this description and used for verifying the authenticity and integrity (i.e. this description
was indeed created by the node with the corresponding global ID and was not changed by
anyone else) of the description.
Instead of aggregating all description data directly into a single and self-contained descrip-
tion message, parts of the overall description are defined from the root description by
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Figure 4.2: Protocol packet, description-, content-, and reference structure
the SHA hash of the actual data (similar to the description reference used within routing
updates to identify a node and its description). Such references-based definitions are called
content references and are used for example to define public-keys or the trust sets of a
node.
The approach comes with the implication that any received packet header or message,
containing description or content references for which the referenced raw data is not known,
cannot be instantly processed and must be requested first. To resolve such situations,
description- or content-request messages (containing only the unresolvable hash) are
sent from the node not knowing the hash-matching raw data to the (neighboring) node
from which the packet containing this hash was directly received. The node receiving
a description or content request and knowing the requested data then responds with a
corresponding description- or data-advertisements messages, providing the requested
data.
4.5.2 Link Authentication
Neighbor and link authentication is used to (i) let neighboring nodes, with a direct
communication channel between each other, detect and authenticate each other as the
node they claim to be and (ii) to ensure authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation of
information exchanged between them (to avoid misunderstanding: link authentication
can verify information X as being stated by neighbor A, but not that information X is
necessarily true).
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Link authentication is achieved by authenticating exchanged messages with signatures
or with HMAC authentication codes. Since the authentication needs to be performed
continuously and with a high frequency, the underneath cryptographic operation should
be sufficiently lightweight to be accomplishable even by resource-constrained embedded
routers.
4.5.2.1 RSA signature based
For signature based link authentication, a secondary and temporary RSA-based transmis-
sion public key (txPK) is added to the node description and used by neighboring nodes
for (authenticity and integrity) verification of received link-discovery and routing-update
messages signed and broadcasted by this node. The key can be updated periodically or
sporadically (e.g. every hour) via description updates, allowing the originating node to use
also RSA keys with weaker key strength and smaller crypto overhead (such as RSA896)
than its permanent nodePK.
4.5.2.2 Diffie Hellmann, HMAC based
An alternative method for authenticating exchanged messages is based on keyed-hash
message authentication codes (HMAC). HMAC essentially works as follows. The to-be-
authenticated message is concatenated with the hash of a shared secret (known only
to the two specific link neighbors interested in authenticating the messages exchanged
among them). The hash of this concatenation is concatenated a second time with a
differently padded version of the shared secret. The resulting hash is then sent as a message
authentication code (MAC) together with the original message. The link neighbor verifies
the received message and MAC by matching the latter against its self-calculated MAC
using the received message and the shared secret as inputs.
A variation of Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism, tailored to the SEMTOR-protocol
concepts, is used to let nodes establish the necessary shared secret over a public network.
Therefore, each node (e.g. x) selects a private secret kx (only known to itself) and publishes
Kx, given as
Kx = g
kxmodp (4.1)
via its description, using pre-defined protocol constants for the modulus p and the base g.
This way, any pair of nodes, given that each others description is known, can calculate a
mutual shared secret Sx,y without additional handshake procedures as described by Garzia
in [191]:
Sx,y = K
ky
x modp = K
kx
y modp (4.2)
As with transmission public keys, K values are used only temporary and can be replaced
via description updates at any time. Further, a shared-key exchange is neither explicitly
announced nor is its completion explicitly acknowledged. A successful shared-key exchange
is only implicitly confirmed by receiving messages with a valid HMAC based on a shared
key calculated from the latest known descriptions of the two involved nodes.
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4.5.3 Network Assets Authentication
4.5.3.1 Address, route, and traffic ownership
A cryptographically generated address (CGA) provides the basis for identifying and proving
the owner of addresses, routes, and data packets.
The primary IPv6 address of a node provides such CGA. It is computed by combining a
small (between 8–48 bits) well known ULA prefix, typically from IPv6 Unique Local Address
(ULA) range [192], and the most-significant (at least 80 bits) of the node’s permanent
global ID (the nodePKHash). The concept of CGAs has been proposed by [193] which also
describes mechanisms to calculate provable network ranges or further enhance the security
of generated addresses and networks. Addresses or networks within this ULA prefix are
owned by the node possessing the private key for the CGA mathing global ID.
Network announcements (published via node descriptions) are used for declaring the
ownership of addresses and networks. All announcements overlapping with this ULA prefix
must be provable as being owned by the node that originated the corresponding description.
Otherwise the description must be considered as invalid and discarded upon reception.
Forwarding routes to a given CGA address of this ULA prefix, although installed in different
routers, are owned by the node owning the destination address of the routing entry and
must be maintained according to the rules specified via its description. Otherwise the
route must be removed.
IP-data packets, containing a verified CGA address of this ULA prefix as destination
address, are also owned by the node owning the address and must be forwarded according
to the forwarding route configured to this address. Otherwise the packet must be dropped.
4.5.3.2 Routing and heartbeat updates
An Anchored Hash Chain (AHC) value substitutes the destination network and
sequence number of routing updates from traditional destination-sequenced distance-vector
protocols such as [190]. The approach has been inspired by the SEAD protocol [148] which
uses an AHC to protect, in addition to the destination nodes sequence number, also the
distance vector (metric) of routing updates.
In SEMTOR, the IP addresses and networks, towards which forwarding routes shall be
maintained due to the reception of a routing update, are given by the network announcement
published via the referenced description.
The creation, mapping, and validation of received AHC values has been designed as follows.
Whenever a node creates a new description it picks two random 112-bit values s0 and r0,
concatenates these with its node ID I and the upcoming descSqn, and calculates an initial
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SHA224 hash H0 of these ingredients. This hashing is repeated nmax times
1 where for each
iteration the first 112 bits of the output hash are used as input for s:
Hn+1 = sn+1 ⊕ rn+1 = SHA224(sn ⊕ r0 ⊕ I ⊕DescSqn) (4.3)
The initial hash H0 (and particularly its ingredient s0) is kept as a private secret and
is called the AHC root with which all followup hashes could be easily calculated. The
final hash Hnmax is published together with r0, I, descSqn, and nmax in the description of
the node. It is called the anchor of the hash chain and allows to easily verify whether a
given 112-bit value is part of this hash chain or not. Followup routing updates sent by
an originating node start revealing the pre-calculated hash values starting with nmax − 1
towards n1. The amount of iterations i needed to match the hash-chain anchor Hnmax of a
received hash-chain value sn (thus, Hnmax = Hn+i) is used to calculate the routing update
sequence number (routeSqn) as:
routeSqn = (descSqn ∗ nmax) + (i− nmax) (4.4)
By doing a brute-force search for a hash-chain anchor in previously received and verified
descriptions that matches a particular iteration output of Formula 4.3, receiving nodes can
retain the identity of the node that originated the update and verify its authenticity and
freshness in terms of corresponding descSqn and routeSqn. The former because node Id
and descSqn are mandatory inputs for calculating the chain anchor; all of them being part
of the description that has been signed with the node Id matching public-private key pair.
This way, the calculated routeSqn also provides a secure heartbeat which propagation can
be supported by other nodes via flooding. But its testimony can not be anticipated by any
other node because only the originating node itself can create hash-chain values that yield
a newer (or greater) routeSqn than any previously yielded routeSqn for that node.
Although, the described concept does not facilitate integrity validation of the overall routing
update message (because the contained distance vector of the update is left unprotected),
the provable routeSqn can always be used to identify the newest heartbeat of a node
and disqualify old updates, making so called “false destination sequence attacks” [194]
impossible.
Optionally, to relieve updates-receiving nodes from the extensive search of finding the hash-
chain anchors for a given chain value, routing update messages can be extended with an
(16-bit) internal identifier field (IID). Each node uses an individual IID value for identifying
the originator of each routing updates it propagates to its neighbors. Updates-receiving
nodes maintain a list for each verified link neighbor for mapping their IID values to a
globally unique originator ID. If a mapping for given IID-neighbor tuple is known than
the latest description for the corresponding originator ID is used for verifying the given
1nmax = 6000 has been selected as default to limit the needed hash power of used routing hardware
while allowing to send new routing updates every 6 seconds and avoid description updates (due to exhausted
AHC values) for 6sec ∗ 6000 = 10hours. SHA224 has been selected as the most lightweight standard among
current state-of-the art secure hash functions. The truncation to 112 bits has been chosen considering
available data from http://bitcoin.sipa.be/ (April 2017) that indicates the global cumulative number of
yet calculated bitcoin double-sha256 hashes around 1026 ∼ 289 which is assumed to roughly correspond
to that of 290 single-sha224 hashes. Thus, we assume that, even given a doubling of hash-power per year,
a brute-force attack for finding the matching first 112 bits of a SHA224 hash remains unfeasible for the
following 112− 90 = 22 years, especially if the attacked AHC root is invalidated every few hours with each
description update.
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hash-chain value. If an originator ID for a given IID-neighbor tuple is not known, or if
the maintained originator ID for a given tuple could not be proven as the originator of
the received hash-chain value, then the received update is ignored and an IID-request
message containing the unknown IID is sent to the neighbor using this IID. The expected
IID-reply messages are then supposed to contain the nodeId, the currently used IID and
the latest descSqn and hash-chain value known by the requested neighbor. Upon reception
of this reply, its values can be verified (as described above) and used for processing further
updates from this neighbor. As such, IIDs may be re-used and changed at any time. They
only provide an option for receiving nodes for faster chain value verification. However,
nodes showing too frequent IID re-assignments may always be ignored by their neighbors
to avoid the unjustified resource consumption.
Routing updates and IID-request and reply messages exchanged between neighboring nodes
are covered by the link authentication mechanism described in Section 4.5.2, allowing to
always verify the authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation of exchanged information.
The signature of the sender covering the update allows the receiving node to verify if the
sender is trusted by the originating node and whether contained metric can be accepted
for further path maintenance. This way, a routing update can be seen as a signed promise
by each propagating node, stating to the receiving nodes that (i) this particular update
has been propagated exclusively via nodes trusted by the originator of the message, and
(ii) that all yet intermediate nodes also stated their willingness and capability for routing
packets (with destination addresses as expressed via the referenced and signed description)
towards the originating node.
4.5.3.3 Sub-topology authentication
The trust set of a node is given as a list of other node’s global IDs that constitute the
trusted nodes of this node. This way, the trust set implicitly defines, together with
the links possible between any pair of trusted nodes, the trusted virtual topology of
this trusting node. Only the good-listed nodes identified via this trust set are authorized
for propagating routing updates originated by the trusting node. However, instead of
expecting untrusted nodes to respect this demand, all trusted nodes are expected to ignore
routing updates originated by the trusting node that were not received directly and securely
authenticated via any of the trusted nodes. As a consequence, only neighboring nodes
that are trusted nodes of a described trusting node are considered as next hop towards
the trusting node and eventually also end-to-end established routing entries towards this
trusting node are only set along these trusted nodes.
In addition, particular node IDs of a trusting primary node’s trust set could be flagged as
super-trusted nodes. This means that all nodes that are explicitly identified via the trust
set of such super-trusted nodes shall also be considered as trusted nodes of the primary
node. More precisely, the current overall trust set of the primary node is given as the
union of its own directly trusted nodes, defined via its current description, and the directly
trusted nodes defined via the current description of the primary’s super-trusted nodes.
This way, the responsibility and burden of node administrators for identifying trustiness of
existing nodes and maintaining trustiness-relations and respective trust-set configurations
can be delegated to one or several secondary sources of assessed trustiness. Such sources
may be given by a single node (or, to increase redundancy, by a small subset of nodes)
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from a larger set of nodes administrated by the same individual(s). Then, delegation
would relieve administrators from having to reconfigure all their nodes for each considered
trustability change (i.e. only a single node needs to be reconfigured while all other nodes
having this single node flagged as super-trusted would automatically adapt the trust set of
the super-trusted single node).
The preference of CN-users to minimize maintenance efforts as much as possible represents
another likely use case and motivation for delegating, in part or entirely, the assessment of
trustiness to one or several other sources that are highly and individually trusted anyway
and that may actually be able to treat the topic of trustability with a much greater
responsibility (for example due to a higher technical knowledge or better social connection
with many CN participants) than the administrator of the actual delegating (primary)
node.
4.5.3.4 Optional description content
Without going into much further details, a number of optional node properties, that
might be interesting in the context of computer networks and considered worth for being
propagated via node descriptions, have been supported via our implementation and are
briefly summarized in the following.
Routing metric announcements allow to define a non-default algorithm for identifying
the best next hop for routing packets towards the originating node. This way end-to-end
path establishment can be tailored to individual traffic demands such as optimizing for
delay, bandwidth, or robustness. The approach has been discussed in more detail in
preceding work [4] and [6]. Essentially, such announcement specifies the function and
related parameters to be used by other nodes for processing and propagating the metric
values of routing updates originated by the announcing nodes.
Hostname and email announcements are typically used to give a name or contact
address to a node. This way propagated hostnames only provide an informal and insecure
way to name nodes. Since the selection of these only depends on the choice of the node
administrator at a given time, their values may change at any time and the same values
may be used by different nodes. However, an email address announced via the signed
description of a node may still be used to gain confidence that that the holder of the nodes
public-private key pair used for signing the email-announcing description is indeed the
owner of the announced email account.
IP4in6 and/or IP6in6 tunnels announcements can be used for announcing the
availability of other hosts and networks via tunneling through the announcing node. Just
as with hostname and email announcement, any tunnel network could be announced by any
node without restriction. However, other nodes, trusting a given set of tunnel-announcing
nodes, and willing to send data to destinations within the announced networks are free to
do so without suffering from overlapping announcements from other, maybe non-trusted
nodes. Therefore, they encapsulate related traffic by adding an outer IPv6 header using
the tunnel-announcing nodes primary IPv6 as outer destination address. This allows
an automatic but end-user controlled IPv4 and/or IPv6 overlay networking on top of a
securely-trusted IPv6 network.
Local topology announcements can be used by any node to periodically reveal the
identity of its local link neighbors. Publishing such information may be useful for generating
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global connectivity maps, a feature that proved to be very famous in community networks
for real-time topology, coverage, health, and growth visualization2.
Last, but not least, arbitrary data announcements can be used to publish arbitrary,
even binary data. This feature comes with an optional plugin that, if enabled, synchronizes
the content of given data files to a specific directory in all other nodes receiving and
processing such announcements. The remotely created data file names will always start
with the node id of the announcing node. Protocol parametrization allows to ignore
descriptions exceeding a particular size.
4.5.4 Bootstrapping Example
Figure 4.3 illustrates related bootstrapping procedures of the protocol in four phases: (1)
the local node discovery, (2) the link discovery, (3) the global node discovery and (4) the
trusted path establishment.
The local node discovery (phase 1) shows how nodes n2 and n3 react on the reception of a
new (for n2 and n3 yet unknown) nodePKHash (I) or descSqn (here given by a received
packet header) and resolve the description, identity (pubKey) and further referenced
description content by sending corresponding description or content request messages
(containing only the unresolvable hash) to node n1. Then n1 replies with the requested
information. When all requested contents have been resolved, n2 and n3 can assemble the
full description and verify its authenticity with the signature and public Key as defined
by the initially received nodePKHash that triggered this process. The descHhash and
signature is calculated over the raw description data and contained data hashes as they
occur (not the referenced original data).
A transmission signature message (txSignature in Fig. 4.2 and 4.3) verifies the au-
thenticity and integrity of all following signature-demanding messages. These include
the locally exchanged link-discovery and routing-update messages but do not include
the eventually globally exchanged descriptions (already signed explicitly via description
signatures) or content advertisements (already signed implicitly via SHA reference hashes
used in signed descriptions).
To protect against link-local replay attacks, the txSignature also covers the transmission
sequence number (txSqn) that again can only be reused after renewing also the currently
used txPK and a transmission IP (txIP) that must match the link-local src IPv6 address
of the IP packet containing the protocol data.
The link discovery (phase 2) briefly indicates how the provided functionality can be used to
authenticate the exchange of link-probing messages and subsequent deduced link qualities.
Here, the hello message contains a sequence number that is unique during the lifetime of a
node’s description and the corresponding hello-reply message unambiguously references a
previously received hello message and link via which this message has been transmitted
(by specifying the hello-sequence number, the current description hash of the hello-sending
node, and the txIP from which the hello has been sent and via which own interface it has
been received). By receiving correctly signed hello and hello-reply messages (referencing
the receivers own hello messages via included txSqn and txIP), the exchange of link-probing
2As a living example one may look at existing on-line maps such as http://tomir.ac.upc.edu/qmpmon,
http://sants.guifi.net/mapa, https://berlin.freifunk.net/network/map/
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Figure 4.3: Network bootstrapping (node, link, and path discovery)
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messages becomes a continuous and bidirectional challenge-response handshake that only
the holder of the corresponding private keys can maintain.
During the global node discovery (phase 3) nodes are discovered beyond the link neigh-
borhood. The discovery is triggered by the detection of an unknown descHash contained
in routing updates which causes the receiving nodes to resolve and verify the full node
description (similar to local node discovery in phase 1).
Phase 4 illustrates the establishment of forwarding paths along trusted nodes. First n2 and
n3 receive the routing update from n1, which description has already been fully resolved in
phase 1. Because the update was received via an authenticated link (due to its txSignature)
with known link-quality (see phase 2) and because n1 itself is listed as a trusted node in
the description, n2 and n3 know that n1 trusts the transmitter of the received message
with regards to correctly process, update, and re-broadcast its routing update messages.
In the following, the end-to-end path cost to the originating node and via the trusted link
peer can be calculated based on the pathMetric of the update and the current link quality.
In case the calculated cost identifies this link as the best next hop towards the originating
node, the routing update is re-broadcasted with a modified pathMetric value that reflects
the cost of the additional link (see [5] for more details).
In the next illustrated step, node n3 and n4 receive the routing update originated by n1
and re-broadcasted by n2. This time, the update-conveying txSignature verifies n2 as the
transmitter and last modifier of the routing update. However, the identity (nodePKHash)
of n2 is not listed in the trustSet described by the originating node n1 and therefore the
update is discarded (by n3 and n4) for path establishment towards n1. Node n4 does
not have a trusted route to n1 unless it receives the routing update via n3 which is listed
within the trustSet of n1 and can therefore be considered as next hop towards n1. The
topology depicted at the bottom of phase 4a illustrates with arrows the resulting virtual
topology for routing traffic towards n1. In this example, n2 is the only node which n1
does not trust. Consequently, its traffic is directed around n2. Given the assumption that
n3 trusts all nodes, phase 4b illustrates with blue arrows also the concurrent established
topology for routing traffic towards node n3. Traffic from n4 to n3 will be routed via n2
(due to potentially strong involved links n4 − n2 − n1). But traffic towards n1 remain
routed via n3 (being the only trusted path option towards n1).
4.5.5 Summary of Properties and Advantages
In the following, fundamental properties and advantages of this approach are summarized:
• Descriptions can be rather short while being able to securely specify large amounts
of data (e.g. a single 224-bit SHA2 hash compared to a 2048-bit RSA signature or a
trust set listing the global IDs of hundreds of nodes).
• Referenced data that does not change over a description update or that is used by
several nodes (e.g. defining equal trust sets) does not need to be re-propagated since
their reference (hash) would not change and can be reused.
• A significant processing advantage is achieved by using a secondary and possibly
weaker temporary key and verification mechanism (e.g. a weaker RSA key pair
or a DH-HMAC based message authentication) for the continuous packet signing
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and validation operations (typically occurring several times per second), leaving a
potential adversary with insufficient time for cracking this key before it gets replaced
by a new one (typically every few hours). In contrast, a reasonable strong key can
be used for signing the rather seldom propagated description updates (typically once
per hour) and thereby allowing a long-term protection of node IDs and descriptions.
• The mechanisms allow (without requiring any pre-deployed infrastructure or registry)
the network-wide, dynamic, and secure (in terms of authenticity and integrity)
deployment of a public-key infrastructure that can be used for further integrity
verification of link-discovery and routing-update messages between neighboring nodes
and ensuring the propagation of routing updates along nodes trusted by the originator
of these updates.
• With the ability to delegate the maintenance of trust sets to particular super-trusted
nodes, it is possible to share and distribute the work related with a careful trustability
assessment, while keeping the conceptual decentrality of the approach, and ensuring
each actual node owner as the final root of trust that can withdraw or extend
previously defined delegations at any time. This comes under the assumption that
the administrators of super-trusted nodes are highly and individually trusted, and
known to share the same routing preferences anyway but also they may actually be
able to handle this topic with a much greater responsibility (for example due to a
higher technical knowledge or better social connection with other CN participants)
than the administrator of the actual delegating node itself.
4.6 Specification and Correctness
4.6.1 Definitions
• A node description DX,Q denotes a particular version Q ∈ N+ of a statements’
summary created and signed by the node with the identity VX . A valid description
DX,Q = {DcX,Q, SX,DcX,Q} contains unsigned description components DcX,Q and a
signature SX,d = s(K
priv
X , d) with data d = D
c
X,Q that, created with the private key
KprivX of VX . D
c
X,Q, covers non-ambiguously definitions for VX , KX , Q = Q
d
X , AX ,
VtX , MˆX , and fX(M,L) as defined in the following. Nodes are supposed to learn
the latest description (with highest description sequence number Qd) of all other
nodes. Therefore each node creates and broadcasts a description for itself which is
then flooded by receiving nodes across the network. All nodes are also supposed to
resend any earlier flooded description when demanded by a neighboring node so that
new nodes can learn the descriptions of already existing nodes. Further background
in Section 4.5.1.
• The primary IPv6 address AX = a(VX) of a node is a Cryptographically Generated
Address (CGA) based on a truncated version of the nodes identity VX . The existence
of a sufficiently secure CGA function a(V ) (as described in Section 4.5.3.1) that
provides proof of identity and ownership is assumed for this work.
• A link-metric function l(EB,A) = LB,A with L ∈ R+ is a heuristic function that
quantifies the quality of a given link as a positive real value (including zero). For any
LB,A ≥ LZ,Y it is defined that the link quality of link EB,A is better than (equal to)
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that of EZ,Y . The existence of a sufficient link-metric function is assumed for this
work.
A simple but sufficient link-metric function for letting VA assess the quality of link
EB,A could be given by the following two processes. For VA the process would be as
follows:
– VA broadcasts tx(d
T ) with dT = {sA(dtA), dtA, DA,QdA} and d
t
A = {VA, ct, QtA},
ct = ping representing a message code, and QtA ∈ N+ being a (ping) sequence
number.
– Then VA waits for an interval of I
l
– If, during I l, VA received rx(d
R) and if
dR == {sB(dr), dr, DB,QdB} and
DB,QdB
is valid (contains VB, K
pub
B ,...) and
VB 6= VA and
s(sB(d
r), dr,KpubB ) == true and
dr == {cr, V r, Qr, VA} and
cr == pong and V r == VB and Q
r == QtA (and VA == VA) then:
Set l(EB,A) = 1
Else: Set l(EB,A) = 0
– VA sets Q
l
A = (Q
l
A + 1) and repeat.
For any neighbouring node of VA, such as VB the process would be as follows (for
any VX 6= VB such as VA):
– If VB receives rx(d
R) and if
dR = {sX(dr), dr, DX,QdX} and DX,QdX is valid (contains VX , K
pub
X ,...) and
s(sX(d
r), dr,KpubX ) == true and
dr == {V r, cr, Qr} and
cr == ping and V r == VX and Q
r ∈ N+ then:
– VB immediately broadcasts tx(d
T ) with
dT = {sB(dt), dt, DB,QdB} and
dt = {VX , ct, Qt} with ct = pong, and Qt = Qr.
If description D has already been propagated and known by neighbouring nodes as
described above (and as considered by design in Section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2) they do not
need to be transmitted with each dT messages because they could be looked up in
memory by receiving nodes via contained V r components.
• The overall topology of a network is given by the graph G = g(V,E) representing all
nodes V ∈ V as vertices and all links E ∈ E as edges if l(E) > 0.
• A path-quality value MT,S and path-metric function m(VT , Vs, fT , MˆT ) with VT ≡
V0, VS ≡ Vs, s ≥ 1 is defined as:
MT,S = M0,s =
m(VT , Vs, fT , MˆT ) =

if s == 1 : fT (MˆT , LT,s−1,s), else
if fT (m(VT , Vs−1), LT,s−1,s) == 0 : 0
else : fT (m(VT , Vs−1), LT,s−1,s
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MˆT is a constant defined by VT via DT,Q for the upper bound of any MT,S . fT (M,L)
is the customizer function specified via DT,Q. It must ensure that
0 ≤ f(M,L) < M < Mˆ for any M ∈ R+ , L ∈ R+ (4.5)
A function satisfying Equation (4.5) would also ensure that:
– Greater path quality values reflect better paths, thus for any path PT,A =
{VT , ..., VA} with a better (equal) path quality than another path PT,X =
{VT , ..., VX} that MT,A > (=) MT,X .
– A sub path PT,A = {VT , ...VA} of another path PT,X = {VT , ..., VA, ..., VX} with
equal destination VT and path components up to including VA must lead a
greater path metric MT,A than that of MT,X . The existence of a sufficient path
metric is assumed for this work.
• A route RT,S = {VT , Vs−1, Vs} explicitly identifies the next hop Vs−1 of a particular
path PT,S from Vs ≡ VS via Vs−1 and implicitly defines also all following nodes
Vs−2, ...V1, V0 to V0 ≡ VT .
• The set of all routes from VS to VT with different next hops is limited by the number
of neighbors of VS and is given as RT,S .
A routing function r(VT , Va) = RT,A = {VT , Va−1, Va} implicitly also identifies all
consecutive nodes by iterative resolving Va−2 from r(VT , Va−1) = {VT , Va−2, Va−1}.
• The trust set VtX ⊆ V of a node VX lists the node identities (including itself) of its
trusted nodes. E.g.: VtX = {VA, VB, VC , VX}.
• A trusting node is a node (e.g. VS) that defines a non-empty trust set VtS to secure
itself against attacks from non-trusted nodes. Therefore, the cardinality of VtS must
be greater or equal than one: |VtS | ≥ 1. Thus, if a particular node VX does not trust
any other node then it would define only itself as trustable: VtX = {VX}.
• A trusted node is a node (e.g. VX) which is explicitly listed in the trust set VtA
of a given node VA. This is formalized as VX ∈ VtA. A non-trusted node VY is a
node which is not listed in the trust set of a given other node VA, formalized as
VY /∈ VtA. Thus, trust is a tuple of the trusted node (VX) and the trusting node (VA).
A particular node VZ can be a trusted node of node VA and at the same time be a
non-trusted node of node VB: VZ ∈ VtA
∧
VZ /∈ VtB. Trust relations are not implicitly
symmetric, e.g.: VZ ∈ VtA
∧
VA /∈ VtZ . Direct trust relations are not transitive, e.g.:
VC ∈ VtB
∧
VB ∈ VtA
∧
VC /∈ VtA.
• A link EB,A is a trusted link of node VX if the two neighboring nodes VA and VB are
trusted nodes of VX . The trusted link set EtX of node VX is defined as
EtX = {EB,A|EB,A ∈ E, VA ∈ TX , VB ∈ TX} (4.6)
• The trusted topology GtX of node VX is a sub graph of G(T,L) consisting of vertices
V ∈ TtX and edges E ∈ EtX with GtX = G(TtX ,EtX).
• A trusted path is a connected end-to-end path between a given source-destination-
node tuple that consists only of trusted nodes and links of the (trusting) destination
node. It represents one particular combination of consecutive links from the trusted
topology of the destination node. A trusted route denotes, according to a given path
metric, the currently best existing trusted path.
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Figure 4.4: Cases in SEMTOR considering trust, correctness, and a detection mechanism
4.6.2 Desired Properties
For any given node VT two orthogonal properties of nodes are considered: correct (V
c ∈ VcT )
versus adverse (V c /∈ VcT ), and trusted nodes (V t ∈ VtT ) versus non-trusted nodes (V t /∈ VtT ).
This leads to four possible combinations as illustrated by the four sectors in Figure 4.4:
Non-trusted correct nodes, trusted correct nodes, non-trusted adversaries, and trusted
adversaries.
For any given (T, S)-path tuple and network graph G one of the following topological
constellations can be considered:
a) Incorrect path: S is isolated from T either because a continuous (T, S)-path in G
does not exist at all or because not a single consecutive path exists that consists only
of T -correct nodes: PcT,S = ∅
b) Correct path: At least one (T, S)-path of T -correct nodes exists, that may (or may
not) consist of T -trusted nodes, but some T -trusted nodes of G may be T -adverse
(incorrect) nodes: PcT,S 6= ∅ ∧ VtT \ VcT 6= ∅
c) Correct trust and path: At least one (T, S)-path of only T -correct nodes exists and
T -trusted adversaries do not exist but a (T, S)-path of only T -trusted nodes may not
exist: PcT,S 6= ∅ ∧ VtT \ VcT = ∅ ∧ PtT,S = ∅
d) Correctly trusted nodes and path: At least one (T, S)-path of only T -trusted and
correct nodes exists and T -trusted adversaries do not exist: PcT,S 6= ∅ ∧ VtT \ VcT =
∅ ∧ PcT,S 6= ∅
We are interested in the correct and continuous provisioning of awareness (node and node
state discovery) and reachability (path and route discovery and packet delivery) services.
These services can be characterized by a set of properties [163, 195] that can be differentiated
between safety and liveness properties [196, 197].
Safety properties state the guarantee that bad things do not happen:
• Information authenticity and integrity are mandatory properties for an awareness
service that, in our case, shall propagate node descriptions and heartbeats. We define
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this property as update-safety which guarantees that if a QT,S-sequenced update
(supposedly created by VT ) can be verified by a receiving node VS as correct then it
must have been sent earlier by the supposed originating node VT as QT,T and has
propagated unchanged to VS . Because every QT,T,τn ∈ N+ sent by VT at time τn
must be greater or equal to any previously sent QT,T,τn−1 , τn > τn−1 this guarantee is
expressed as: QT,T,τ ≥ QT,S,τ . This property shall apply to description and heartbeat
updates, sequenced with Qd and Qh respectively.
• Path-adversary-freedom is an important property for guaranteeing the reachability of
VT from VS along a path. A path PT,S is adversary-free if it has no adversary nodes.
• Adversary-resilience: Routing is adversary-resilient if its behaviour under the presence
of adversary nodes is equivalent to that of a network that has no adversary nodes.
This means that adversary nodes, if present, do not have any noticeable effect. An
update-safe awareness service and a delivery service that routes and forwards data
packets only along adversary free paths can be considered adversary resilient.
• Loop-freedom: A path is loop-free if it has no repetition of nodes.
• Consistency: packets only traverse loop- and adversary-free paths between source
and destination. We define this property as route-safety for any established route
RT,S that consists only of non-repetitive nodes that behave correctly (non-adversary)
regarding VT : RT,S ⊆ VtT .
There are also liveness properties which state that good things [eventually] happen:
• Update freshness: An update is fresh with respect to an interval I and an incrementally
increasing update-version Q (update-sequence number) if the last received update
QT,S,τ from VT by VS at time τ is greater or equal than any update QT,T,τ−I sent
by VT since I. We define update-liveness as the property that guarantees update
freshness so that: QT,S,τ ≥ QT,T,τ−I .
• Route freshness: A route RT,S,τ from VS to VT at time τ is fresh with respect to
an interval I = (τ − I, τ) and a given set of existing paths PT,S,I if all implicitly
via RT,S,τ defined consecutive hops and respective links are up during I. We define
route-liveness as the property that guarantees in addition to route freshness also
consistency so that: RT,S,τ ∈ PcT,S,I .
• Route accuracy: A route RT,S is accurate if it is consistent and fresh and, with respect
to a path-metric function mT () defined via DT,Q, if the path-metric value calculated
and re-propagated by VS conforms with the actual link-metrics LB,A between all
successive path nodes VB, VA ∈ RT,S .
• Responsiveness: Depending on the logic of the routing-update process, updates
received by a node are validated (which, if necessary, may include the immediate
request and resolution of depending information) and applied to its forwarding table
and propagated to other routers, including those that potentially depend upon the
outcome of the update. This affects how quickly the network reacts to changes and
therefore it qualifies the timeliness of freshness.
It is assumed that the transmission delay υ (from data-link layer assumptions in
Section 4.4.2) of up links and the responsiveness ρ of correct nodes for processing
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Table 4.2: Topology constellations and respective protocol properties.
received updates and responding to resolution requests from neighbors is much smaller
than I: υ + τ  I
• Delivery: data packets get eventually delivered to its destination though a path, with
statistical guarantees as channels are usually lossy, typically in a small percentage.
This property depends on the liveness of updates (freshness) and routes (freshness
and accuracy).
• Efficiency: The expected resource overhead cost for each node amortized over all
usage. Resources can be processing (CPU, memory in nodes) and communication
(traffic in links), and the overhead cost, the additional resource consumption due to
the protocol translated into a performance penalty (cost).
Safety and liveness properties about updates and routes are the basis to ensure over-
all properties: the (safety) consistency and resilience to adversaries; and the (liveness)
responsiveness, delivery and efficiency of routing.
Table 4.2 summarizes the desired safety and liveness properties and identifies the previously
described topology constellations a) - d) for which these properties shall be satisfied. Here
the ∗-symbol is used to indicate that no assumptions are made on the requirement given
in the respective header row (thus, may be true or false) and the X-symbol is used to
indicate that a corresponding property can be satisfied. None of the four constellations
makes assumptions on the presence of non-trusted adversaries.
It should be noted that the assumptions and objectives outlined in Section 4.3.1 are actually
reflected by the conditions and properties listed for constellation d) while constellation a)
to c) list properties that shall be provided under even less restrictive conditions.
Regarding the security objective: Any group of nodes (e.g. subeset VX ⊆ VY ) that is
trusting (so ∀VT ∈ VX : VtT = VX), willing to cooperate and support each other (correct, so
VX ⊆ VcT with VtT = VX ⇒ VtT \VcT = ∅, so not trusted adversaries exist), and contiguous
(connected, so with VtT = VX ⇒ ∀VT , VS ∈ VX : PtT,S 6= ∅) can not be inhibited by an
external VZ /∈ VX on the objective of routing packets to each other (which is satisfied by
the given route-safety and -liveness properties).
4.6.3 Proving Correctness
In this section we analyze the safety and liveness properties defined in Section 4.6.2 for
updates and routes as lemmas and theorems that we prove with formal reasoning.
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Lemma 1 Descriptions discovered by SEMTOR are authentic and can be differentiated
between older and newer versions, independent of the presence of trusted or non-trusted
adversaries.
Proof: A description DX,Q received by a SEMTOR node is only accepted as valid if
it contains the components DcX,Q = {VX ,KpubX , QdX , AX ,VtX ,MX , fX} and a signature
SX,DcX,Q for which VX equals v(K
pub
X ) and s(K
pub
X , S,D
c
X,Q) is true and Q
d
X is greater than
any earlier received and accepted description from VX . Description integrity is proven
because, given Assumption 2, a s(KpubX , S,D
c
X,Q)-correct signature can not be created by
any other node than VX , so also not by any adverse node. Identity and authenticity is
implicitly proven because of the matching signature and VX matching v(K
pub
X ). Exclusive
ownership of AX is proven based on Cryptographically Generated Address (CGA) respective
rules. Possibly earlier received descriptions from VX can be reliably identified as outdated
if contained Qdearlier < Q
d
current. 
Lemma 2 Heartbeats discovered by SEMTOR are authentic, can be related to a particular
description of the originating node, and differentiated between older and newer versions,
independent of the presence of trusted or non-trusted adversaries.
Proof: A heartbeat QbX,Q received by a SEMTOR node is only accepted as valid and
identified as originated by VX if, among the latest accepted descriptions known from any
node, one can be found which contained AHC anchor QaX,Q yields a positive heartbeat-
sequence number calculated as QhX = h(Q
a
X,Q, Q
b
X , VX , Q
d
X) and one of the following
conditions is true: Either QhX is equal or greater than any previously accepted Q
h
X
value from VX that was based on the same Q
a
X,Q and Q = Q
d
X . Or the last accepted
heartbeat-sequence from VX was based on an outdated description from VX that has
since then be replaced by the receiving node with an accepted description updated. The
authenticity, belonging to a particular description, and differentiability (in older and newer
versions) of heartbeats is proven because of the cryptographic properties of AHCs (see also
Section 4.5.3.2 and Assumption 2) that also covers VX and Q
d
X so that only the originating
node VX , that knows the secret AHC root, can create heartbeats that yield Q
h
X values
that are acceptable as newer (greater) than the heartbeat with the greatest corresponding
QhX value ever sent before by VX . 
Theorem 1 SEMTOR guarantees update-safety: the authenticity, integrity, and differen-
tiability of discovered node descriptions and heartbeats.
Proof: From Lemmas 1 and 2. 
Theorem 2 SEMTOR guarantees update-liveness: Descriptions and heartbeats discovered
by SEMTOR in the presence of correct paths are fresh so that any description DX,Q or
heartbeat QbX,Q originated at time t1 by VX with Q = Q
d
X is discovered by any VY before
time t2 = t1 + I if a consecutive path P
c
X,Y of VX-correct nodes exists between VX and VY
that is up during the entire interval I = (t1, t2).
Proof: Let Ih = (t2 − t1) be the interval duration with which each node VX broadcasts
a new heartbeat (update) QbX,Q yielding a heartbeat-sequence number Q
h
X,Q that is one
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greater than the previously broadcasted heartbeat sequence of VX . If an up-link between
the QbX,Q-broadcasting node and a correct neighboring node VN of the broadcasting node
exists during the broadcast of QbX,Q then VN receives Q
b
X,Q and one of the following three
cases occur:
(i) VN already knows and accepted DX,Q (see Lemma 1) that Q
b
X,Q is based on and has
also already accepted QbX,Q (see Lemma 2) due to an earlier reception from a neighboring
node of VN . Then VN only responds to description requests received from its neighboring
nodes that demand a description known by VN .
(ii) VN already knows and accepted DX,Q that Q
b
X,Q is based on and accepts Q
b
X,Q as a
new heartbeat update. Then QbX,Q is re-broadcasted by VN .
(iii) VN does not know DX,Q that Q
b
X,Q is based on. Then the acceptance-processing of
QbX,Q is postponed by VN for at most I
h, QbX,Q is cached for possible later processing for
the duration of Ih, and a request is broadcasted to all neighboring nodes of VN demanding
for a description that allows VN to accept Q
b
X,Q. If within I
h a description DX,Q is received
by VN that is acceptable and yet unknown by VN then VN accepts DX,Q and searches its
cached heartbeats for one that can be accepted based on DX,Q. If this is the case then VN
continues as described for case (ii).
As a consequence of this mechanism, and given that the transmission delay of up links
and the responsiveness of correct nodes for processing received updates and responding
to requests is much smaller than I, then QbX,Q and DX,Q will be received, accepted, and
re-broadcasted by all correct neighboring VN nodes of the originating node VX to which a
link exists during I. And they will be further propagated to all correct neighboring nodes
of VN which, if behaving correct, will further propagate these till they are accepted by all
nodes VY to which a consecutive path P
c
X,Y of VX -correct nodes exists that is up during
the entire interval I. 
Theorem 3 SEMTOR guarantees route-safety: Routes discovered by SEMTOR in the
presence of non-trusted adversaries (implying that trusted adversaries do not exist) are
loop free and adversary free.
Proof: Any destination node VT broadcasts a new and signed routing update message
UT,QbT ,T
= {QbT ,MT,T } with each new heartbeat update QbT and with MT,T = MˆT .
Any route RT,S,QbT
to destination VT , propagated via routing update messages UT,QbT ,N
=
{QbT ,MT,N}, and broadcasted by node VN (VN may be equal with VT ) is only accepted by
a correct receiving node VS if all of the following conditions are satisfied.
(i) The current description DN,QdN
of VN is known and accepted (from proof of Lemma 1).
(ii) The transmission signature that covers UT,QbT ,N
proves the authenticity and integrity
of the update as having been created and broadcasted by VN (note also Assumptions 1
and 2 and related mechanism details described in Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.2).
(iii) A description DT,QdT
is known that allows to accept QbT from UT,QbT ,N
as a valid
heartbeat update from VT (from proof of Lemma 2)
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(iv) QbT is either new or Q
b
T is equal to the newest heartbeat update from VT and MT,N
from UT,QbT ,N
is the greatest path-metric value ever accepted (via any neighbor) for VT .
QbT .
(v) MT,N from UT,QbT ,N
is greater than zero.
(vi) VN is listed as a trusted node in VtT from DT,QdN .
Only if a routing-update messages received by correct node VS is accepted as valid then VS
configures a forwarding route to VT via VN and propagates the route further by creating and
broadcasting a new and VS-signed update as: UT,QbT ,S
= {QbT ,MT,S} with MT,S < MT,N .
Condition (vi) is only true if VN ∈ VtT , which, given that VtT ⊆ VcT , implies that VN ∈ VcT .
Therefore routes are only accepted and configured if propagated along correct, therefore
adversary free, paths.
Condition (iv) is only true if the contained heartbeat and/or path-metric value represents
an update that is newer or better than any previously received updates by the processing
node. Therefore neither the processing node, nor any other correctly processing node,
could yet be part of a route established by any updates with the same heartbeat sequence.
Therefore all accepted routes are loop free. 
Theorem 4 SEMTOR guarantees route-liveness: Routes discovered by SEMTOR, in the
presence of non-trusted adversaries (implying that trusted adversaries do not exist) and at
least one correct and trusted path, are fresh.
Proof: The proof of route-liveness is provided by an equivalent reasoning as given for
Theorem 2.
As a consequence of the routing-update propagation mechanism from the proof of Theorem
3, and given that the transmission delay of up links and the responsiveness of correct nodes
for processing received updates and responding to requests is much smaller than I, then
any routing update UT originated by VT will be received, accepted, and further propagated
by all correct neighboring VN nodes of VT to which a link exists during I. And they will
be further propagated to all correct neighboring nodes of VN which, if behaving correct,
will further propagate these till they are accepted by all nodes VS to which a consecutive
path P c,tT,S of VT -correct and trusted nodes exists that is up during the entire interval I. 
4.7 Experimental Validation
4.7.1 Implementation and Validation Framework
In this section the key security and performance achievements of the SEMTOR protocol are
validated experimentally. First the proposed protocol mechanisms have been implemented
and then this implementation has been observed when exposed to key attack scenarios and
challenging network environments.
For the implementation, the message structure and handling of the BMX6 [38] routing-
protocol has been extended as it already provides functional support for node-descriptive
profiles, SHA hashes as referencing identifier, and a “hash-based profile-propagation
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Table 4.3: Protocol implementation details
Topic Details and used default
Protocol Source code BMX7 branch, git revision ee2f1d86
Crypto Library MbedTLS version 2.4.0
Node-identity and description referenciation SHA224 (RFC4634) hashes
Primary key foundation RSA2048 (RFC8017)
Asymmetric txKey foundation RSA896 (RFC8017)
Symmetric txKey foundation 112-bit truncated SHA224-MAC based on DHM2048
(RFC3526) negotiated shared key
Description-update interval 36000 s
Heartbeat authentication 112-bit truncated, SHA224-based, anchored hash
chain
Routing updates interval 6 s
Link-probing interval 0.8 s
Aggregation (TX) interval 0.8 s
mechanism” to disseminate node descriptions. For cryptographic operations such as hashing,
asymmetric-key generation, signing, and verification the MbedTLS [198] (former PolarSSL
[199]) library has been used. Our SEMTOR implementation currently provides RSA512 to
RSA4096 public-key authentication for node and description verification, SHA224-based
hashes for node-, description-, and routing-update referenciations (the latter based on
anchored-hash chains), and Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange for Message Authentication
Codes (MAC) based neighbor verification. The complete source code is publicly available
via the BMX7/SEMTOR git-repository branch at [38] and [200]. Protocol implementation
details are summarized in Table 4.3.
The scenarios to which our SEMTOR-enabled BMX6 implementation got exposed was
realized with an emulated network consisting of Linux nodes and using MLC [39], a suite of
LXC3-based scripts, that allow to visualize hundreds of Debian systems inside a single host
and to configure virtual topologies, essentially by linking virtual or real nodes’ interfaces
via a virtual bridge and using ebtables4 and tc5 to control packet loss and delay between
nodes on layer two.
The host system was an Intel i5-3230M CPU @2.60GHz with 4 CPU cores and 8GB RAM,
allowing to run more than 200 virtual systems and protocol instances in parallel.
Further emulation parameters and ranges used for the functionality validation in Section
4.7.2 and the performance measurements following in Section 4.7.3 are given in Table
4.4. The selected probing ranges comprise network sizes and densities that are typical for
deployments in clouds and core-graph zones of real community networks [2, 23, 24].
4.7.2 Validation of Functionality
To validate our design and implementation (regarding the ownership, security, openness,
and decentralization objectives as outlined in Section 4.3.1), a number of representative
network attacks have been set up and analyzed respectively.
3Linux Containers http://lxc.sourceforge.net/
4Linux ebtables, http://ebtables.sourceforge.net
5Linux traffic control: tc, http://tldp.org/HOWTO/Traffic-Control-HOWTO/
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Table 4.4: Emulation defaults and ranges
Parameter Default [range] Figures
Host hardware Intel i5-3230M @2.60GHz, 4 cores, 8 GB
RAM
Host system Linux, Debian
Emulation system MLC git rev. d63f726c
Network virtualization ebtables, qdisc, brctl
Emulated systems Linux, Debian
Measurement tools tcpdump, tshark, top, ping, iperf
Network structure (topology) Grid 10x10 [10x2..20] 4.13
Link loss 0% loss [0%,30%,50%] 4.9,4.10-4.12
Node interfaces 1
Network size (# of nodes) 100 [10..200] 4.14a,4.15a
Density (# of links per node) 4 [4..20] 4.14b,4.15b
Primary key strength RSA2048 [512..4096] 4.14d,4.15d
TxKey method RSA896 vs. DHM2048 4.14, 4.15
TxKey strength RSA512..1536, DHM1024..3072 4.14c, 4.15c
Others description-update interval 36000 s [100..2 s] 4.14e,4.15e
Own description-update interval 36000 s [10..2 s] 4.14f,4.15f
Therefore, Section 4.7.2.1 first details the implementation of different attack vectors and
Section 4.7.2.2 then evaluates their impact on a node that naively (and falsely) trusts in
the correct behavior of all nodes (including existing malicious and attacking nodes) which
corresponds with constellation b) from Table 4.2.
Section 4.7.2.3 then validates our SEMTOR implementation and quantifies its performance
to recover, given that attacking nodes have been correctly identified (as given by constel-
lation d) from Table 4.2), from the most powerful combination of previously introduced
attacks. Eventually, Section 4.7.2.4 uses obtained measurements to illustrate further the
protocol contributions regarding openness, decentralization, and cooperativeness.
4.7.2.1 Attack Vectors
In order to experimentally validate the resistance of the SEMTOR protocol when exposed
to attacks, an implementation is needed that supports the execution of a corresponding
attack. In this section we describe and validate the implemented attacks by observing their
impact on a node that is reachable via paths consisting of correct and adverse nodes and
that considers all, thus also the attacking node(s), as trusted. That corresponds to the
most adverse topology constellation b) from Section 4.6.2.
For the below detailed attacks, an attacking node behaves, with particular exceptions, just
as a correct (non-attacking) node and only the deviations from the correct behavior are de-
scribed (all not-explicitly mentioned mechanisms behave correct). Functions implementing
these attack-specific deviation from the correct behavior are provided via a so called “evil”
plugin, extending the default protocol implementation with malicious capabilities. The
plugin allow to (i) define a set of attacked nodes based on a list of node IDs and (ii) define
the combination of attacks performed on these nodes.
We have considered attacks to manipulate or selectively suppress routing information about
the identity and description of the nodes, the routing updates, and route announcements.
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An Identity Hijacking Attack (IHA) would be given by any successful attempt to
propagate a manufactured or modified description of an attacked node, for example by
replacing the trust set or transmission key of the attacked nodes original description.
One variance of such description manufacturing has been implemented by transmitting
descriptions of attacked node IDs with an incremented description SQN.
Test confirmed that this-way (or any way) manipulated descriptions are discarded immedi-
ately upon reception by any correctly behaving node because of the description signature
mismatch with the node IDs public key (remember that a node ID is defined as the SHA
hash of its public key). To successfully execute this attack, an adversary would need to
manufacture also a matching signature which is possible only by knowing the node IDs
private key. Therefore the IHA attack would fail as long as node ID private keys are not
revealed.
A Route (or primary IP) Hijacking Attack (RHA) is implemented by letting an
attacking node announce the primary (CGA) IP addresses of the attacked nodes via its
own description and propagating this and this description referencing routing updates to
the network via its neighboring nodes.
Test confirmed that this-way composed descriptions and this description referencing routing
updates are discarded immediately upon reception by any correctly behaving node because
the contained CGA announcements do not match with the descriptions’ node ID.
A Heartbeat (or routing-update) Manufacturing Attack (HMA) is implemented
by transmitting all internally scheduled routing update messages, that reference the
description of an attacked node ID, with a hash-chain value replaced with random bits.
Test confirmed that this-way manipulated and received routing-update messages are not
further processed nor propagated because the contained hash-chain value does not match
with the hash-chain anchor of any known description.
A Description Dropping Attack (DDA) is achieved by discarding all internally sched-
uled description transmissions that contain a node ID matching any of the attacked node
IDs.
A Routing-Update Dropping Attack (UDA) is achieved by discarding all internally
scheduled routing message transmissions that reference the description of an attacked node
ID.
A Route Dropping Attack (RDA) is achieved by configuring a route towards the
primary (CGA) address of each attacked node, instead of via the next hop of its collectively
established path, but into a virtual “/dev/null” interface that drops all IP packet routed
into it.
A Routing-Update Metric Manipulation Attack (MMA) is achieved by transmit-
ting all internally scheduled routing update messages, that reference the description of an
attacked node ID, with a metric value modified to the maximum.
From above attacks, three categories can be identified: (i) Those that the SEMTOR
protocol always secures against. The first three (IHA, HMA, RHA) of above attacks are of
this kind. No further exploration on this kind of attack is needed, as prevented by design.
(ii) Attacks that can be considered relatively harmless because the behavior of the attacker
is similar to the case where the attacker does not exist: The DDA and UDA attacks are of
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this kind. However, it should be noted that the combination of the DDA attack with the
RDA or MMA attack does make a difference that can be lucrative from the point of the
attacker because not supporting the propagation of an attacked nodes’ description updates
may certainly increase the latency with which these are eventually received by all other
nodes. Especially if such late received update then has the attacking node removed from
its previous trust set. (iii) Attacks that the protocol only secures against if performed by
non-trusted nodes. These are given by the latter RDA and MMA attacks which are analyzed
(in combination with the DDA) in more detail in the following Sections. To neutralize
these attacks it is needed to identify the incorrect nodes and mark them as non-trusted.
This identification could be achieved either by improving the assessment of trustability
on a social layer among CN members or it could be automated with a monitoring and
distributed detection protocol. For the analysis of the re-coverage performance of the
SEMTOR protocol in Section 4.7.2.3 we take the availability of eventually correctly assessed
trustability as given and focus on the performance of the protocol to enforce such updated
assessments.
4.7.2.2 Network Attack Scenarios
In order to further explore the power of these attacks we first assume a network scenario
without non-trusted nodes (thus, all nodes are trusted, whether correct or not) and
therefore also without counter-measures. A base network scenario has been designed as
outlined in Figure 4.5 that allows to place one or more adversaries (intermediate B-nodes)
on differently “good” strategical positions for attacking the routing process between an
attacked destination node DA and a given source node S. As an example, by activating, in
addition to the permanent links (illustrated as solid lines), the optional SB4 link between
node S and B4, any communication between nodes S and DA would fully rely on the only
possible end-to-end path S − B4− B3− B2−DA, allowing any intermediate node B2,
B3, or B4 to easily disrupt this communication, simply by dropping any packet sent via
them to DA. However, if in addition, also the optional SA2 link is activated, then an
alternative end-to-end path from S, via A2 to DA emerges which is also shorter than the
previous path. In this case, the position of node B3 is less advantageous for attacking the
communication between S and DA and additional attack measures would be needed to
“convince node S to send packets to DA via the longer S −B4−B3−B2−DA path.
Further measurements are executed as follows. At time T0, all nodes start bootstrapping
a previously configured network topology and establishing end-to-end paths to all other
nodes which takes less than 40 seconds to complete. At a randomly selected time Tx
between 50 and 55 seconds, node S starts sending ICMPv6 packets with an interval of
10ms to both destination nodes in parallel. At the same time all intermediate B- nodes
start performing DDA&RDA-combined attacks on destination node DA.
The graphs in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illustrate the impact of applied attacks in terms of
success and latency as the duration (averaged over 5 measurement probes) between the
attack activation at Tx and its successful completion. The completion is measured from
two perspectives. The path collapse time represents the duration between Tx and the last
successfully delivered packet to the corresponding destination node. If none of the packets
sent by node S since Tx ever got delivered, then this duration is assumed as zero, meaning
that the attack succeeds immediately. If on the other hand, since Tx, packets continued
to be delivered for more than 40 seconds, then this attack is considered as failed, the
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evaluated collapse time is counted as infinite, and no result is printed. The path entrapment
time represents the duration between Tx and the first packet forwarded to any of the
intermediate attacking nodes (which, due to their configuration, drop the packets instead
of further forwarding them). If for more than 40 seconds since Tx no packets towards an
attacked destination node could be received by any of the attacking intermediate nodes,
then also this duration is counted as infinite and no result is printed.
The DA path collapse time and DA path entrapment time lines in Figure 4.6 show,
depending on the length of the attacking B path, the impact of a data-packet dropping
attack (performed by all intermediate B-path nodes) on packets sent (by S) to destination
node DA. The length of the alternative A-path between S and DA was configured to 3,
6, or 9 hops respectively for Figure 4.6a, 4.6b, or 4.6c. From the results it can be seen
that this attack is only possible from nodes that constitute the shortest path between a
given source and an attacked destination node. If the attack is possible, then it succeeds
immediately. However, whenever an existing non-attacked path is shorter (or in general
better) than the attacking path, such as in 4.6a for a B-path length of 3 or more hops, in
4.6b for a B-path length of 6 or more hops, or in 4.6c for a B-path length of 9 hops, then
at least one of 5 observed attacks failed.
As a double check, also the DB path collapse time and DB path entrapment time were
measured to show the impact of all intermediate A nodes attacking the routing towards
destination node DB (from the same source node S) with vice verse results. For the sake
of brevity these measurements are not shown here.
In summary, for DDA&RDA attacks, it can be seen that the most vulnerable scenario
for the attacked destination nodes is given if the attacking nodes are in the advantageous
position of a shorter or better path.
A different impact can be seen if an attacking nodes combines the DDA&RDA with the
MMA attack as illustrated in Figure 4.7. For these measurements only a singe B node
attacked the packet delivery to DA. For Figure 4.7a, the network scenario is, apart
from the singe attacking B node, equal to that of Figure 4.6c. It can be seen that the
combined attack on DA also succeeds with a 9-hops B-path that has the same length
as the non-attacking A-path. This is because the attacking node, that manipulates the
distance-vector metric of DAs routing updates to the best possible value so that other
nodes receiving these updates get the perception that the path to DA via the attacking
node has a better path metric than it actually has. This effect proves even more drastic in
the scenarios used for Figures 4.7b and 4.7c. In the former DA is successfully attacked
by B8 for a B-path length between 5 and 9 hops. It should be noted that B8, in case
of B-path length of 5 to 7 hops, is not on any reasonable path between S and DA. In
the case of the 5-hops B-path it is actually 3 hops apart from the shortest path given by
S-B5-B4-B3-B2-DA (that consisting only of correct behaving nodes) and still succeeds in
redirecting routes towards itself. That is because B5, which resides on the shortest path,
is closer to the MMA-attacking node B8 than to the destination node DA and affected by
the promising updates manipulated by B8. The same effect causes the successful attacks
shown in Figure 4.7c where the actual shortest path is given by the varied A-path length
while the B-path, where the attacking B8 node resides, has been fixed to 9 hops. Still B
succeeds to attack DA even from a path that is up to 6 hops longer than the alternative
A-path.
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Figure 4.5: Base-network topology for validating attack vectors
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Figure 4.6: Performance of route (and packet) dropping attack (RDA) performed by B
nodes on DA node depending on A and B-path length
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Figure 4.7: Performance of DDA&RDA&MMA-combined attack on DA node depending
on A or B path length and adversary position
4.7.2.3 Functionality and Performance (of Eventual Consistency)
In this section we evaluate our SEMTOR implementation regarding its performance to
recover, given that attacking nodes have been identified, from the most critical combination
of previously introduced attacks by applying corrected trust sets that exclude all adverse
nodes6.
This attack combination is given if the adverse node(s) are placed in the advantageous
position of a shorter path towards the attacked destination node, are as close as possible
to the source node, and perform an DDA&RDA&MMA-combined attack. Such scenario is
given for the transmission from S to DA when attacked from B2 in the topology illustrated
in Figure 4.8. The topology extends that of Figure 4.5 with a third group and (optional)
path of neutral (correct) C nodes which, in it its default configuration, corresponds (apart
from the new C-nodes) with the scenario used for Figure 4.7a.
6Recovery performance could also be interpreted as the duration it takes to effectively exclude a set of
identified adversaries from the routing towards a given destination node.
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First, we deviate from this default configuration by varying the path length of correct and
non-correct (attacking) A and B nodes. Later, the effect of an enabled neutral path length,
as given by the intermediate C nodes, is discussed in more detail in Section 4.7.2.4. In order
to capture the recovery and convergence performance of our implementation at the presence
of lossy and fading links, which must be expected for any realistic WMN deployment, we
also vary the broadcast packet loss of configured links between 0% (corresponding to perfect
links) and up to 60%, using the Linux traffic control command mentioned earlier. However,
the artificial loss is only applied to broadcast transmissions which the SEMTOR protocol
uses for all its protocol data. All unicast transmission along all configured links are kept
as loss free. This allows us to trace the routing decisions of the protocol by capturing the
path of forwarded unicast packets such as the ICMPv6 ping request and reply packets used
for probing end-to-end packet delivery between a given source-destination pair.
All B nodes perform DDA&RDA&MMA-combined attacks to disrupt packet delivery to
DA. In parallel, all A nodes perform the same combination of attacks to disrupt packet
delivery to DB. C nodes perform no attacks, are not attacked by any other node. C-nodes
trust all other nodes but are not trusted by any A or B nodes. The S node is used as
source node that sends packets to the destination nodes DA, DB, and DC in parallel with
the same parametrization as given in Section 4.7.2.1 and 4.7.2.2.
We measure path entrapment in the same way as performed for Figures 4.6 and 4.7. However,
once all attacked destination routes are entrapped we keep on running the emulation, wait
a random period between 40-60 seconds to let protocol instances adapt to the given
configuration, and then update the trust sets of DA and DB so that DA does not trust
B nodes anymore (e.g. V tDA = {VDA, VA2, VA3, VA4, VA5, VA6, VA7, VA8, VA9}) and DB does
not trust A nodes anymore (e.g. V tDB = {VDB, VB2, VB3, VB4, VB5, VB6, VB7, VB8, VB9}).
Note that neither DA nor DB needs to trust S because for this scenario S is not needed
to relay packets from S to DA or DB (S creates and sends packets but does not relay
them). Also note that the trust set V tS of S is irrelevant for the delivery of packets sent
by S. Such trust update actually reflects a constellation switch from Table 4.2 from b)
to d). We then measure the elapsed time from the moment of the updated trust sets till
the last packet from S to DA was routed via any B node and till the last packet from S
to DB was routed via any A node. Therefore, tcpdump captures from the master switch,
that covers all existing links, were searched for respective packets from S to DA, DB, and
DC that contained a MAC address from the deprecated path. In the following Figures the
average of these measures are represented as path avoidance latency. We also measure the
elapsed time from the moment of the updated trust sets till the first packet reach their
intended destination which we represented as path recovery latency.
For the measurements shown in Figure 4.9 the following attacks and links have been
configured. From all optional SA links only the SA9 link is activated which enables a
9-hops A-path between source node S and the destination nodes DA, DB, and DC. From
all optional SB links only the SB2 link is activated which enables an alternative 2-hops
B-path between S and DA, DB, and DC. None of the optional SC links is activated so
that no third alternative C-path exists.
Figure 4.9 indicates a clearly increasing entrapment latency for the S-DB route which is
plausible given that routing updates from DB need to traverse several hops with increasing
packet loss before an MMA-modified update by any A-path node could delude S to perceive
the 9-hops A-path as shorter than the 2-hops B-path. The Figure also shows that the
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S −DA route is entrapped from the beginning, simply because the shortest path already
traversed B nodes even before these started to attack the S −DA routing.
The recovery and avoidance latencies of the S − DA and S − DB routes increase with
increased protocol-data loss. The avoidance of a deprecated path is achieved faster than
the convergence to the new trusted path. In the case of the S −DA route the average
recovery increases to up to 40 seconds which is acceptable given that routing updates along
the only trusted A-path need to propagate along 9 links, each of it having a remaining
success rate for propagating broadcasted protocol messages of only 40%.
Figure 4.8: Network topology for measuring path-recovery performance
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Figure 4.9: Path recovery latencies depending on average link loss
4.7.2.4 Openness, Decentrality, and Cooperativeness
In the following, the attainment of further protocol objectives and desired properties shall
be illustrated with the measurements given in Figures 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12. The Figures
represent the effect of path-length variations based on the topology of Figure 4.8 that
extend the default scenario used for Figure 4.9 by enabling a third path of neutral C nodes.
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Table 4.5: HW and OS characteristics of used target device
Characteristic Details
Type / CPU TP-Link TL-WR703N, Atheros AR7240@400 MHz
Wireless AR9331, 802.11bgn 150 Mbps @100 mW
Flash / Memory 4 MB / 32 MB
Ports 100 MBit Ethernet, USB 2.0
Power supply 5 V, 100 mA, 0.5 W
Cost approx 10 Euro (2013)
OS and distro Linux OpenWrt/Lede (lede-17.01)
Further reading http://wiki.openwrt.org/toh/tp-link/tl-wr703n
However, as a reference, the grey vertical bar in each Figure indicate measurements that
can also be found in Figure 4.9.
Autonomy and decentrality, so to not relying on any central entity, was demonstrated
indirectly via all performed experiments since none of the security enhancements provided
by the gained capability for recovering functioning end-to-end routes required the existence
of any central authority or entity to rely on and are all based exclusively on the individual
and autonomous definition of trused nodes of each destination node.
Support for openness, neutrality, and cooperativeness, in a sense that unknown nodes
could join an existing network infrastructure and be neutrally supported without prior
conditions, could be well observed in Figures 4.10a and 4.10b where the reachability of the
DC node from S is always provided despite none of the C-nodes is ever trusted by any A
or B nodes and an alternative S-DC path of intermediate C-nodes does not exist in any
of the captured scenarios.
Our experiments also demonstrate how nodes benefit from the existence of paths given
by unknown (so non-trusted) but correctly behaving nodes as can be seen from the
measurements shown in Figures 4.10c, 4.11c, and 4.12c. Here, the existence of an alternative,
although non-trusted C path between S and DA, clearly reduces the avoidance latency with
which the non-trusted and DA attacking B-path nodes could be rendered as deprecated.
This effect is especially shown in the presence of lossy links and short C-path length where
the correctly behaving C nodes can contribute to a significantly faster propagation of DAs’
description (and conained updated trust) set to S.
4.7.3 Validation of Resource Consumption and Scalability
To evaluate our design and implementation with respect to its performance implications
and our scalability objectives outlined in Section 4.3.1, the effect of network and protocol
parameters on total protocol overhead and performance has been measured by benchmark-
ing our implementation on a cheap embedded device with hardware characteristics as
summarized in Table 4.5 and that can be considered the bottom end of devices typically
used within community networks [2, 23]. This device, running the Lede OS (an OpenWrt
[32] based Linux system) and a cross-compiled version of our implementation, has been
connected as a core node via Ethernet to the virtual network environment explained above.
Figure 4.13 illustrates the setup.
The overhead has been measured in terms of CPU usage (relative to the totally available
of the node), absolute virtual memory usage (both using the Linux top command) and
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Figure 4.10: Path recovery performance depending on different physical path-lengths at
0% link loss
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Figure 4.11: Path recovery performance depending on different physical path-lengths at
30% link loss
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Figure 4.12: Path recovery performance depending on different physical path-lengths at
50% link loss
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Figure 4.13: Experimentation setup consisting of benchmarked embedded router and
MLC-emulated network environment
sent protocol-data (using tcpdump). Graphs in Figure 4.14,4.15 represent the results of
these measurements averaged over 30 seconds. To save space and ease comparability, CPU,
memory, and protocol-traffic overhead are represented in a single Figure for each analyzed
input parameter. Sent (TX) Protocol-data is given per node and distinguish between sent
data as Kbit/sec and sent packets per second. All measurements represent the resources
consumed by the overall implementation and not just the extra overhead added over the
BMX6 implementation that was used as a basis for integrating the SEMTOR mechanisms.
The impact of a node updating its description at higher (non-default) rates is illustrated in
Figure 4.14e,4.15e . The measurements show that protocol-data overhead and CPU usage
are indeed significantly affected by such bootstrapping events and that update intervals
occurring at rates higher than twice per second have the potential to seriously harm
the stability of the protocol; a finding that we’ll get back to later. To avoid capturing
massively parallel bootstrapping phases, an unlikely scenario for real nodes under distributed
administration, further measurements have been delayed for a stabilization period of 120
seconds after each protocol-configuration change.
From Figures 4.14a,4.15a it can be seen that network size7 roughly linearly affects CPU,
memory, and traffic usage per node; but CPU raises slower than the others. This could be
explained by the fact that the most CPU-intensive operation, being the continuous and
asymmetric signing and verification of hello and routing update messages, is performed on a
per-packet basis (and not on a message basis) and that almost no additional transmissions
(packets) are needed to convey the increasing amount of protocol-data.
As can be seen from Figure 4.14b,4.15b , CPU and traffic overhead heavily depends on the
number of links to which the test node is exposed while no additional memory requirements
were observed for maintaining an increasing amount of links. This could be explained with
the relatively small related memory requirements for maintaining these links compared
to the allocations needed for maintaining node descriptions and thereby referenced data
which must be tracked anyway, also for non-neighboring nodes.
7Trust sets described per node were kept constant despite the varied number of participating nodes.
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Figure 4.14: Overhead using RSA-packet signatures depending on network and protocol
characteristics
The impact of RSA transmit-signatures is illustrated in Figure 4.14c. The results confirm
the expectation that stronger keys lead to linearly increasing protocol-data overhead and
exponentially increasing CPU load. However, it is interesting to note that using RSA key
strength such as RSA1024, which can be considered secure against factorization attacks
by today and thus sufficient for the supposedly short lifetime of only few hours in our
approach, for continuous signing and verification is well feasible and requires only about
8% of the target device CPU resources.
In parallel to the capturing of CPU and traffic overhead imposed by the variation of
input parameters the following additional system characteristics were observed with the
objective to continously validate the correct operation of the target device itself as well as
the emulation environment provided by the host (desktop) machine:
The routing performance in terms of throughput (TP) for forwarding user-data traffic,
along SEMTOR-configured routes, in and out of the target device was measured by doing
a TCP TP test (using iperf) between the A1 LXC node, the first node from the left in the
top (A) row in Figure 4.13, to the A4 LXC node (the fourth in the same row). Since in
all topological setups the target device was always linked to at least the nodes A1,A2,A3,
and A4 (the first four top left nodes), the best (shortest) path between A1 and A4 always
had to consist only of the target device as the only intermediate hop. To ensure that only
correctly (along this best path) routed TCP traffic is considered, all TCP traffic between
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Figure 4.15: Overhead using DHM-packet signatures depending on network and protocol
characteristics
A1 and A4, that was not routed back and forth via the target device, got dropped using
iptables.
The CPU load (in percent) relative to the total available processing capacity of the 4-core
host machine (that emulated up to 200 nodes) was captured (again using top command)
and represented as HostCPU. During all measurements all four host CPUs were fixed to
their maximum frequency of 2.6GHz.
The fill rate (in 10 percent) of the TX-queue in the target device that is used by our imple-
mentation to throttle (via increased aggregation of scheduled messages) the transmission
of protocol-data packets was captured as TXQueue.
The measurements confirm that (i) user traffic is continuously routed via the correct path
and (ii) in most cases at the maximum speed the 100MBit ethernet HW is capable to
process. However, a clear relation can be seen between the host CPU load and the TP
which degrades when host CPU load exceeds 50% (e.g. Figures 4.14a, 4.14e, 4.15a, 4.15e)
while it appears uncorrelated with CPU or protocol-traffic increase of the target device
(e.g. Figures 4.14b, 4.14c, 4.14f, 4.15b, 4.15f). The sharp increase of the TX-queue fill rate
in Figures 4.14e and 4.15e explains why the increase of the protocol-data overhead declines
(in the same Figures). Once the fill rate reaches its maximum, scheduled messages are
delayed for later aggregation, leading less totally transmitted packets. In summary, none
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of the observed deviations was considered critical enough to justify an invalidation of the
obtained results.
4.8 Open Issues and Adjacent Solutions
In the following, routing-security aspects are discussed in the context of the objectives
defined for this work and grouped into (i) those out of the scope or not considered an
attack (although worth discussing), (ii) those addressed and explicitly handled, and (iii)
those remaining a potential threat.
Confidentiality attacks via eavesdropping of disseminated protocols data fall into the
first category. Such data includes topology, trust, identity, and if published, personal
information. Particularly, the disclosure of trust sets has raised concerns8 as its transparent
dissemination allows others to deduce trust relations between the users of a community
network and exploit this knowledge for attacking individuals or groups of them in higher
layers (e.g. social layer). However, it should be noted that the provision of personal
information via node descriptions or other parallel infrastructure services is left to the
preferences of each node admin and could be omitted (thus revealing only trust relations
between anonymous cryptographic identities) at the cost of complicating the task for
identifying the nodes considered as trustworthy.
Malign attacks also fall into this category, being the case where a malicious node aims to
influence the reputation of another node by incorrectly reporting on its negative behavior.
SEMTOR does not facilitate such attacks simply because no functionality exist for detecting
nor reporting behavior (good or bad) of other nodes.
This also means that selfish, non-cooperative, and unfair behavior is not considered
by the protocol and (as yet) left to be solved independently. Here, approaches based on
reputation such as [151, 152] or observed traffic validation [170] and distributed detection
[174] mechanisms could be employed for detecting (groups of) faulty nodes and add them
to the list of non-trusted nodes.
However, it should be noted that with the support for verifiable and dynamically-updatable
node descriptions, self bootstrapping public-key infrastructure, and individually-definable
trust topology, powerful tools are provided, that can be used for arguing on the trustability
of nodes and enforcing individual decisions without requiring consensus among network
participants.
Several Data-plane attacks, compromising confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, non-
replication, and non-repudiation of user data are also considered as out of scope. Various
existing and well established end-to-end security solution should be used instead such as
TLS-based protocols like HTTPS, VPN solutions like OpenVPN or tinc, and anonymization
and privacy protocols like TOR. In fact, the security aspects covered by our protocol,
operating on layer 3, complement these higher-layer solutions as these build on the
availability of a functioning (although best effort based) routing and data-forwarding
service in the first place, partially for creating encrypted overlay networks on top of it.
What these higher-layer security protocols typically require are identity- and ownership-
8E.g. during discussions and presentations of our approach at community events such as the International
Summit for Community Wireless Networks 2013 and the Wireless Battle Mesh in Germany 2014 and
Slovenia 2015.
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proven addresses and the availability of a functioning end-to-end packet delivery along
trusted paths established between nodes owning these addresses. Related guarantees should
be provided by the control plane which can be attacked by disturbing the propagation of
node and topology information or the forwarding of data packets. Attacks on this plane from
non-trusted nodes are falling into the second category and preventing related attacks [56]
(such as blackhole, partition, detour, routing-table poisoning, impersonation via replication,
dropping, modification, or fabrication of protocol messages) is what the main contribution
of this work is about. This is essentially achieved by excluding all non-trusted nodes from
related attack-susceptible tasks such as route-discovery, establishment, and forwarding. The
key enabler for this approach are the strictly non-overlapping receiver-driven responsibility
for these “trusted tasks”, the usage of a permanent strong asymmetric key pair (used for
authenticating node identity, cryptographically generated addresses ensuring conflict-free
IPv6 addresses and route ownership, trusted nodes, and secondary-key replacements) and
a secondary lightweight key pair of which security relies on its short lifetime and frequent
replacement (used for frequent tasks of verifying communication between neighboring nodes
and to identify and discard data from non-trusted nodes).
Wormhole and Denial of Service (Dos) attacks are falling into the third category
that remain unsolved with yet defined mechanisms. While several approaches, such as
TIK [187] using packet leashes, or NPA [188] observing standard deviation of round trip
times exist to defend against wormhole attacks, the threat of DoS attacks on the security
of mesh routing protocols has received much less attention.
The susceptibility to DoS attacks is actually a pillar stemming from the open and decen-
tralization objectives pursued with our approach that provides no means for excluding
malicious or selfish nodes from exploiting or exhausting other nodes resources. For example,
an adversary can fake and propagate large numbers of physically non-existing virtual node
IDs with frequently updated node descriptions that can hardly be distinguished from real
nodes but whose processing may easily exceed existing memory and CPU resources in real
nodes. The consequences of such attack could already be seen from the measurements
performed in Section 4.7.3 showing overhead depending on the number of nodes or de-
scription update frequency. To defend against such kind of attacks, without sacrificing
the decentralization and open preambles defined for this work, nodes may prioritize the
processing of certain known nodes and throttle the support of unknown, an approach we
plan to research further in future work.
The design in Section 4.5 and experimental validation in Section 4.7 shows that: It can
safely separate trusted nodes from the influence from non-trusted nodes. As illustrated
in Figure 4.4, when incorrect nodes are detected by any means, if these nodes are not
considered as trusted anymore and tagged as non-trusted, SEMTOR can render detected
incorrect nodes as harmless to the network.
In summary, with respect to the design objectives in Section 4.3.1, SEMTOR can effectively
ensure the ownership of data traffic, forwarding routes, and node identities, so that they can
be attributed to exactly one node (ownership in objective 1); the ability to communicate by
a contiguous group of trusting nodes, never prevented by an external (security as autonomy
and robustness in objective 2); following an open and decentralized model where each
node admin decides on the nodes to rely on (openness and decentralization in objective
3); in a scalable manner (scalability in objective 4). Regarding the liveness properties,
responsiveness is satisfied by the proactiveness of the protocol and the progress as soon as
correct messages with correct information are delivered. Data delivery is satisfied according
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to the conditions in the above paragraph: across trusted nodes that are expected to be
trustworthy (correct). The freshness and accuracy of update and route information comes
by design of the information ownership and security mechanisms, and efficiency of the
protocol has been analyzed in detail in Section 4.7.3.
Regarding the safety properties, the consistency and loop-freedom are provided by the
baseline routing algorithm, that ensures route-safety combined with the security and
trust mechanisms for node and path information (update-safety). Adversary-freedom and
adversary-resilience come from the separation between trusted and non-trusted nodes,
particularly when trusted nodes are also trustworthy and incorrect nodes are or become
non-trusted when detected.
4.9 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we pointed to new trust and security requirements arising for open and
decentralized networks such as community networks. We described SEMTOR, a novel
routing protocol that can be used for satisfying these demands. SEMTOR allows the
verifiable and undeniable definition and distributed application of user-individual trust
topologies for routing traffic towards each node. One particular advantage of SEMTOR
is that it does not require a global consensus on the trustiness of any node. This gives
each node admin the freedom to individually define the subset (and resulting sub topology)
from the whole set of participating nodes that he considers sufficient trustworthy to meet
their security and data-delivery objectives and concerns.
Addressed security aspects have been discussed and put in context with related and or-
thogonal security solutions and how these can benefit by building on it. The proposed
mechanisms have been implemented, tested and evaluated for their correctness and per-
formance to exclude non-trusted nodes from the network. Therefore safety and liveness
properties that are guaranteed by our protocol have been identified and proven with
formal reasoning. The scalability of our implementation has been evaluated regarding
network size, density, reconfiguration dynamics, and strength of used crypto parameters.
Measurement results, obtained via benchmarking on low-end embedded hardware, show
scalability limits and parameters with significant impact on performance and overhead.
The results also show that the usage of strong asymmetric cryptography for building
trusted routing-topologies is possible; even given the scalability requirements imposed by
environment and characteristics of nowadays community-networks. In the future, we plan
to research further the impact and challenges due to the presence of large numbers of
anonymous nodes and denial of service attacks.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
Community networks, collectively created and maintained by citizens, allow for the es-
tablishment of network infrastructures that extend far beyond what could be reached
with the capabilities of the participating individuals alone. Such initiatives can enable the
affordable provisioning of intra- and inter-net services based on the cooperation among
routing processes that are distributed across the nodes of a network. In this work we have
addressed the challenging requirements for the routing in community networks, which must
provide open, decentralized, and efficient mechanisms that scale with the characteristics
of such networks while being able to respect the individual and potentially controversial
performance, service, and security demands of their participants.
Although widely applicable, we have considered the scope of routing protocols for wireless
mesh network (WMNs) deployments in community networks. By analyzing technologies
and existing deployments of CNs based on field studies and comparison with related work
from the literature we identify technological and topological properties and dynamics,
achieved performance, and shortcomings of such networks. Our contributions, stemming
from these studies, include detailed observations of network structure such as sizes and
densities and its evolution over time. We analyze the implications, efficiency, and usage of
these networks. We look at the distribution and usage of links, paths, and gateway nodes
and compare the throughput experienced by the users with the theoretical achievable path
capacities based on a conflict-graph model that considers the impact of interfering links.
The results show benefits of WMNs based on licence-free MIMO technology and mesh-
routing protocols, particular in terms of autonomy, resilience to outages, and performance,
and that routes chosen by the used BMX6 routing protocol typically conform also with
the best theoretically existing paths.
In a separate effort we evaluate the scalability, performance, and stability of the three
favorite proactive mesh-routing protocol implementations of BMX6, OLSR, and Babel. Our
results, based on emulation and testbed-based experimentation, show the relative merits,
costs, and limitations of these protocols such as the low resource footprint of Babel given
a stable and low-density network which, however, outperformed by OLSR and especially
BMX6, once network size or density increases or varies.
Our first contribution in Chapter 2, with the characterization and performance analysis
in the scope of wireless mesh networks used in community networks, and our second
contribution in Chapter 3, with the evaluation of the most widely used routing protocols
and implementations in this scope, constitute our answer to the research question RQA.
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Building upon the identified characteristics of and the requirements for CN deployments
we contribute with the development and evaluation of novel routing protocol mechanisms
that can enhance the openness, decentralization, neutrality, autonomy, and security of CNs.
This is essentially achieved by enabling the verifiable definition and distributed application
of individually trusted topologies for routing traffic with respect to the data-delivery
concerns of each traffic-owning user.
Security achievements have been analyzed regarding the correctness of specified guarantees
and the observed performance with which our open-source implementation achieves to
encounter attacks of wrongly-trusted adversaries by propagating and applying respectively-
updated trust definitions. Scalability has been analyzed with respect to network character-
istics and dynamics that are typical for existing WMN deployments, but also with respect
to new parameters such as the strength of used crypto parameters or the frequency of
reconfigured trustiness. These results also show that our approach, based on asymmetric
cryptography, is feasible, even when executed on embedded-router hardware (10 Euro,
Linux SoC) that, due to its very limited computation capabilities, can be considered the
bottom end of what is commonly used in wireless CNs. This third contribution constitutes
our answer to the research question RQB.
Together, with these contributions and answers, we can conclude that we provide a
satisfactory answer to the overall research question of how to cooperate decentralized,
efficiently and reliably on the collaborative provisioning of routing services in open and
heterogeneous community networks.
5.1 Future Directions
Based on the insights gained through the evaluation of considerable scenarios and proposed
solution for routing in open and decentralized CNs, remaining challenges (and possible
approaches) have been identified whose further elaboration and the development of effective
(counter) measures would be interesting for the future sustainability of CNs.
Our measurements identified the susceptibility to DoS attacks, where the overly exhaustion
of certain processing resources caused by an adversary node may affect the liveness
properties guaranteed by our protocol, which depend on the responsiveness of correctly
behaving nodes. For example, an adversary may fake and propagate large number of
physically non-existing virtual node IDs with frequently updated node descriptions that can
hardly be distinguished from real nodes but whose processing may exceed the memory and
CPU resources in real nodes. To defend against such kind of attacks, without sacrificing
the decentralization and open preambles defined for this work, future research can explore
how nodes can prioritize the processing of information coming from already known (as
indeed existing) nodes and throttle the support of unknown nodes.
We classified nodes as trusted versus non-trusted, and correct versus non-correct, and
achieved the establishment of adversary-free routes based on the general assumption that
incorrectly behaving nodes are not trusted. However, in cases where a correct attribution
of these properties is not easily achievable (for example based on the personal recognition
among node administrators of a CN) without discarding an overly large fraction of correct
nodes as non-trusted, distributed monitoring and detection mechanisms would be needed to
identify and continuously verify the actual behavior of nodes. Future research can explore
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the integration of existing approaches to this problem with the response mechanisms
provided by our work and further evaluate the performance of the resulting system.
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